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The research presented in this thesis is directed at the analysis of critical systems and
protocols and the improvement of their safety and security aspects respectively, by com-
bining formal and informal analysis methods. More specifically, we focus at combining
Abstract State Machines (ASMs) as a formal method, with System Theoretic Process
Analysis (STPA) as a safety analysis technique, with the aims of developing safer systems
and more secure protocols. The ASM method was chosen due to both its generality in
specifying any system at a convenient level of abstraction, and its specification which is
supported by different formal analysis activities. While the reason for choosing STPA was
its capability of eliciting safety requirements originated from inadequate control actions
which affect the whole system functions.
The first contribution of this thesis is a methodology to analyse safety-critical systems
by capturing both the formal representation of ASM and the safety requirements generated
by the STPA. This has the advantages of verifying the STPA requirements in a formal way
and giving insights to improve the ASM specification, depending on these requirements.
We illustrated this methodology by applying it to a train door controller and an insulin
pump control system case studies, showing what safety issues it highlighted.
The second contribution of the work presented in this thesis is a systematic methodology
for analysing security protocols. This methodology was intended to provide a link between
the formal simulation of external attack scenarios and protocol under analysis specified
by the ASM method, and the analysis outcomes of a proposed technique called FATI
method. The FATI (Flaws and Attack Types Identification) method is an inspired form
of STPA that applies queries on each protocol action to determine the possible protocol
flaws and their expected attack types. The identified attack types help to select the attack
scenario specifications whose simulations are likely to produce attacks. Our methodology
also minimized the number of the simulated protocol runs by reducing the number of
intruder’s messages through considering the receiver’s expectations about the message type
format and the content. Furthermore, we showed how to analyse protocols in the presence
of an algebraic property for the commutative encryption. Our methodology for analysing
security protocols was applied to several protocols. Moreover, within the security protocols
area, we clarified the ambiguous requirements for simple authentication and security layer
example depending on the ASM method.

Acknowledgements
My great full thanks to God, the Most Merciful and the Most Gracious, for giving me the
strength and patience to overcome the challenges in my work and life while conducting my
Ph.D study.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to both supervisors Dr. Alexei Lisitsa and
Dr. Clare Dixon for their ongoing support, patience, constructive criticism and encourage-
ment throughout my Ph.D. journey. Their continuous guidance and valuable comments
have made the completion of my Ph.D. possible and enjoyable. It has been a great privilege
to have worked with you both.
I would also like to extend my deepest gratitude to the Higher Committee for Education
Development in Iraq (HCED) for their generous financial support that has given me the
opportunity to complete my Ph.D. study.
I am also thankful to my advisors Prof. Sven Schewe and Prof. Boris Konev for their
advice and helpful comments.
Thanks also to all staff members and colleagues in the Department of Computer Science
at the University of Liverpool who have been helpful whenever necessary.
A special thanks go to my family: father, mother, father-in-law, mother-in-law, sisters,
brother, sister-in-law, and brothers-in-law, for their prayers, support, and encouragement.
Last but not least, my warmest thanks go to my sons and my husband who have given
me constant love during the completion of the thesis. I apologize for every moment I missed
to care about you all or to share your ups and downs. My husband, you are fabulous. I










List of Figures xiv
List of Tables xvi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Safety-Critical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research Questions and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Abstract State Machines Method 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Abstract State Machines Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Basic Abstract State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Simple Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Terminology Used in Abstract State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Ground Model and Stepwise Refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 The Abstract State Machines Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.1 The Dynamic Algebra Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2 The ASM Workbench . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.3 The ASM Gofer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
ix
2.4.4 Extensible Abstract State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.5 Abstract State Machine Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.6 The Timed ASM Language and Toolset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.7 Simulator for Real-Time ASMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.8 Core Abstract State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.9 The ASM mETAmodelling Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Why Abstract State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3 Safety and Security Analysis Techniques 46
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Software System Development Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Safety Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.2 HAZards and OPerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.3 System Theoretic Process Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Evaluation of Safety Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.5 Security Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1 Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.2 Vulnerability Identification and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.3 Requirements Analysis and Elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5.4 System Theoretic Process Analysis for Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Evaluation of Security Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Security Protocols Background 74
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3 Algebraic Properties of Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 Protocol Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.5 Protocol Attacks and Attack Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Protocol Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6.1 Needham-Schroder Public Key Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.2 Needham-Schroder Symmetric Key Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.3 Denning-Sacco Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.4 Three-Pass (TP) Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.6.5 Andrew Secure Remote Procedure Call Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6.6 Kehne Langendorfer Schoenwalder Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7 Protocol Analysis Methods and Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.7.1 BAN logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.7.2 GNY logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.7.3 Casper/FDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.7.4 SPIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.7.5 NuSMV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.7.6 ProVerif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7.7 Tamarin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.7.8 Simulation Based Attack Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5 Safe Design Development Methodology for Safety-Critical Systems 107
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.2 The Proposed Methodology for Developing Safe Design . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3 Case Study: The Train Door Controller System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3.1 Modelling the system Behavior via AsmetaL and Simulating the Re-
sultant Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3.2 Validating the AsmetaL Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3.3 Eliciting safety requirements for the system via STPA . . . . . . . . 116
5.3.4 Formalizing the Elicited STPA Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3.5 Verifying the Formulated Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.3.6 Evaluation of the TDC Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 Case Study: The Insulin Pump Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4.1 The IPCS Case Study Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4.2 Methodology Applied to IPCS Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6 Security Protocols Analysis Methodology 147
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.2 Flaws and Attack Types Identification Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.2.1 Application of the FATI Method to the AS RPC Protocol . . . . . . 152
6.2.2 Application of the FATI Method to the NSPK Protocol . . . . . . . 153
6.3 The proposed Methodology for Analysing Security Protocols . . . . . . . . 154
6.3.1 The Protocol Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3.2 The Intruder Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.3.3 The Attack Scenarios Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.3.4 The Invariant Security Properties Aspect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.4.1 Manual Analysis Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.4.2 Automatic Analysis Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
7 Clarifying Ambiguous Requirements: SASL Case Study 179
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.2 Simple Authentication and Security Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
7.3 The Formal SASL Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.3.1 The Mechanism Negotiation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.3.2 The Authentication Negotiation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.3.3 The Security Layer Negotiation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
7.4 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
7.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
7.6 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
8 Conclusion and Future Research Works 197
8.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.2 Main Findings and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
8.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Appendices 203
A The Application of Safety and Security Techniques 204
B The Corresponding Requirements for the IPCS Scenarios 210
C The Ground model for the Rest Steps of the Second Phase for SASL 213
References 219
List of Figures
2.1 The train door controller example’s signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 The main rule for Train Door Controller example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 The ClosedToOpening rule for Train Door Controller example . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 The OpeningToOpened rule for Train Door Controller example . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Control state ASMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1 The safety V representation of the development process . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 A basic control loop (adapted from [146]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 An example of MITM attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 The NSPK protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 The NSSK protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 The DS protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 The TP protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6 The AS RPC protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.7 The KSL protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.8 The Application of Idealization Process to AS RPC Protocol . . . . . . . . 94
4.9 The BAN’s revised AS RPC protocol and its attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1 The safe design development methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Part of the simulation for the TDC model with incorrect main rule . . . . . 114
5.3 Simulation of the scenario in Code 5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4 Safety control loop for automated train door controller case study from [227] 117
5.5 Failing trace of running open door action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.6 Part of the simulation for the IPCS model with incorrect rule . . . . . . . . 130
5.7 Simulation of the scenario shown in Code 5.12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.8 Safety control loop for the insulin pump control system . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.9 Failing trace for running alarm action when the available insulin is equal to
the 4 maximum single doses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.10 Failing trace for updating available insulin action when the manual dose is
greater than the available insulin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
xiii
6.1 The safe design development methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.2 Message Tree Representation Examples for the NSPK Protocol . . . . . . . 165
7.1 Client side for mechanism selection phase - ground model . . . . . . . . . . 182
7.2 Server side for mechanism selection phase - ground model . . . . . . . . . . 183
7.3 Client side for performing an initial step in the authentication negotiation
phase - ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
7.4 Server side for performing an initial step in the authentication negotiation
phase - ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.5 Client side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on
RFC 2222 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
7.6 Client side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on
three references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
7.7 Server side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on
three references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A.1 Example FTA diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
A.2 An AT example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.3 REA tree analysis for the requirement: The authentication is not guaranteed 209
C.1 Client side for performing rest steps in the authentication negotiation phase
- ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
C.2 The Challenge processing rule - ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
C.3 Server side for performing rest steps in the authentication negotiation phase
- ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
C.4 The Response processing rule - ground model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
List of Tables
2.1 The LTL operators and their corresponding function in AsmetaL . . . . . . 39
2.2 ASM languages and tool comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 HAZOP guide words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 A generic context table of providing the CAi control action . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Unsafe control actions for train door controller example (adapted from [227]) 59
3.4 Summary of safety analysis techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 VIA guide words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 Insecure control actions for single authentication protocol . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.7 Summary of security analysis techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1 Summary of protocol analysis methods and tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1 The context table for the open door action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2 The function for the IPCS and their denotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.3 The context table for the run alarm action with warning conditions . . . . . 136
6.1 The identified flaws table for the AS RPC protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 The identified flaws table for the NSPK protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.3 The possible assignments for MITM attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.4 The possible assignments for REFL attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.5 The possible assignments for INTRL attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.6 The possible assignments for DoS REPL attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.7 The possible assignments for Simple REPL attack scenario . . . . . . . . . 172
7.1 The security policies for authentication mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
7.2 The source document for each ambiguity and its formal clarified specification194
A.1 Example FMECA worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
A.2 Example HAZOP worksheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.3 Analysis of VIA for the requirement: The nonce and the initiator’s identity
must be sent to the responder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
xv
B.1 Corresponding requirements of the successful scenarios for the IPCS case
study-Part 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
B.2 Corresponding requirements of the successful scenarios for the IPCS case
study-Part 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis considers analysing safety-critical systems and security protocols by combining
the ASM method with STPA technique for critical systems, and with STPA-like technique
for protocols.
1.1 Safety-Critical Systems
An increasing number of embedded systems are applied everywhere and are designed for
specific purposes. Some of these systems are designed to operate in situations at which
failure can lead to a safety issue. These are called safety-critical systems [134], which
are considered in the context of this thesis. Safety-critical systems have a crucial contri-
bution to many sectors in human life, such as medical care, transportation, automotive,
aerospace, avionics, military, chemical applications, etc. Along with their contributions to
the prosperity of the community, different accidents yield from critical system failures, for
instance, the explosion of Chernobyl nuclear reactor as a result of flawed reactor design
coupled with human mistake led to the death of many people and thousands of cancer cases
among children afterward [241], overdoses from Therac-25 radiation therapy machine used
to treat cancer resulted in eight people died and six injured [153], when Patriot missile
defence system failed to destroy the incoming SCUD missiles from Iraqi army during the
second Gulf war, due to imprecise arithmetic calculations, twenty-eight American soldiers
were killed and ninety-eight were injured [210], and the crash of Ethiopian and Indonesian
Boeing 737 MAX 8 planes caused by errors in position sensors leading to 346 people being
killed [176]. Such accidents raise awareness of ensuring safety aspects for these systems
1
2 Farah Al-Shareefi
when they are developed, where safety means the system’s ability to function without
endangering its users and environment [220].
Moreover, modern systems have become more complex, both architecturally and func-
tionally, as well as becoming more reliant on software that controls and monitors their
critical functions. Hence, analysing and developing safe designs for safety-critical systems
are challenging processes.
There is a great emphasis on using formal methods to address the analysis and develop-
ment challenges. Formal methods are applied at the early stages of system development life
cycle to detect the design faults as early as possible and to increase confidence in the cor-
rectness of the system behaviour. These methods are mathematically grounded languages
and analysis tools for performing the following [80]:
System modelling which is a conceptual abstraction describing and representing the
system behaviour [236].
Model Simulation is a process of carrying out experiments with a designed model to
assess the performance of the system under different operational conditions [236].
Model Validation is a process of ensuring that the system model adequately satisfies
the user requirements and expectations [44].
Model Verification is a rigorous evaluation process to check whether a system model
fully satisfies the systems and users requirements [44].
In this thesis, all of the above activities are used for safety-critical systems, while for
security protocols only the first two are applied. Furthermore, from the available techniques
for conducting the model verification for critical systems, such as theorem-proving and
model checking, this thesis is concerned with using the model-checking technique. This
technique is an automatic method for exhaustive checking whether a finite state model of
a system meets the desired requirements [79].
The model-checking helps to deliver the model correctness that is adherent to functional
requirements. However, adherence to the functional requirements is insufficient to ensure
system safety. Therefore, we need to verify satisfaction of safety requirements to ensure as
safe as possible system behaviour.
System safety can be assessed by obtaining safety requirements through applying infor-
mal safety analysis techniques from system engineering domain. Safety analysis techniques
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enable analysts to identify the system hazards and to elicit the safety requirements that
mitigate or prevent those hazards [96]. Therefore, combining the formal verification with
the safety analysis outcomes is beneficial for safety-critical systems, though, this combi-
nation faces the difficulty of expressing the outcomes of the safety analysis techniques in
a formal way. The work in this thesis is directed at dealing with this difficulty to achieve
the required combination.
In the following section we state the second topic that has been considered by this
thesis.
1.2 Security Protocols
Security protocols form the building blocks of infrastructures required for secure commu-
nication over public networks. A security protocol is essentially a predefined sequence
of actions performed by multiple communicating participants to achieve security-critical
function(s), such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, etc. [212]. These functions
are accomplished by using cryptographic mechanisms, and due to this, security protocols
are also called cryptographic protocols.
Security protocols are increasingly employed in our daily life online applications, such
as banking, shopping, commerce, election, etc. Failure of such protocols can have negative
financial, political, and social impacts, so the security of these protocols is a major concern.
By security we mean the protocol ability to operate without harmfully influencing the per-
formance of its intended functions. Therefore, developing a secure protocol is a vital and
highly desirable task. Unfortunately, security protocols are notoriously difficult to analyse
due to the implicit assumptions or sometimes unclear details about the environment in
which the protocol operates, the intruder capabilities, the features of the employed cryp-
tographic mechanism, etc. The work in this thesis considers analysing security protocols
and specifying clear design.
A great deal of research work in formal methods has been conducted towards the
development and analysis of security protocols. These methods operate under Dolev-yao
intruder [91] assumptions which state the following: (1) unbounded number of messages
can be generated by the intruder based on its knowledge; (2) an encrypted message cannot
be broken without knowing the decryption key; and (3) unbounded number of protocol
sessions(executions) can be launched by the intruder.
The first assumption may lead to some superfluous messages with wrong format or
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type, are likely to be rejected by the honest participants. The second assumption may
be too strong in some contexts. In particular, some encryption mechanisms with certain
algebraic properties can be broken [141], for instance commutative encryption [166]. The
third assumption together with the first one generally lead to unbounded state space to be
analysed. In this case, methods that use model-checker will face the state space explosion
problem, but they usually deal with this problem by drastically simplifying these assump-
tions to keep the state space small and finite. Some tools, e.g., ProVerif [51], and Tamarin
[168], have addressed infinite state space problem by utilizing a finite characterization of
the infinite state space whenever possible; but this is at the cost of possible non-termination
of the analysis, particularly in the presence of non-trivial algebraic properties, such as the
one of commutative encryption. The work in [129] copes with the infinite state space
problem by simulating security protocols using scenarios designed for external attacks. A
scenario is a protocol run composed of multiple sessions in which the pattern of ordering
the protocol steps for the involved sessions is specified. This approach is an effective way of
reducing the number of protocol runs while looking for an attack by simulation. However,
the intruder in work [129] composes messages using only type matching restriction, which
may still increase the message space with unacceptable messages. Furthermore, in work
[129] all the attack scenarios are simulated even those whose simulation will definitely not
produce attacks. Moreover, analysing security protocols in the presence of commutative
encryption algebraic property has not been shown in [129]. This thesis deals with these
three limitations in [129].
Besides works in formal methods, there are two attempts to develop informal techniques
for analysing security protocols based on safety-critical system hazard analysis techniques
[107, 108]. These attempts help to identify and address elementary vulnerabilities and to
elicit requirements to reduce the likelihood of these vulnerabilities occurrence. However,
in these attempts, it has not been shown how to utilize the output of their techniques in
the next development phases which utilize formal methods.
Like its beneficial role in safety-critical systems, the collaboration between formal and
informal analysis methods can play a similar contribution to security protocols. The work
in this thesis is directed at this collaboration.
Another point that needs more attention is the silent assumptions and unclear details
in the described requirements for such protocols. Most security protocols are described by
RFCs or standards using natural language which has inherent imprecision and ambiguity,
such the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [169, 173]. Therefore, it is
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necessary to make certain that security protocols requirements are clear before performing
the analysis task.
As our work focuses on combining a formal method and an informal safety analysis
technique to analyse safety-critical systems and security protocols, we looked for the best
such combination that can be applied to both topics. So, we chose the Abstract State
Machine (ASM) method [64, 60] from formal methods, and from informal safety analysis
techniques we selected System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) technique [149].
The reasons for choosing the ASM method are the following. First, the generality
feature which makes this method flexible enough to specify any system, whether critical
or protocol, at a required level of abstraction. Second, the ASM method has simple and
rich syntax along with accurate semantics which will together help to specify high fidelity
models balancing between abstraction and preciseness. Third, the ASM method underpins
the analysis of complex systems, and this satisfies our need to support formal analysis
activities to improve system safety and protocol security. Fourth, ASM method uses two
concepts: ground model, for capturing the informal requirements in an abstract, precise,
and understandable way, and stepwise refinement, for gradual refining of the ground model
into a more detailed and concrete model. These notions together are useful to clarify the
requirements for complex protocols, such as SASL.
While we chose the STPA technique because it identifies safety requirements to mitigate
or avoid hazards resulting from interaction faults among system components, component
failures, requirement flaws, human mistakes, software errors, or inadequate control in sys-
tem design. The STPA views the system as a control loop consisting of a controller, actu-
ator, sensor, and a controlled process. Eliciting the safety requirements by STPA is based
on some queries guided by time provided conditions on every control action issued by the
controller. Recently, the STPA technique has been used, in [17, 19], as an integrated tool
with verification activity by supplying it with the formulated safety requirements. How-
ever, the formalization process of safety requirements does not accurately capture some of
the temporal aspects of the requirements. To handle this situation, the work in this thesis
focuses on presenting adequate formalization to STPA requirements. Concerning security
protocols, the STPA queries are not that helpful because typical attacks against protocols
are not necessarily about timing, rather, they are about some other security-relevant as-
pects for each protocol action. Therefore, part of the work in the context of this thesis
concerns with developing the STPA technique in a way that serves security protocols..
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1.3 Research Questions and Contributions
Analysing safety-critical systems and security protocols is a challenging problem. This
problem is dealt with in our thesis by combining a formal method, which is Abstract State
Machines (ASMs), with an informal analysis technique, which is System Theoretic Process
Analysis (STPA), to assess both safety and security of critical systems and protocols.
Therefore, our overall goal is to investigate the ability of this combination to develop safe
systems and secure protocols. This goal can be formulated in a research question as follows:
Can ASM be combined with STPA to analyse safety aspects of critical systems and
security aspects of protocols?
To provide an answer to this research question, the following research sub-questions
need to be addressed:
1) Can the STPA technique help to improve the ASM specifications concerning safety
issues? How can we formulate the STPA safety requirements to be used in further
verification?
2) Can the STPA technique be developed to analyse security protocols?
3) Given the answer to the above, in which analysis activity (simulation, verification),
should the outcomes of the developed STPA technique be considered to serve the
analysis of security protocols?
4) How to clarify ambiguous requirements for security protocols using the ASM method?
In the context of addressing the above research questions, the following list summarizes
the main contributions of the work presented in this thesis.
1) A systematic methodology for analysing and developing safety-critical systems. This
work is based on the idea of combining ASM with STPA, to develop safe specifica-
tions, and to provide an adequate and concise temporal formalization of the STPA
requirements. In this methodology, we formalized the outcome of the STPA tech-
nique as LTL safety properties, and we utilized the validation and verification tools
developed around ASMs to guide the modeller to redesign the ASM model. Guid-
ing the modeller is attained through violation detection of the functional and safety
requirements. This work is presented in Chapter 5.
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2) A well-guided analysis method, called Flaws and Attack Types Identification (FATI),
for determining the possible protocol flaws and attack types. This method is STPA-
like, where it employs on every protocol action a set of queries whose answers facili-
tate recognizing potential flaws, which then will be assessed to determine the possible
attack types that can exploit these flaws. The employed queries are essentially con-
cerned with participants’ liveness and messages freshness. This is because most of
the attacks upon security protocols exploit flaws resulting from the falsely alive par-
ticipant in the current run, and/or the message or part of it is not indeed fresh. The
applicability of this method is shown to two security protocols: AS RPC and NSPK
protocols. This work is presented in Chapter 6.
3) A methodology for analysing security protocols by considering the combination of
formal and informal analysis methods. This methodology is based on simulating se-
curity protocols using attack scenarios [129]. Typically, our methodology consists of
two phases: the manual and the automatic analysis phases. In the manual analysis
phase, we avoid wasting efforts in simulating all the specified scenarios through the
application of FATI method to identify only the possible attack types whose cor-
responding scenarios will be simulated. While in the automatic analysis phase, we
implement the idea of attack pattern scenarios in the ASM methodology. We also
formulate a principle for generating messages by the intruder according to the re-
ceiver’s expectations that are related to the message content and type format. This
principle helps to further reduce the number of protocol runs during the simula-
tion process. Furthermore, we show how to analyse protocols in the presence of an
algebraic property for commutative encryption. This work is detailed in Chapter 6.
4) Comprehensible specifications for the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
(SASL) protocol. By these specifications, we explicated ambiguities of the SASL
informal descriptions in RFCs and Oracle implementation documents based on two
ASM notions: ground model and stepwise refinement. The ground model enabled
us to reflect the desired behaviour, which is explained in RFCs. While the step-
wise refinement helped us to illustrate the ambiguous part of the desired behaviour
accurately, using other document sources. This work is stated in Chapter 7.
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1.4 Publications
Three peer-reviewed publications have been arisen out of the work presented in this thesis.
These are listed below together with a brief description of each.
1) Farah Al-Shareefi, Alexei Lisitsa, and Clare Dixon. “Abstract state ma-
chines and system theoretic process analysis for safety-critical systems”.
In Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Formal Methods: Foun-
dations and Applications (SBMF 2017), vol. 10623, pp. 15-32, Springer,
2017.
This was the first paper resulting from the work presented in this thesis. In this
paper, what was described is a methodology for analysing safety-critical systems
based on the combination between the ASM method and the STPA technique. This
methodology captures both the formal representation of ASM with the ability to
generate safety properties from the STPA hazard analysis. This has the advantages
of verifying the STPA requirements formally and giving insights for the improvement
of the ASM specification, depending on these requirements. The methodology in this
paper has been applied to an insulin pump control system case study, to show what
safety issues it highlights. The content of this paper is included in Chapter 5.
2) Farah Al-Shareefi, Alexei Lisitsa, and Clare Dixon. “Clarification of ambi-
guity for the simple authentication and security layer”. In Proceedings of
6th International Conference on Abstract State Machines, Alloy, B, TLA,
VDM, and Z (ABZ 2018), vol. 10817, pp. 189-203, Springer, 2018.
This paper was intended to show how can the ASM method be employed to deal with
the problem that the silent assumptions and unclear details in the security protocol
requirements can sometimes result in the flawed protocol design. This was realized
by choosing the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) as an example
to clarify its behaviour in terms of ASMs. This example is informally described
in RFCs and Oracle implementation documents. The SASL behaviour has been
clarified by starting with capturing the informal description of the RFC document,
via ASM ground model. After that, the potential ambiguous description is explicated
depending on other document sources through ASM refinement. The content of this
paper is covered in the context of Chapter 7.
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3) Farah Al-Shareefi, Alexei Lisitsa, and Clare Dixon. “Analysing security
protocols Using scenario based simulation”. In Proceedings of 13th In-
ternational Conference on Verification and Evaluation of Computer and
Communication Systems (VECoS 2019), Springer, 2019.
This paper presents a method for analysing security protocols. Typically, the idea
presented in this paper was to extend the method of security protocols simulation
based on attack scenarios in three ways. First, further reducing the number of proto-
col’s runs by minimizing the number of intruder’s generated messages; this achieved
by limiting the intruder’s ability to generate messages through considering: the ex-
pected message content and type matching. Second, specifying the attack scenarios
in AsmetaL and simulating them using AsmetaS tool. Third, analysing protocols
in the presence of the commutative algebraic property. The content of this paper is
covered in Chapter 6.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2: This chapter introduces background knowledge on the ASM method, starting
by defining the main terminology used in this method, then reviewing various tools
used for executing and analysing the ASM specifications.
Chapter 3: This chapter presents an overview of the common and well-known techniques
that are used for safety and security analysis. Each technique is reviewed according to
the following facets: analysis process, application areas, timing use, distinct features,
and shortcomings. A comparison between these techniques is also illustrated in this
chapter.
Chapter 4: This chapter provides background information on security protocols area,
where basic notations, several external attacks, and flaws on such protocols are de-
tailed. Besides, this chapter reviews the literature on formal methods for analysing
security protocols. The reviewed methods include those applying logical inference
rules, model-checking, term-rewriting rules, and simulation, to detect attacks upon
protocols.
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Chapter 5: This chapter details the methodology for analysing and developing safe de-
signs for safety-critical systems by combining the ASM method with the STPA tech-
nique. This chapter also manifests how the informal STPA requirements are trans-
lated into the formal ones to be used in further verification. Furthermore, in this
chapter, an illustration of applying this methodology to two case studies: the train
door controller and the insulin pump control system, is shown.
Chapter 6: This chapter details a methodology for analysing security protocols. This
methodology is based on developing queries that enable us to identify the possible
flaws and the expected attack types; which are, in turn, used to determine the attack
scenario that must be simulated to discover attacks upon the protocol under analysis.
Chapter 7: This chapter shows how can the ASM method be employed to clarify the
informal requirements for simple authentication and security layer case study that is
presented in the RFC document. This depends on using two ASM notions: a ground
model and stepwise refinement, to build clarified specification for the behaviour of
this case study.
Chapter 8: This chapter concludes this thesis by summarising the main findings regarding
the research question and the associated subsidiary questions. It also discusses some
suggested directions for future work.
Appendix A: This appendix illustrates the processes of the safety and security analysis
techniques by applying them to an illustrative example.
Appendix B: This appendix states the functional requirements that are specified by val-
idating scenarios used to analyse the insulin pump control system.
Appendix C: This appendix shows the ground model-control state for performing the
rest steps in the authentication negotiation phase for simple authentication and se-
curity layer example.
Chapter 2
Abstract State Machines Method
2.1 Introduction
Formal methods play an effective role in the development process of computing systems.
The effectiveness of formal methods comes from their mathematical basis, which is required
for constituting well-formed notations for system specifications, and for allowing formal
analysis. One of these methods is Abstract State Machines (ASMs) method [64].
This chapter provides an overview of the ASM method, starting with its theoretical
background and moving down to its formal definition. In addition, a variety of tools for
executing and/or analysing ASM specifications are reviewed and evaluated. This chapter
also explains why ASM method has been used in this work for specifying and analysing
computing systems.
2.2 Abstract State Machines Theory
Abstract State Machines (ASMs) were initially introduced by Yuri Gurevich [114, 115]
as a general state machine formalism for modelling any algorithm at a convenient level
of abstraction. He formulated the basic theory of ASMs as “every algorithm, no matter
how abstract, is step-for-step emulated by an appropriate ASM”. The generality of ASMs
originates from the notion of abstract states. In traditional state machines, like Turing
machines and finite state machines, states are represented symbolically by a collection of
symbols. In contrast, abstract states are represented syntactically and semantically by
mathematical structures of elements from domains equipped with functions and predicates
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defined on them. In addition, ASMs have transition relations defined by rules, which specify
how function interpretations are updated from one state into another. ASM specifications
describe how the state of the system under specification evolves depending on transition
rules. ASMs are further developed into a practical and mathematically well-grounded
method for high-level system design and analysis [64, 60]. This method bridges the gaps
between human understanding, formalization, and executable machines of a real world
problem. ASMs improves the system development process by building an accurate high
level modelling paradigm which is oriented toward executable code. ASMs have a number
of successful applications in diverse areas, such as: specifying sequential, parallel, and
distributed systems [64] [Chap. 4, Chap. 5, Chap. 6], modelling dynamic databases
[106], defining the specification for programming and design languages like Prolog, Java,
and UML [62, 38, 63, 70, 82], proving compiler correctness [244], specifying and analysing
security protocols [45, 46, 240], modelling and verifying safety-critical systems [33, 30, 35],
and so on.
The ASM method is constructed from three essential concepts:
• basic abstract state machines are transition systems which are based on abstract
states, to model the systems structure, and on transition rules, to model the systems
dynamic behavior;
• ground model is a technique for capturing system requirements through a concise
and precise conceptual model;
• stepwise refinement is a general concept for constituting a “hierarchy of refined
model” through a chain of steps starting from the abstract ground model and leading
to a more and more detailed model which is implementation-linked, depending on
the design decisions.
2.3 Basic Abstract State Machines
The notion of ASMs, or basic ASMs, were originally defined to capture the case where a
single agent can execute simultaneous parallel actions. Later, this notion is generalized to
distributed multi-agents acting and interacting in a synchronous or asynchronous paradigm,
see Section 2.3.2.7.
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Formally, basic ASMs are finite sets of transition rules with the form:
If Condition then Updates
which is the basic form for specifying the transition between abstract states. The
Condition (or guard) is a formula in first-order predicate logic with no free variables,
whose interpretation can be evaluated to true or false. Updates denotes a finite set of
update functions of the form
f(t1, ... , tn) := t
where f is an n-ary function name, t1, ... , tn are function arguments which are first-order
terms, and t is the updated function value. In other words, the transition from one state
into another one takes place when a finite set of functions modify their values. A basic
ASM consists of four components:
• Signature (Σ): the required declaration of functions and domains.
• Initial states (I): a set of states defined by specified constraints imposed on the
signature.
• Transition rules (T R): a set of transition relations identifies update sets over
abstract states.
• Main rule or program (R): a main transition rule of the machine with zero arity.
2.3.1 Simple Example
This section presents a very simple example, known as Train Door Controller (TDC) [227],
with a view to provide the reader with a basic familiarity of ASMs formalism.
An automated TDC System receives sensitive data and transmits commands control-
ling the physical door of the train. Typically, the TDC system consists of the following
components: a) computerized controller; b) door sensor; c) train sensor; d) emergency
sensor; e) actuator; and f ) door. The operation of the TDC system is best understood
in terms of its components. The computerized controller manipulating the inputs coming
from the sensor components to issue open or close the door command. The door sensor
sends information about the door position and the obstacle existence. The train sensor
generates signals showing the train motion and it’s position according to the platform.
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The emergency sensor produces an emergency signal when there is an emergency condi-
tion, such as fire or toxic gas. The actuator executes the issued control command on the
door. The description of the requirements is that: the door should not be closed on a
person in the doorway, the door should not be opened while the train is moving or when
it is not aligned with a platform, and the travellers should be able to exist during the
emergency.
2.3.2 Terminology Used in Abstract State Machines
This section provides some abstract state machine terminology used to describe the ma-
chine’s execution.
2.3.2.1 Domain
Domain (also called universe) is a finite or infinite set of elements employed for the machine.
The superdomain or superuniverse D of an ASM state A is divided into smaller domains
related to specific category.
2.3.2.2 Function
A function in ASMs is defined by its name and arguments through the following form:
f(t1, ..., tn)
where f is a function name, and t1, ..., tn are n arguments of a function; n is called an
arity (a number of function’s arguments). Zero arity functions, or nullary functions, are
called constants. A function name is firmed in the signature. A function f is updated to a
new value v in the next state, if in the current state the arguments ti of f are evaluated to
their values, say vi, and a f(v1, ..., vn) is evaluated to v value (the value of the function). A
pair of function name and its associated parameter values constitute a location. A location
represents a memory unit. The value of the function with its indicated argument values is
the value of that location.
Functions can be pragmatically classified into: derived functions and basic functions.
Derived functions are auxiliary functions which come with a specification or computa-
tion scheme to yields values for the given read-only arguments. The basic functions are
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differentiated from the derived functions in that they do not come with certain specifica-
tion to update their values, instead, they are updated either by the machine (its rules),
the environment (user), or both of them. Basic functions can be further classified, based
on the updating way of their values, into: static functions and dynamic functions.
Static functions are functions with values that never change at any machine execution,
i.e. their values are constant.
Dynamic functions are functions with changeable values from one state into another,
so that they are similar to variables in programming. They are also categorized into three
types: controlled, monitored, and shared.
Controlled functions are dynamic functions whose values can be read and modified only
by the machine.
Monitored functions have values that are read by the machine, but written by the
external environment (user). Whereas the dynamic shared functions are read and updated
by both the rules and the environment of the machine.
2.3.2.3 Signature
A Signature Σ, (also called vocabulary), is a finite set of declarations of function names, and
domain names. Each function name has a fixed arity. The zero arity functions, including:
true, false and undef (undefined) are always assumed in the signature.
The signatures are declared when defining an ASM. The signature for TDC example
is listed in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1, the domains Status1, DoorStatus, PositionStatus,
MotionStatus, and Availability are introduced to represent the operation states of the con-
troller (sensing or executing), the set of potential door’s states (opened, closed, opening,
or closing), the set of possible train’s positions (aligned and not aligned with a platform),
the nature of train’s motion (moving or stopped), and the availability status (exist or
not) for the emergency and the obstacle, respectively. The functions trainMotionSensor,
trainPostionSensor, emergencySensor, obstacleSensor denote monitored predicate, which
represent an external environment input for train’s motion and position, and existence of
emergency and door’s obstacles. The dynamic functions doorStatus, trainMotion, trainPo-
sition, emergency, obstacleStatus, and state, show the current state for the door, the train’s
motion, the train’s position, the emergency, and the obstacle at the doorway, and the op-
1Note that, we declare the Status domain as an abstracted domain, instead of enumerated one, to show
how to deal with an abstracted domain
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eration mode, respectively. The 0-ary functions, which comprises sensing and executing,
refer to the atomic objects belonging to the Status. The safeSituation is a derived function
that checks that the door is opened during the emergency situation. The safeSituation is








abcdef DoorStatus={OPENED, CLOSED, OPENING, CLOSING}
abcdef PositionStatus={NOT ALIGNED, ALIGNED}
abcdef MotionStatus={STOPPED, MOVING}
abcdef Availability={EXIST, NOT EXIST}
Monitored Functions
abcdef trainMotionSensor : MotionStatus
abcdef trainPositionSensor : PositionStatus
abcdef emergencySensor : Availability









abcdef sensing : Status





abcdefghi9s 2 {OPENED, OPENING}: doorStatus= s
Figure 2.1: The train door controller example’s signature
2.3.2.4 State and Update Set
A state A for Σ is a mathematical structure consisting of the superdomain D, a non-
empty set, together with an interpretation fA, evaluation of terms and formulae, for every
function name of Σ. When f has n arities, then it is interpreted as a function from Dn
into D.
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An update of A is expressed in a form
(loc, v)
where the loc is a location of A, and v is an element from the superdomain D. A set of
updates of that form is called update set U .
An update set is called inconsistent if it has clashing updates that assign two different
values to one location i.e (loc, v1) and (loc, v2) ∈ U , but v1 6= v2; otherwise it is called
consistent update set.
2.3.2.5 Transition Rules
A rule in ASMs specifies an update set over transition states, to describe the system’s
behaviour. It can be one of the following basic rules, or one complex rule constructed from
more than one basic rule. Basic transition rules T R are as follows:
• Skip rule: skip.
It causes an empty update set.
• Update rule: f(t1, ..., tn) := t.
It updates the value of f(t1, ..., tn) to t. Where t1, ..., tn, t are first-order terms.
• Block rule: X par Y.
It evaluates X and Y rules simultaneously and produces unified update sets com-
puted by X and Y. The X and Y rules are syntactic expression.
• Sequence rule: X seq Y.
It executes the rules X and Y in a sequential way, starting with X.
• Conditional rule: If ψ then X else Y.
It checks if ψ, a boolean expression, is true then it executes the X rule, otherwise
executes the Y rule.
• Let rule: let a = t in X.
It allocates the t value to a, a logical variable, and executes X. The resulting update
set is the set computed by X.
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• Forall rule: forall a with ψ do X.
It executes the X rule in parallel for every a meeting ψ. The computed update set
from this rule is the union of all the update sets yielded by the parallel execution of
X over various values of a.
• Choose rule: choose a with ψ do X ifnone Y.
It non-deterministically chooses a satisfying a given condition ψ and executes the X
rule. In case that no such a exists, it executes the Y rule.
• Call rule: r(t1, ..., tn).
It executes the formerly specified transition rule r with the given t1, ..., tn arguments.
The main rule, or program, of the machine is “a distinguished rule name of arity zero”,
that describes single step of the machine. It is executed repeatedly. A main rule may either
successfully terminate if no new update set is produced or no rule is viable, or it may fail
to terminate when inconsistent update set is produced.
To illustrate, the TDC example has main rule and eight textual complex rules. Four of
the complex rules, including ClosedToOpening, OpeningToOpened, OpenedToClosing, and
ClosingToClosedOrOpened, are used to update the doorState, which is initially CLOSED.
Three of the complex rules, which are EmergencySensing, TrainMotionSensing, and Ob-
stacle Sensing, are specified to sense the sensors’ information. The main rule, named
TrainDoorController, is defined to model the behavior of the system.
In the main rule for TDC example, see Figure 2.2, if the current state of the system
is SENSING, then three rules are called for sensing the current state of the emergency,
train motion, train position, and the door’s obstacle. While if the current system’s state in
EXECUTING, the emergency is checked. If it exists, the emergency is handled by opening
the door; otherwise, four rules are called in parallel, one per door state changing. Note
that, the par construct is rarely written, as the synchronous parallelism is the execution
mechanism of ASMs by default [60].
In the ClosedToOpening, see Figure 2.3, the controller checks whether the state of the
door is CLOSED and the train is STOPPED such that it is ALIGNED with the platform,
to update the door state to OPENING. While in the OpeningToOpened rule, see Figure 2.4,
the controller updates the state of the door into OPENED, if it is at OPENING state. The
OpenedToClosing, and ClosingToClosedOrOpended rules have the same changing the door
state activity, but they check the input from the obstacle sensor before taking a decision
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about changing the door state.
ClosedToOpening =
abc if doorStatus = CLOSED and trainMotion = STOPPED and
abcdetrainPosition = ALIGNED then
ab defgh doorSt tus := OPENING
OpeningToOpened =
abc if doorStatus = OPENING then
abcde doorStatus = OPENED
TrainDoorController =





abcdeemergency := NOT EXIST












abcdefgh if not safeSituation then
abcdefghijk doorStatus = OPENED
Figure 2.2: The main rule for Train Door Controller example
ClosedToOpening =
abc if doorStatus = CLOSED and trainMotion = STOPPED and
abcdetrainPosition = ALIGNED then
abcdefgh doorStatus := OPENING
OpeningToOpened =
abc if doorStatus = OPENING then
abcde doorStatus = OPENED
TrainDoorController =





abcdeemergency := NOT EXIST












abcdefgh if not safeSituation then
abcdefghijk doorStatus = OPENED
Figure 2.3: The ClosedToOpening rule for Train Door Controller exampleClosedToOpening =
abc if doorStatus = CLOSED and trainMotion = STOPPED and
abcdetrainPosition = ALIGNED then
abcdefgh doorStatus := OPENING
OpeningToOpened =
abc if doorStatus = OPENING then
abcde doorStatus = OPENED
TrainDoorCo troller =





abcdeemergency := NOT EXIST












abcdefgh if not safeSituation then
abcdefghijk doorStatus = OPENED
Figure 2.4: The OpeningToOpened rule for Train Door Controller example
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2.3.2.6 Step and Run
A computation step for an ASM is the process of simultaneous executing, firing, all updates
for all transition rules in a given state to yield the next state.
A run is a finite or infinite sequence of consecutive states, resulting from executed steps.
2.3.2.7 Distributed Abstract State Machines
Distributed Abstract State Machines (DASM) are extended basic ASMs that cover the
formalization of multi-agents acting and reacting in a synchronous or asynchronous manner
[64].
DASM has a finite set (possible dynamic) of agents Agents where each agent executes
its own basic ASMs. DASM introduces two notions: local state, a A state for an agent’s
machine, and global state, a B state for DASM. Using these states is supported by the
self function, which is a reserved 0-ary function of type Agents for denoting the agent
which is running its basic machine. The relation between these states, which is required
to determine the run of DASM, relies on the agents nature: synchronous or asynchronous.
In synchronous DASM, every agent operates in parallel and synchronously by running
their own machine using an implicit global system clock, and contributes to the global
states over the union of the signatures of each machine. The runs for the synchronous
machine is a totally ordered set of steps.
Asynchronous DASM provide a coherent global system view for concurrent sequential
computations of single agents, where each individual agent has it’s own pace without any
global clock to execute its basic ASM in its local state. In DASM, a single computation
step achieved by an agent is replaced by the notion move, which can be atomic or durative.
A run for DASM is a partial order set of moves for Agents. It is formally defined as a triple
(M, φ, γ), such that the following conditions are attained [114]:
1. M is a partially ordered set of moves for Agents, such that each move has only finitely
many predecessors;
2. φ is a function onM for associating agents with the set of moves in such a way that
the set of moves computed by every agent is linearly ordered;
3. γ is a function for assigning a state of M to each initial segment X of Agents by
performing all moves in X ;
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4. Ifm is a maximal element belonging to a finite initial segment X ofM and Y = X−m,
then Agents(m) is an agent in γ(Y), and γ(X ) is gained from γ(Y) by firing φ(m) at
γ(Y).
2.3.3 Ground Model and Stepwise Refinement
Ground model is a conceptual model that represent an accurate formulation (also called
system blueprint or system contract) of a real-world problem for a system to capture it’s in-
formal requirements in a transparent way. The ground model has no general mathematical
definition, but it has the following intrinsic features:
• precision: it means the ground model must be precise at a convenient level of detailing
that satisfies the desired accuracy literally, without adding inessential exactness;
• simplicity and conciseness: constructing a simple and concise ground model needs to
avoid any extraneous encoding and reflect just the structure of the system to provide
an understandable model and manageable for the analysis;
• abstractness: presenting every semantically relevant features and abstracting from
irrelevant ones which are required for later refinements;
• consistency : eliminating misleading details and ambiguities in the textual require-
ments;
• semantical foundation: the ground model is equipped with a precise semantical foun-
dation which is the basis for the model analysis process.
The ground model can be constructed graphically using control state ASMs. Control
state ASMs are a class of ASMs representing a normal form for UML activity diagrams,
and enabling the designer to model machines which under the main control structure of
Finite State Machines (FSM). Control state ASMs enrich the FSM control structure by
synchronous parallelism and/or manipulating data structures. A control state ASM can
be used at an early stage of the system development process, to capture the system’s
requirements due to its graphical form which is associated with a precise semantics.
A control state ASM is an ASM whose rules are all of the form textually and graphically
presented in Figure 2.5, such that in a given control state i, the machine remains at it if
no condition conditionj is satisfied.
22 Farah Al-Shareefi
Typically, in a control state ASM, each rule can be defined as a generalized FSM with
the following representation:
FSM(i, if condition then rule, j) ≡
if ctl state = i and condition then
rule
ctl state := j
where each rule updates the control state ctl state value, from i for example to the next
value j relying on the guard condition.
Figure 2.5: Control state ASMs
Stepwise Refinement is a successive refinement method that enables to obtain a more
detailed model from the abstract one. This can be achieved by either refining the signature,
the flow of operations, or both of them. At each refinement step, an obtained model must be
proved correct with respect to former upper one, i.e, the more concrete model implements
the exact functionality of abstract model plus its one, while keeping the main features
of the system, e.g., safety. The first abstract model (the ground mode) is close to the
system’s description view (often informal), while the lowest refined model is close to the
programmer’s view (executable code). Such stepwise refinement facilitates changing the
system design in an incremental way, and enables to find silent assumptions and ambiguities
in the system’s requirements while crossing abstraction levels.
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2.4 The Abstract State Machines Tools
For the last two decades, different tools have been developed around ASMs to offer ex-
ecutable models and to support one or more of the following analysis tasks: simulation,
validation, and verification. Among all the available tools, this work has chosen the AS-
META framework. As a result, this section surveys a number of the more popular ASM
tools and specification languages, and compares their distinctive attributes and potential
shortcomings, see Table 2.2. Table 2.2 summarizes the main features for each tool, hence,
we can conclude from this table that the ASMETA framework is the most convenient tool
for this work, as it is available, it uses notation close to the ASM formalism, and it supports
a variety of analysis tools that serves the aim of this work.
2.4.1 The Dynamic Algebra Specification Language
The Dynamic Algebra Specification Language (DASL) is a formal language for an earliest
ASM simulator [135]. DASL is inspired by an approach for a Dynamic Algebra (DA)
Specification of the full Prolog language [58, 57]. Typically, within a Prolog framework, a
concrete language for DA specifications was defined, and a prototype compiler was designed
[135].
The DASL is a typed language that extends the ASMs by a specific form for a set
of multi-sorted equational specifications which defines the static part of the specifications.
Generally, a signature in DASL can be declared according to two types: dynamic and static.
The dynamic or evolving part is a finite part that includes the domains and functions
declaration. The static part is infinite part consisting of a sequence of constructors and a
set of conditional and unconditional equations defined on the declared functions. In DASL,
updating states occurrs regularly at each step of the simulation depending on the evaluated
conditional rules. The initial state for DASL is specified explicitly using the start rule.
While final states are defined implicitly by transitions originating from the initial state.
However, in DASL a distinguish between regular and error final states must be defined to
characterize the termination situation. Where, the final states imply no further updates
of algebra are permitted.
The DASL specification is associated with a compiler for compiling its specification
into intermediate program, known as an Algebraic Target Machine (ALMA). ALMA is a
single-sorted abstract state machine adapted for DA computations. It presents three types
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of control statements: a simple and two conditional statements (if- and case- statements).
An ALMA program is obtained by a decision tree. This tree has if- or case- nodes, with
either update- or error- leaves. A computation for the ALMA is the execution of a simple
statement (initialization) followed by a recursive walk over the decision tree. Both of the
ALMA and the compiler are implemented in the Prolog language.
Although the DASL has a nice features, like simplicity and executability, it is tailored
only for a small subset of sequential deterministic ASMs, with slightly different syntax and
semantics from the actual ones of ASMs.
2.4.2 The ASM Workbench
The ASM Workbench (ASM-WB) is a development framework of modelling and analysis
tools for ASMs [86, 87]. It aims to overcome the main shortcomings of the existing ASM
tools at that time, including incompatibility between the available ASM tools, and lack
of extensibility with other analysis tools. It was designed to constitute a basis for the
development of further ASM tools and transformations to other modelling languages.
The ASM Workbench provides an executable specification, which is the ASM-based
Specification Language (ASM-SL). The ASM-SL notation extends the basic language of
ASMs [114] by introducing several structural and pragmatical additions. In particular,
defining a simple and pliable type system, identifying the states’ structure based on tran-
sition rules, providing mechanisms to construct interfaces to the system’s environment.
The type system of the ASM-SL adopts the same one of the Standard ML [171]. This
type system may allow for detecting trivial errors and inconsistencies at a very early devel-
opment stage, before conducting any simulation or verification. The data structures and
notation include a set of predefined types (booleans, integers, floating-point numbers, and
strings), data structural constructors (tuples, lists, finite sets, finite maps), and definitions
for recursive and mutually recursive functions.
The ASM Workbench architecture consists of a kernel and a set of exchange formats
that allows the Workbench to be extensible. The kernel is a set of program modules
written in the functional language Standard ML [171], which is responsible of the main
functionalities, such as parsing, type-checking, and interpreting-based evaluation. A kernel
is formed of a collection of data structures representing syntactic (e.g., transition rules and
terms) and semantic (e.g., update sets and runs) objects of ASM specifications, and a
collection of functions to treat ASM objects. According to the exchange format feature,
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any tool can be added to the ASM Workbench, without caring about the internal work of
the ASM Workbench, through either the tight coupling, writing other ML programs that
employ the kernel’s functionalities, or through the loose coupling, writing other programs
in any language that compatibles with the ASM Workbench kernel.
The key tools that have been involved with the ASM Workbench are a type checker,
an interpreter, and a graphical user interface for controlling the simulation results and
debugging. The planned tools were a code generator for the Java Virtual Machine, and
an interface to the SMV model checker [167] relying on the translation of the ASM-SL
specification into the SMV language.
The development for the ASM Workbench ceased in 2001. The ASM Workbench is not
available on the Web [2], at the present time.
2.4.3 The ASM Gofer
The AsmGofer is a programming system based on abstract state machines [208], aiming
at providing an ASM interpreter, which is embedded in the functional programming lan-
guage Gofer [235] (more precisely TkGofer [233]), a dialect of Haskell language [228]. The
AsmGofer is compatible with the Unix, MS, and Windows 95/NT operating systems. This
system has been used in several substantial applications. For example, Java and the Java
Virtual Machine [223], the Light Control Case Study [61], and Simulating UML Statecharts
[71].
An AsmGofer program, or script, is a combination of signatures, rules, functions and
data structures which are given in any order. AsmGofer is strongly typed but its signatures
are non compulsory nevertheless.
The AsmGofer conservatively extends Gofer by introducing the concepts of state and
parallel updates. Supporting these concepts is performed by allowing the AsmGofer to
modify the evaluation machine in the run-time system for Gofer, and to use the IO actions
[191] for achieving the input-output-operations. By this way, encoding ASMs in Gofer
is enabled while maintaining the ASMs feature of having side effects on the global state.
Typically, AsmGofer does not provide any ASM syntax. Instead, it retains the Gofer
syntax and represents the ASM features as expressions. As a consequence, the AsmGofer
language is Gofer-based, but it is not ASM-based.
AsmGofer defines constructs for sequential and distributed ASMs. For sequential
ASMs, the seq construct is used for executing a set of rules sequentially in one step.
26 Farah Al-Shareefi
For distributed ASMs, the special function multi is employed for firing rules of multiple
agents. This function takes a bounded set of agents as an input, and it is implemented
by non-deterministically choosing a subset of those agents to execute their rules simul-
taneously at every step. The multi function does not choose a subset that leads to an
inconsistent update.
The AsmGofer interpreter underpins a command line interface. With this interface,
the user can issue several commands, such as evaluating an expression, printing the type
of an expression, loading and editing files containing an AsmGofer script, etc.
A practical feature of AsmGofer is an automatic generation of a graphical user interface
(GUI) which is fairly useful for validating and debugging the specifications. The GUI
generator, which is written in AsmGofer, reads information from a special configuration
file, such as information about expressions to display, and rules that can be selected in the
GUI to execute. By this information, the GUI generator shows the evaluation of AsmGofer
program at each step.
The AsmGofer is available for academic use on the system website [13].
2.4.4 Extensible Abstract State Machines
One of the noteable implementation for ASMs is the Extensible Abstract State Machines
(XASM) project [28]. This project considers the sequential abstract state machines to
generate efficient executable programs and simulate the run of the specified machines.
Generally, the main design goals are upgrading the ASMs formalization into a program-
ming language, and managing large ASM specifications by the added features, including
modularity and reusabilty. The XASM project comprises the executable XASM-language,
XASM-compiler, the runtime system, and the graphical debugging and animation inter-
face.
The XASM-language underpins the concept of the constructs modularization, which is
based on the component notion (presented in [225]), for structuring and reusing the ASM
specifications. A modularization construct or a component in XASM machine can be
reused either as a sub-asm, a rule called in its parent-asm to compute a step of the parent-
asm, or as a function, a term or normal machine in the body of the parent-asm used to
compute its internal steps. Each construct includes a list of declared functions that is
enriched with accesses and updates functionalities for reading and writing, respectively,
the locations of the included functions.
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The XASM is a typed language. It supports the regular expression based pattern
matching on strings, to match the left operand (string data) against the right operand
(pattern matching variables). In addition, this language supports the grammar definitions
to generate a parser of the specified syntax and semantics for this language.
TheXASM project is implemented in C language. At this basis, theXASM source files
are translated by the XASM-compiler into C source code to implement the ASM version,
which is specified in XASM files. To this end, the runtime system fulfills the update and
the access functionality for the ASMs functions. The graphical animation and debugging
tools have been employed for tracing the updates and viewing the function values at each
step.
The XASM project defines an external language interface for interconnecting the
XASM programs with C programs. The interaction is realized in two alternative ways.
First, specifying external C functions in XASM specifications. In this case, the arguments
and the returned values of C functions must be characterized in a specific C-type which
are represented elements of the XASM super-domain. Second, the main XASM machine
and all its sub-machines can be embedded in the main C-code, when they are compiled
properly using the XASM-compiler. An interface to the Java language has been considered
as a future work.
At the present time, the XASM is not available on the Web [6].
2.4.5 Abstract State Machine Language
In 2000, the Foundations of Software Engineering (FSE) team at Microsoft Research devel-
oped an executable specification language called Abstract State Machine Language (AsmL)
[40, 117, 4]. AsmL is fully integrated into the Microsoft .Net framework. It is inspired by
the ASM theory but it supports some object-oriented and programming features required
for the .Net integration. Typically, the AsmL combines the intrinsic features of ASMs, in-
cluding synchronous parallelism and finite choice, with the programming language merits,
such as interfaces, classes, methods, and exception handling. AsmL provides mathemati-
cal types and declaration for sets, bags, tuples, maps and sequences. It also upholds some
mathematical set operations which are necessary for editing high-level specifications, such
as comprehension and quantification. The AsmL strongly enforces the data typing at a
compile time. The essential characteristic of the AsmL is being executable specification
which can be used at the design and test development stages.
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According to the implementation side, the Microsoft’s AsmL tool originally includes
a compiler for compiling the AsmL specification into executable .Net files. Subsequently,
it has been added a plug-in for the Microsoft Word that facilitates the literate specifica-
tion, i.e., the AsmL specification can be encoded into Microsoft Word file, using a specific
formatting style, and then the resulted file is compiled by the AsmL compiler. The inte-
gration with the Microsoft environment and supporting some programming features cause
the AsmL specification to be more closer to the detailed code universe than to the concise
problem description universe. Furthermore, it can not specify the distributed systems.
From the analysis side, there is an approach for model checking AsmL specification,
without encoding the AsmL into another notation accepted by the existing model checker
tools [136]. This approach employs the on-the-fly verifying to achieve a direct exploration
for the state space of a system specification. However, the performance for this approach
is considerably slower than the other explicit model checking tools, like Spin and NuSMV,
as it runs in the .Net platform [136]. The efficiency for this approach has not been shown
for a complex case study [136].
In addition to the verification activity, the AsmL is integrated with a model-based
testing tool, known as Spec Explorer, within the Microsoft .NET architecture [230]. The
integration with this tool provides an environment for developing models through generat-
ing test cases from models, and executing them against an implementation under test. The
model can be written either in MS Word that is embedded in Spec Explorer, or in Spec#
language. The Spec# is an extended version of C# through presenting most of AsmL
features with C# syntax. The new version of Spec Explorer: Spec Explorer 10 Visual Stu-
dio, does not directly support the implementation of ASM parallel update semantics [118].
Furthermore, the official language for Spec Explorer is Spec# which is slightly different
from the AsmL.
2.4.6 The Timed ASM Language and Toolset
The Timed Abstract State Machine (TASM) language [184] and its associated toolset [183]
are developed for engineering the reactive real-time systems. The TASM language extends
the theory of ASMs by integrating the functional and non-functional specifications, in
particular: function, time, resource consumption [184, 181]. In other words, the TASM
language differs from ASMs in two syntactical aspects to capture the physical behaviour of
the real-time systems. First, the machine steps are instantaneous in ASMs, while they are
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durative in TASM. Second, in TASM, the durative steps can consume a finite quantity of
resource, such as power, memory, and communication bandwidth. The syntactical sugar
addition of TASM language considers the specification of the sequential and concurrent
behaviours. However, it seems to be that the TASM language deals with time in some
limited form, where the continuous dynamic behaviour is not introduced. Furthermore,
the syntax of the TASM language is presented in a concise way, which does not has the
definition of arrays and data structures.
TASM language also providess the hierarchical composition concept, which is based on
the component concept for XASM language [28], for structuring large specifications.
The TASM toolset has three essential components for implementing the features of
the TASM language, including an editor, an analyzer, and a simulator. The editor en-
ables the TASM specification to be created and edited using formal expressed syntax and
semantics of the TASM language [181]. The simulator allows the dynamic behaviour of
the specifications to be visualized graphically through a step-by-step fashion. The simu-
lator’s application results are illustrated in [180]. The analyzer component achieves the
specifications analysis task.
For the formal analysis of the TASM specification, two tools, including SAT solver [172]
and UPPAAL [43, 143], have been used to perform functional and static types of analysis,
respectively.
During the functional analysis, an automatic verification of completeness and consis-
tency properties of TASM specifications is performed [182]. In the TASM context, for a
given machine, the completeness of the specification means that there is an enabled rule for
every possible combination of it’s monitored variables. While the consistency means that
there are no two enabled rules at the same time with two different values. The analysis of
these properties is achieved by translating the TASM specifications into the input specifi-
cations for SAT solver and by formulating both completeness and consistency properties
as a Boolean satisfiability problem [217]. The TASM toolset employs the SAT4J solver,
which is an open source SAT solver [48].
Whereas for the static analysis, the timing properties [142] of TASM specifications are
verified using UPPAAL tool [179]. The TASM specifications are mapped into the timed
automata of UPPAAL, and the timing properties, in terms of safety and liveness, are
formulated in the temporal logic of UPPAAL.
The main limitations with the TASM toolset are as follows. The analysis toolset is
inapplicable to large case studies. The translation to the input specification of UPPAAL
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and SAT solvers supports only finite TASM model with allowed datatypes, e.g., decimal
numerical values from the Reals domain are not acceptable. Furthermore, there is no a
generic translation way to be adopted if a new tool is desired to be added.
The TASM toolset is fully written in Java programming language, using a number of
the freely available Eclipse libraries [1]. Unfortunately, this toolset is not available at the
website [10], contrary to what is claimed in its paper [183].
2.4.7 Simulator for Real-Time ASMs
The Simulator for Real-Time ASMs is designed for simulating reactive timed abstract state
machines [218]. The reactive ASMs mean that the ASMs should sufficiently respond to
infinite input. In particular, ASMs have a special input that represents the time value,
which is given by the external function CT (derived from current time as in [116]). The
time for ASMs, that the simulator deals with, can be continuous or discrete. The time
constraints, or the guards of the rules, are linear inequalities.
The simulator is equipped with a language to describe the timed semantics for ASMs.
Essentially, for this simulator, two semantics have been defined: one with instantaneous
actions, and the another one is with no-deterministic, bounded, and delayed actions. These
semantics are characterized for timed basic ASMs with a syntax similar to AsmL [40]. The
denoted syntax is based on the if-then updates, parallel, and sequential composition.
The simulator is applied for verifying whether the generated run from the reactive timed
machine satisfies the requirements property for this run. The properties of real-time ASMs
are expressed as First Order Timed Logic (FOTL) formulas [41], which is a predicate logic
with arithmetics. It’s main concept is to select a decidable theory, e.g., real addition, to
manipulate arithmetics or other concrete mathematical functions, and then extend it by
abstract functions of time, which are required to specify the considered problems.
Unfortunately, a complicated case study that entails multi-agent construction is inap-
plicable using the simulator, and some rule constructors, such as: extend, import, are not
defined in the presented timed ASM’s syntax [218].
The simulator is an independent tool implemented in Java programming language.
It’s architectural components include a kernel and a graphical user interface. The
kernel is a java-application for accomplishing the necessary tasks of processing the ASM
specifications and checking the FOTL properties. The results of the simulation, which are
runs of the simulated ASM, are stored in trace repository. These results are accessible
Chapter 2. Abstract State Machines Method 31
by the user, the verifier component of the kernel, and the graphical user interface. The
verifier verifies the timed ASM properties. The graphical user interface represents the
results graphically. Currently, a version of the simulator is not available at the mentioned
website [11] in [218].
2.4.8 Core Abstract State Machine
The Core Abstract State Machine (CoreASM) is an open development project that includes
tools for modelling and simulating ASM specifications [99, 97, 100, 98]. It was designed
with the aims of providing an executable language that supports rapid prototyping for
ASM models, and developing an extensible tool architecture to accommodate different
application domains.
The CoreASM project provides the following facilities [101]:
• A lean and executable specification language, called CoreASM.
• A multi-agent simulation engine for simulating the CoreASM specification language.
• A library of optional plug-ins that provides extra characteristics and syntactical
sugar, which are not de facto part of the ASMs, for example case, and the plug-ins
concept facilitates the extensibility aim and it is in charge of the most of the engine’s
functionalities.
• An Eclipse user interface with a command-line interaction plus dynamic syntax high-
lighting.
The CoreASM language has textual notation very close to the mathematical definition
of ASMs. CoreASM language serves as an untyped modeling language, to enable rapid
prototyping with ASMs. Unfortunately, this feature is at the price that unpredictable
type errors will be caught only at the execution time, and handling the large erroneous
specification will be slightly difficult. The design of sequential, parallel, and distributed
systems is feasible through CoreASM language.
The structure of the specification language consists of a header block for declaring the
signature depending on the used plug-ins, and rule declaration block, where the specifi-
cations of the rules take place, including the init rule for constructing the initial state.
The engine’s architecture is made up of four constituents: the Parser, the Interpreter, the
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Abstract Storage, and the Scheduler. To execute the specification, the Parser firstly pro-
duces a parser for the specification, with a language grammar based on the used plug-ins
in the header block. Then, the Interpreter evaluates all the specified rules and generates
update sets. The Abstract Storage saves the current state of the machine and the history
of its previous states as well. The Interpreter gets the value for the current state from
the abstract storage and produces updates for the next state. The Scheduler is used for
scheduling the agents.
There are several attempts for making CoreASM supports model-checking activity,
such as: [102, 161, 42]. In [102], an approach for translating the CoreASM specifications
into Promela specifications, which can later be verified by Spin model checker [123], is
illustrated. This approach is extended in [161], to support the n-ary functions and the
extend rule which can potentially lead into models with infinite state space. Contrary to
these approaches, the method in [42] aims at keeping the expressiveness of the CoreASM
language, by not performing any translation from CoreASM language into another input
model checking language. This is achieved through employing the CoreASM simulator to
generate the state space, which can then be model checked by the Model Checking Micro-
Controller, or for short [MC] SQUARE model checker [207]. This method is nevertheless
has limited capability and has been applied to only small case studies [94]. Despite all of
these attempts, till now there is no an automatic tool integrated within CoreASM project
to support them.
The CoreASM engine is implemented using the Java programming language. The
CoreASM is an open source project available at [5]
2.4.9 The ASM mETAmodelling Framework
The ASM mETAmodelling Framework, ASMETA for short, is one of the most compre-
hensive modeling and analysis environments developed for ASMs [111, 36]. Realising the
drawbacks of available tools around ASMs, such as limited coverage of the aspects in the
whole development process, encoding ASMs into a language with syntax rigidly relying
on the implementation environment, and the impracticality of the integration of the ASM
tools, the ASMETA framework was born to provide a unified notation and interoperable
tools environment for ASMs.
ASMETA is based on the guidelines of the Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) concepts
and technologies [209], which facilitate the practical integration of a set of tools supporting
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various tasks of the development process. The MDE technologies include:
• domain-specific modelling languages for describing the system’s behaviour and design
intent. The model-driven language consists of: an abstract syntax (metamodel) that
abstractly represents the concepts and constructs of a specific domain (e.g., ASMs),
a concrete syntax, which can be textual, visual, or both, and it is driven from the
metamodel to be the language used by the designer, and sematics that find the
meaning of the user language.
• transformation engines and generators for analysing specific aspects of the models
and synthesizing different artifacts, like simulation , source code, or alternative model
representations.
Regarding this technology, the ASMETA development defines a metamodel for ASMs,
known as Abstract State Machine Metamodel(AsmM ), using the OMG metamodelling
framework [7], and it develops a set of software artefacts (concrete syntax, parser, API,
etc.) which is used for model editing and it is also helped for developing new complex tools
integrated within this framework.
ASMETA is implemented using the Java programming language. The ASMETA frame-
work is available for academic use on the website [3].
As one of the analysis tools for the ASMETA framework is a model checker, we provided
some background on model-checking and its input temporal logic, before introducing the
ASMETA tools.
2.4.9.1 Model-Checking
Model-checking [79] is a common technique that emerged with the goal of automatic veri-
fication for the desired behavioural properties of computational systems. It entails a finite
model of the system and a property of interest which is a formula expressed usually in
temporal logic. The model-checking technique depends on an efficient algorithm to ex-
haustively traverse the state space of the system in order to determine whether the given
model satisfies the desired property. When a model fails to satisfy a required property, the
model checker generates a faulty trace called counter-example that manifests an incorrect
system’s behaviour. The model checker has become a prominent verification technique as
it does not require the construction of a manual proof, and it produces diagnostic coun-
terexamples. Several practical model checking techniques have been developed, such as
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SPIN [123], UPPAL [143], NuSMV [75], etc. In our work for analysing safety-critical sys-
tems, we use the AsmetaSMV model checker that verifies temporal properties of ASM
models based on the capabilities of the NuSMV model checker.
2.4.9.2 Temporal Logic
Temporal logic is an approach for describing the desired properties of a system behaviour
as logical formulae based on the concept of time [104]. Different forms of temporal logic
have been constructed depending on the adopted way of defining the time concept, such
as Linear-time Temporal Logic (LTL) [193], Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [78], etc. In
our work for analysing safety-critical systems, we consider the LTL form, which models
the time as an infinite path of states.
The syntax and semantics of LTL are as follows:
Syntax. Any LTL formula is formally constructed from the following symbols:
• a set, PROP of propositional symbols or literals;
• the constants true and false;
• propositional connectives: ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or),→ (implies),↔ (if and only
if);
• temporal connectives: © (in the next moment in time),  (always in the future),
♦ (eventually in the future), U (until), and W (weak until);
• two brackets symbols: ‘(’ and ‘)’.
The set of well-formed LTL formulae (wff), is inductively defined as the smallest
set that satisfies the following two conditions:
• The true, false, and any element in PROP set are in wff.
• If X and Y are in wff, then {¬X, X ∨ Y, X ∧ Y, X → Y, X ↔ Y, X U Y,
X W Y, © X,  X } are in wff too.
Semantic. The LTL models time in a manner similar to Natural Numbers, N, in other
words, a model of LTL, σ, can be described as a sequence of infinite states of the
form σ = {s0, s1, s2, ....} where each state, si, is a set of proposition symbols. Those
propositions are satisfied in the ith moment in time. Owing to the fact that, any LTL
formula is interpreted at a particular moment in time, the satisfaction of a formula
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X is denoted by (σ, i) |= X, where σ denotes the model and i is a state index at
which the temporal formula is interpreted. For any well-formed formula X, model σ,
and state index i ∈ N, then either (σ, i) |= X holds, or not. Typically, the semantics
for the symbols that construct the LTL formula are:
(σ, i) 2 false
(σ, i)  prop iff prop ∈ si, where prop ∈ PROP
(σ, i)  ¬X iff (σ, i) 2 X
(σ, i)  X ∨ Y iff (σ, i)  X or (σ, i)  Y
(σ, i)  X ∧ Y iff (σ, i)  X and (σ, i)  Y
(σ, i)  X → Y iff (σ, i)  Y whenever (σ, i) |= X
(σ, i) ©X iff (σ, i+ 1) |= X
(σ, i)  X iff ∀j ∈ N and j > i then (σ, i)  X
(σ, i)  ♦X iff ∃i ≥ 1 such that (σ, i)  X
(σ, i)  X U Y iff ∃j ∈ N, such that j > i and (σ, j)  Y and ∀k ∈ N : if i 6 k < j
then (σ, k)  X
(σ, i)  X W Y iff (σ, i)  X U Y or (σ, i)  X
2.4.9.3 ASMETA Framework Tools
The ASMETA framework comprises different tools, including but not limited to:
The ASMETA Language (AsmetaL) is a textual notation and concrete syntax for
AsmM specified in terms of an EBNF (Extended Backus-Naur Form) grammar. It is
strongly-typed language, encoded in a way very similar to the basic and multi-agents ASM
[64]. AsmetaL is equipped with a Standard Library, a declaration set of predefined ASM
domains (Integer, Boolean, String, etc.) and functions defined on those domains, and a
text-to-model compiler (AsmetaLc) for parsing and translating the AsmetaL specifications
into AsmM instances that can later be executed by the simulator.
The structure of AsmetaL consists of four sections: a header for importing the Standard
Library and defining the signatures of domains and functions, body for inserting, in order,
the implementation of static concrete domain, derived and static functions, and then the
rules of the model, main rule, and initialization for initializing the controlled functions.
For example, see the AsmetaL specification for the Train Door Controller example in Code
2.1.
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The ASMETA Simulator (AsmetaS) is a tool for constructing a run (an update set
at every step) of the specification under simulation [112]. In fact, the AsmetaS is an
interpreter that makes computations for the stored ASMs specifications in the abstract
storage or model repository. The AsmetaS enables specification validation process. Due
to the direct integration of the AsmetaS in the ASMETA framework, AsmetaS simulates
the model without the need for implementing a parser, a type checker, and an internal
representation of the model to simulate. The AsmetaS supports several useful activities
during the simulation, including consistency checking for updates set in order to detect
inconsistent updates, random simulation for simulating the specification randomly, where
the simulator chooses the input values by itself in an arbitrary manner, and interactive
simulation for simulating arbitrary values provided interactively from the environment by
the monitored functions, and invariant checking to inspect whether invariant expressed
constrains over the functions and rules of the executed AsmetaL model are satisfied or not.
The invariant constraint can be declared as follows:
invariant constraint name over fun name, ..., rule name : term (2.1)
where invariant is a keyword related to a selected name constraint name of the con-
straint, fun name and rule name are some functions and rules of the specification that
are mentioned after the over keyword, and term denotes the boolean term that expresses
the constraint.
The ASMETA Validator (AsmetaV) tool is a more effective and reliable validation
approach for ASM models than the AsmetaS [69]. It does not depend on the user’s judg-
ment on the conformance of the actual outputs against the supposed ones. It is based on
the scenario construction idea for validating the AsmetaL specifications. A scenario char-
acterizes the system’s behaviour globally through exploring the perceivable interactions
between the system and its external environment in certain circumstances. A scenario is
quite helpful for confirming that the informal requirements are captured correctly, and for
indicating alternative design solutions while exploring system functionalities.
The scenario-based validation approach is inspired from the concept of UML use-cases
description [56], to realize the dual aim of model validation and testing. In UML, a
scenario is a diagrammatic description of the interaction sequences between actor actions
and reactions of the analyzed system. In the AsmetaV context, a scenario is an algorithmic
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enum domain DoorStatus={OPENED | OPENING
| CLOSING | CLOSED}
enum domain Ava i l a b i l i t y={EXIST | NOTEXIST}
enum domain Pos i t i onS ta tu s = {NOTALIGNED
| ALIGNED}
enum domain MotionStatus = {STOPPED | MOVING}
enum domain Status = {SENSING | EXECUTING}
// FUNCTIONS
controlled s t a t e : Status
controlled doorStatus : DoorStatus
controlled tra inMotion : MotionStatus
controlled t r a i nPo s i t i o n : Pos i t i onS ta tu s
controlled emergency : Av a i l a b i l i t y
controlled ob s t a c l eS t a tu s : Av a i l a b i l i t y
monitored t ra inMot ionSensor : MotionStatus
monitored t r a i nPo s i t i onSen s o r : Po s i t i onS ta tu s
monitored obs ta c l eSen so r : Av a i l a b i l i t y
monitored emergencySensor : Av a i l a b i l i t y
derived allowToOpen : Boolean
derived al lowToClose : Boolean
definit ions :
function allowToOpen=
i f doorStatus=CLOSED and
tra inMotion=STOPPED and






i f doorStatus=OPENED and





rule r c l o s e d t o op en i n g=
i f allowToOpen then
doorStatus :=OPENING
endif
rule r open ing to opened=
i f doorStatus=OPENING then
doorStatus :=OPENED
endif
rule r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g=
i f al lowToClose then
doorStatus :=CLOSING
endif
rule r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d=
i f doorStatus=CLOSING then












rule r TrainMotionSens ing=
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f t ra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED then
par
tra inMotion :=STOPPED




rule r Obs tac l eSens ing=
i f doorStatus=CLOSING or
doorStatus=OPENED then
ob s t a c l eS t a tu s := obs ta c l eSen so r
endif
// MAIN RULE
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else




r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]





default in i t s0 :
function doorStatus = CLOSED
function tra inMotion = MOVING
function t r a i nPo s i t i o n = NOTALIGNED
function ob s t a c l eS t a tu s = NOTEXIST
function emergency= NOTEXIST
function s t a t e = SENSING
Code 2: The AsmetaL specification for Train Door Controller exampleCode 2.1: The Asmet spe ification for t ai door controller example
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description of a specified path for the interaction sequences, that could include two actors:
user actor, adopted UML actor, and observer actor, added actor. The user actor is capable
of setting the external environment, i.e., determining the values of the monitored functions,
and checking the machine outputs, i.e., the values of the updated controlled functions. The
observer actor has further capabilities to check the internal configurations of the machine,
to ask for the execution of the determined transition rule, and to oblige the machine to
make one or more steps.
The AsmetaV supports a metamodel-based language, called Avalla (ASMETA Validation
Language). This language has a list of syntactic commands to express executing scenarios
as interaction sequences. The list includes: the set command for updating monitored or
shared functions, the step for executing one ASM step, the step until for iterative execut-
ing more than one ASM steps until a specified condition is satisfied, exec for executing an
ASM transition rule, and the check for inspecting the boolean value for internal property
at the current state of the machine. Avalla has a well-defined semantics given in terms of
ASM.
The AsmetaV is built around the Avalla scenario language, and the AsmetaS tool. AmetaV
reads a scenario written in Avalla by the user, and invokes the AsmetaS to simulate this
scenario. During simulation, the AsmetaV produces a PASS/FAIL verdict, to indicate
the output results of the specified check actions. In this way, any check violation can be
captured.
The ASMETA SMV (AsmetaSMV) model checker [31] is a formal verification
tool of ASMs. It is designed to enrich he ASMETA framework with the NuSMV [75]
model checking capabilities to verify temporal properties of ASM models. AsmetaSMV
automatically maps the ASM model, which is written in AsmetaL, into NuSMV code, and
runs the NuSMV tool on the translated code. The temporal properties, with AsmetaSMV,
can be expressed as either Computation Tree Logic (CTL) or Linear-time Temporal Logic
(LTL) formula. With AsmetaSMV, the user can directly add the temporal properties to
the AsmetaL program, without the need to know the NuSMV syntax, but knowing the
syntax of the AsmetaL language and the temporal operators is required. In our work for
analysing safety-critical systems, we use the LTL formula, therefore we present just the
syntax for LTL as shown in Table 2.1.
The advantages of using the AsmetaSMV, instead of NuSMV, is that the input language
is easier to write and much more expressive, due to it’s an extensive set of transition rules,
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Table 2.1: The LTL operators and their corresponding function in AsmetaL
LTL operator AsmetaL LTL function
© p static x: Boolean → Boolean
 p static g: Boolean → Boolean
♦ p static f: Boolean → Boolean
p U q static u: Prod(Boolean, Boolean) → Boolean
p R q static v: Prod(Boolean, Boolean) → Boolean
but the price is that the model checking is does not support every ASM element (domain,
function, or rule construct). As a consequence, a user must be aware of the unsupported
elements which as follows:
• the String, Char, any, and abstract domains are not supported. However, the String
domains can be used in terms of numerated (enum) domains. The enum domains are
finite user-named enumerations, e.g. one may define the following enumeration:
enum domain MotionStatus = {MOVING | STOPPED}
Note that the enumerated domain accepted an element consisting only of upper-case
letters with length greater than or equal to two;
• the infinite Integer, and Natural domains are not accepted, although the concrete
domains of Integer or Natural type are possible. The concrete domains are defined
sub-domains of type-domains, e.g., consider the following domain:
domain Numbers subsetof Integer
domain Numbers={1 .. 3};
• declaring sequence Seq and set Powerset terms are disallowed;
• the constructs for sequential seq endseq, extension extend, iterative while while do, and
turbo rules are not supported by the AsmetaSMV. The remaining rule constructs are
allowable;
• using a function as an argument of another function to determine its location is not
possible, as the tool cannot detect what NuSMV variable corresponds to this location;
• AsmetaSMV is not able to resolve the inconsistent updates problem for controlled
functions. Where, the AsmetaSMV will assume that the controlled function has the
first satisfied value, without giving any indication of the inconsistency. Therefore, be-
fore applying the AsmetaSMV, the AsmetaS must be run to discover any inconsistent
updates for the specified controlled functions in the AsmetaL;
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• not exhaustively defined derived and static functions, makes the AsmetaSMV gives
an error signal stating that the conditions of the defined function are not exhaustive,
see Code 2.2. In Code 2.2 a, the boolean derived function allowToOpen is not defined
when the doorStatus is not equal to CLOSED;
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and






(a) The not exhaustively defined derived
function
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and








(b) The exhaustively defined derived
function




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
inCon:= incCon + 1
default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
i f ( incCon + 1) in Numbers then




default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1
(b) The correct update
Code 3: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
4
(a) The not exhaustively defined derived function
functio allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and






(a) The not exhaustively d fined derived
functio
functio allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and








(b) The exhaustively defined derived
functio




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init io s :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule Main =
inCon:= i cCon + 1
default in i s0 :
functio incCon= 1




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init io s :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule Main =
i f ( incCon + 1) in Numbers then




default in i s0 :
functio incCon= 1
(b) The correct update
Code 3: Update the Integer controlled functio : AsmetaL model
4
(b) The exhaustively defined derived function
Code 2.2: Exhaustively and not exhaustively defined derived functions: AsmetaL model
• Updating the Integer controlled function to a value not belonging to the defined do-
main is impossible, see Code 2.3 a. This problem can be managed by adding a
condition that states the allowed value, see Code 2.3 b.
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and






(a) The not exhaustively defined derived
function
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot ionSensor=STOPPED and








(b) The exhaustively defined derived
function




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
inCon:= incCon + 1
default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1




domain Numbers subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
i f ( incCon + 1) in Numbers then




default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1
(b) The correct update
Code 3: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
4
(a) The wrong update
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot io Sens r=STOPPED and






(a) The not xhaustively defined derived
function
function allowToOpen =
i f doorStatus=CLOSED then
i f tra inMot io Sens r=STOPPED and








(b) The ex austively d fined derived
function




domain Numbers su setof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
inCon:= incCon + 1
default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1




domain Numbers su setof I n t eg e r
controlled incCon : Numbers
def init ions :
domain Numbers={1. .3}
main rule r Main =
i f ( incCon + 1) in Numbers then




default in i t s0 :
function incCon= 1
(b) The correct upda e
Code 3: Update the Integ r controlled function: AsmetaL odel
4
(b) The correct update
Code 2.3: Update the Integer contr ll f ction: AsmetaL model
Other tools the ASMETA framework also includes additional tools (we do not present
them, as they are not utilized in this work), such as: the ASMETA Model Advisor (As-
metaMA) [32] for identifying defects of AsmetaL models, the ASM Test Generation Tool
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(ATGT) [110] for test cases generation, Asm2c++ [55] for automatic generation of C++
code from AsmetaL, etc.
As this work chooses ASMETA framework, we are grateful for the ASMETA teamwork
assistance and active communication in several issues that we detected, such as:
• the validator wrongly parses the AsmetaL specifications that contain extend rule, but
the ASMETA teamwork released a new version of the validator;
• a bug in handling the monitored strings during simulation, i.e. reading a string value
from the environment. The ASMETA teamwork updated the plug-ins to solve this
issue;
• the simulator does not implement some functions, such as toInteger(“80”), toChar(“f”),
lt(’h’, ’g’), the ASMETA teamwork rebuilt the plug-ins and implemented them.
• the validator does not correctly validate specifications that include several dependant
monitored functions. We highlight an example of reading the length and the elements
of a sequence of integer numbers. Using AsmetaV to validate an ASM specification
for this example by a scenario, that checks for example the value of the third element,
does not give a right output. In such output, every element in the sequence is repeated
several times equal to the entered length. The ASMETA teamwork is still working to
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2.5 Why Abstract State Machines
There are a variety of formal methods, coming with their own merits and drawbacks.
A well-known example is Petri Nets (PNs) [190], which is a graphical and mathemat-
ical modelling method. PNs are emerged for modelling and analyzing the behavior of
asynchronous distributed systems depending on bi-partite graphs. However, it has been
observed that PNs are inadequate for modelling distributed systems, due to providing in-
sufficient abstraction and introducing algorithmically extraneous details, resulting from the
token-based transition view of objects, make the refinement and analysis processes of the
specified model a more complicated than necessary, failing to support convenient modeling
paradigm of communication among agents and/or the environment, and PNs are dedicated
for only small and medium size systems [59].
Another example that concerns the behaviour of concurrent/distributed systems, is
called Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [121]. CSP is a process algebra notation
for describing the interactions between a system and it’s environment in terms of processes
accomplished events. CSP is equipped with well-defined semantics. The CSP is considered
as a pen and paper language. As a result, the current implementation tools, which are
developed to prove and analyse CSP notation, adopt an input language called machine
readable CSP (CSPM ) [206], which incorporates functional programming language and it
does not support some of the idioms of CSP. To the best of our knowledge, implementing
a truly encoded CSP notation is still an open problem.
Other methods, like Vienna Development Method (VDM) [50], Zermelo (Z) [221], Al-
loy [127], and Bourbaki (B) [20], are considered similar to ASM method with respect to
supporting first-order data structures, providing abstract notations, and underpinning au-
tomatic application tools. Among these methods, the B method, a specification-oriented
method, is the most similar one to ASMs. The reasons for that are its basic block is ab-
stract machine and it includes the refinement concept, that leads in increasingly way to the
generation of the executable code. However, unlike ASMs, the data structures in B are not
pure first-order predict logic, as they also incorporate set theory. Its modelling method-
ology is close to an object-oriented style, and its syntax seems to be more complicated
and less understandable comparing with ASMs. In addition, B 2 and the other methods
2The B method has been extended to the event-B method with slightly different mathematical languages
to support the concurrent/distributed algorithms [68]. With respect to the applications, ASMs method
seemingly is more mature than event-B, due to its wide successful application case studies.
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(VDM, Z, and Alloy) are designated for specifying sequential systems, i.e. executing more
than one update simultaneously is not supported [187]. Furthermore, Z and VDM are
primarily employed for specifying the requirements and they both are not executable, i.e.
there is an issue for converting the specification into executable code. Differently, from Z
and VDM, Alloy is an analysis-oriented method, and its main focus is model checking the
system. The modelling language for Alloy has several restrictions to avoid the state space
explosion issue.
Among all these methods, this work chooses the Abstract State Machine method for
several reasons:
• ASMs come with a generality feature which makes these machines versatile enough
to adapt as needed to model a variety of systems, including sequential, parallel, and
distributed with synchronous or asynchronous paradigm; without the necessity of
assuming a certain size of a system being modelled. This serves our two directions
work for developing safe systems and secure protocols.
• The ASM method provides a link between human understanding and formulation of
problems under consideration and the deployment of their developed solutions.
• The ASM specifications are expressed in a simple and rich syntax with a straightfor-
ward and accurate semantics. This makes the ASM specifications understandable by
being able to read and write them in a transparent way.
• The specifications for ASMs are executable for their simulation and validation, as they
are in fact pseudo-code programs with precisely well-defined semantics on abstract
data structures. [64].
• The faithfulness translation from the concrete problem into an abstract specification,
without superfluous coding details.
• ASMs can non-deterministically describe the behavior of the environment through
two ways: the monitored functions for modifying the machine by it’s environment,
and the choose construct for selecting an arbitrarily value in a manner unaccompanied
by scheduling restrictions.
• ASMs with the ground model and stepwise refinement concepts, can design any
system at the necessary level of abstraction, starting from capturing the requirements
to the executable code.
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• The ASM method serves in supporting the design, simulation, validation, and verifi-
cation activities, within the open source ASMETA framework.
2.6 Conclusion
The Abstract State Machines are general mathematical machines for modelling hardware
and software systems at the natural abstraction level. These machines are further devel-
oped into a system engineering method that seamlessly directs the development process of
computational systems, from capturing the requirements to practical implementation.
There is a wide spectrum of executable ASM languages and analysis tools that have
been developed throughout the years. Some of these languages and their supported tools
are still around, while others are not, as their originators are graduated Ph.D. or no longer
active. Most of the existing tools either adopt different notations of ASM models or they
underpin only one aspect of the whole system development life-cycle. This work employs
the ASMETA framework, as it is maintained and feature-rich project, and it supports
notation language very similar to ASMs and provides tools served the development process
as well.
Chapter 3
Safety and Security Analysis
Techniques
3.1 Introduction
Both safety and security are crucial aspects in the development process of computational
systems [220]. Safety refers to a state being devoid of/protected from unintentional ac-
cidents, whereas security represents a state that is free from/resisted deliberate threats.
Another distinctive feature between these two aspects is: while security is dealing with
environmentally originated risks that might affect the system, safety is focusing on risks
which stem from the system and has potential effects on the environment [192]. System
safety/security can be realized through safety/security analysis techniques, respectively.
As safety and security can not be ensured, these techniques help to convey the systems’
behaviour within reasonable limits.
Safety analysis aims at identifying hazards that could jeopardise a system’s environ-
ment, determining potential causes and effects for hazards, tracing hazards that could lead
to an accident, and eliciting requirements that manage the accidents.
Security analysis aims at identifying threats which may endanger a system, exploring
system’s vulnerabilities (weaknesses) that could be exploited by these threats, evaluating
the risks of the indicated threats, decomposing each threat into possible attacks on a
system, showing how these attacks can be caused, and eliciting requirements which can
tackle or mitigate security problems.
Safety and security analysis techniques can be applied from the beginning of the sys-
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tem development process, or can integrated within any stage of this process. The common
stages of the development process are: requirements elicitation, design (designing a sys-
tem in an abstract way), validation (showing that the designed system satisfies the users’
requirement), verification (showing that the designed system meets its requirements speci-
fication), and Implementation (converting the abstract design into executable code). These
stages can be adopted for safety-critical systems and security protocols [108].
This chapter presents an overview of a number of safety and security analysis tech-
niques. There are a considerable number of techniques from both fields, but we cover
just the techniques that are well-known in the literature and widely practiced in industry.
However, before reviewing these techniques, we briefly explain the system development
process, to grasp the role of these techniques. After that, we look in detail at safety anal-
ysis techniques. In addition, we evaluate the safety analysis techniques according to their
capability to ensure safety in modern critical systems. This is followed by a concise review
of common security analysis techniques, which includes an illustration of their principal
ideas. We also present an evaluation of security analysis techniques to examine whether
they are sufficient to elicit the necessary requirements for security protocols. Appendix A
shows the application of the analysis techniques to an illustrative example with respect to
both safety and security fields.
3.2 Software System Development Process
The software system development process or the software development life-cycle is a struc-
tured process consisting of a set of activities-based stages that help to manage the devel-
opment and the implementation of a system.
Different models have been formed and developed to represent the development pro-
cess. In order to illustrate the role of analysis techniques reviewed here in the development
process, a simple safety V model [196] is sufficient for this purpose. The V model, as
shown in Figure 3.1, has the V shape that incorporates the main activities in a typical
development process. The left branch of the V represents the analysis and design phase.
This phase starts with system analysis stage through identifying the hazards and eliciting
the requirements which are related to the system’s functions, or they are just constraints
on its behaviour. There are many safety and hazard analysis techniques established and
designed to serve this stage. Following this stage, the design of the system should be grad-
ually specified, until the detailed and completed design is obtained. The progressive design
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can be directed by the recommendations resulted from the failure causes and consequences
analysis. The analysis and design phase produces the system design plus the safety-related
requirements and recommendations.
The right branch of the V is the testing phase. The testing phase should be performed
on the software using the requirements and design specifications. Typically, this phase
includes activities for demonstrating that the safety requirements taken place in the right
branch of the V have been met. The activities encompass validation and verification of the
requirements for the abstract and detailed design in an integrated process. An interesting
feature of the safety V model is using the feedback from the earlier phase to the later phase
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and Product
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produced safety evidence
- Confirming that the 
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- Defensible argument that 
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Figure 3.1: The safety V representation of the development process
3.3 Safety Analysis Techniques
There are a huge number of safety analysis techniques that have been developed to identify
and analyse hazards. However, only some of these techniques are applied by safety analysts
in practice [96], such as: Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, and
HAZards and OPerability Analysis. These techniques are known as traditional safety
analysis techniques which are concerned with a system’s component. On another hand,
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there is a technique, called System Theoretic Process Analysis, whose concern is dynamic
system behaviour. In this section each technique is described in a way that covers the
following points: the definition and application areas where the techniques can be applied,
the distinctive features and advantages, the procedure of process related to each technique,
the suitable time to use these techniques with respect to the system development process,
and finally the main limitations for these techniques.
3.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis
Definition and Application Areas: One of the well-known hazard analysis technique
is the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [88]. This technique is firstly designed and developed, in
the early 1960s, by H.A. Watson at Bell Laboratories, contracting with U.S. Air Force, to
evaluate the Minuteman missile system [95]. A few years later, it was further developed, at
Boeing Company, as a safety analysis tool applied in the commercial aviation [14]. After
that, FTA has been successfully used for assessing the safety and reliability of various
systems in different application areas, including but not limited to: transport [74], nuclear
power plants [103], medical domain [39], related safety critical area [232], and so on. FTA
is fully defined and described in the Fault Tree Handbook [231].
Distinctive Features and Advantages: FTA performs a top-down analysis starting
with a given undesired event, which is hazard or accident, and tracing backward to deter-
mine the foreseeable and failure events that may give rise to the top level event. Typically,
FTA is a deductive technique that diagnoses the critical failure combinations which likely
cause a hazardous event, and it can calculate the probability for them [88]. The analysis
by FTA is represented graphically using a logic tree-structured notation. The tree is built
using the following two elements [88]:
Events are the nodes of the tree that comprises the hazardous event/root and its identified
causes. The events are categorized according to their types, as follows:
• Basic events are the basic failure events that do not need to be expanded or
investigated any more, as they explicitly defined. These events are the leaves of
the tree and they represented by a circle shape.
• Undeveloped events are also the leaves failure events, but they can not be
further developed, due to inadequate information is available about them, or
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because they are considered unsuitable in this analysis. They have a diamond
shape.
• Intermediate events are faulty events that requires further investigation. They
are represented by a rectangle shape. The root of a tree is considered as an
intermediate event.
Gates: shows the causal way of combining input/top events to produce output/below
event. The most widely used gates in a fault tree are:
• AND-gate identifies the combination by which the co-occurrence of all input
events is essential to produce the output event.
• OR-gate defines the combination whereby the output event will occur if any
input event occurs.
Process: The analysis process of FTA is structured, systematic, and repetitive, where it
is conducted in two steps [88]:
(1) Identify the top-level hazardous events.
(2) For each hazardous event, do the following:
(a) Construct a fault tree, for the chosen event/the tree’s root, by determining the
combination of intermediate, basic and undeveloped events that may cause the
root using Boolean logic gates.
(b) Define the minimum cutset, which is the smallest collection of tree’s leaves leading
to the top hazardous event.
Using Time: FTA can be applied at any stage of the system development life-cycle.
Disadvantages: FTA does not have explicit guidance to develop its tree structure [96].
However, it has certain questions answered at each gate level to determine it’s type and
inputs. These questions have two concepts: state-of-the-system (SS), a fault does not arise
from component failure, and state-of-the-component (SC), a fault that does arise from
component failure. The SS questions are: “What is immediate (I), necessary (N), and
sufficient (S) to cause the event?”. While the SC questions are: What are the Primary
(P), Secondary (S), and Command (C) causes of the event?”. These questions enable the
FTA user to focus on determining the next failure element in the cause-effect sequence
style. However, it seems to be not obvious how answering these questions gives enough
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guidance during the analysis process. The application of FTA needs a practically and
theoretically experienced analyst to identify the main causes of hazardous events.
3.3.1.1 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis
Definition and Application Areas: The Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is,
as its name suggests, a technique for identifying the potential failure modes of the system’s
components and evaluating their possible effects [81]. The FMEA technique stems from the
development of the U.S. Military procedure MIL-STD-1629A [12], which is an evaluation
procedure of failure modes for weapon systems. Since then, it has been applied in a wide
range of industries, such as: aerospace [133], automotive [195], space rocket [203], textile
industry [186], and so on.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: FMEA has a detailed version, known as Fail-
ure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), where the evaluation of the criticality
for failure modes is added [81].
The FMEA/FMECA is a bottom-up inductive technique, that starts with a system
description, and main constraints for its success and failure. The analysis output of
FMEA/FMECA is documented in a worksheet, which contains a description for the fol-
lowing column headers [81]:
• Component is either a part of a system or subsystem being analysed, or a step of a
process under analysis.
• Failure mode is a way in which a component might fail; the mode of a component
after failure.
• Cause is the potential factor(s) causing the failure mode.
• Effect is a serious repercussion(s) or consequence(s) failure mode on a whole system
and it’s environment.
• Severity classification is a classification or ranking of the severity for the failure
mode, using the following severity levels: catastrophic, critical, marginal, and negli-
gible.
• Criticality ranking is a qualitative or quantitative measure of failure mode critical-
ity. This column is only included in the FMECA worksheet.
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• Recommendations are possible suggestions for mitigating or eliminating the failure
mode effects.
Process: The FMEA/FMECA can be applied through a structured process consisting of
the following steps [81]:
(1) Define the system under analysis, it’s functional requirements, and it’s main assump-
tions and constraints.
(2) Construct the FMEA/FMECA worksheet to record the results of the analysis session.
(3) Pursue the analysis by conducting the recommendations when it is possible.
Using Time: FMEA/FMECA should be applied as early in the development life-cycle as
possible to make early change to the system design according to the obtained results from
this technique [96].
Disadvantages: In [96], it has been shown the following limitations. The FMEA/FMECA
does not provide any guidance to prompt imaginative thinking during the analysis session.
As a result, conducting the FMEA/FMECA requires a multi-disciplined and experienced
team to increase overall creativity of the process. FMEA/FMECA can not determine
hazardous and unpredictable effects unrelated to the considered failure modes.
3.3.2 HAZards and OPerability Analysis
Definition and Application Areas: The HAZards and OPerability Analysis (HAZOP)
study was originally developed by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in the United King-
dom, as an analysis technique for identifying and assessing hazards and operability prob-
lems in the pipework and instruments design of a chemical plant [76, 119]. It has since
then been used in many domains, including but not by way of limitation to nuclear [199],
pharmaceutical [120], safety-critical domains [66], etc.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: The HAZOP conducts inductive bottom-up
analysis by examining how deviations from the aim of system design or the intention
of the planned operation can result in hazardous outcomes [84]. The examination of these
deviations is based on using a set of guide words, listed in Table 3.1, as a facility for
perceiving deviations applied for each system’s part.
The findings of HAZOP are reported in a worksheet, which includes information about
the following column headings [84]:
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Guide Word Meaning
No The design intention is not attained
More A quantitative increase
Less A quantitative decrease
More than (As well as) The design intentions achieved with additional output
Part of The design intention is partially achieved
Reverse The opposite or contrary to the intention happens
Early / Late Something occurs in a different intended time
Before / After Something occurs in a different intended order or sequence
Table 3.1: HAZOP guide words
• Item is an entity, a function, a process, or any part of a system being analysed.
• Parameter is an attribute related to the item under analysis, which affects the item’s
operation comparing with its design intention.
• Deviation-Guide Word is a deviation from the design aim, that is determined by
combining a guide word with a parameter, and provoking a question about whether
such a combination could arise a deviation.
• Cause is a potential causal element that contributes to producing a defined deviation.
• Consequence is a hazardous effect of the identified deviation.
• Risk is two qualitative words describe how the consequence, described above, could
be risky. The two words are chosen from risk’s severity : “catastrophic”, “critical”,
“marginal”, “negligible”, and probability : “frequent”, “probable”, “occasional”, “re-
mote”, “improbable”.
• Recommendations are possible recommended actions for alleviating or removing
the hazardous consequences.
Process: The process of HAZOP is accomplished in an examination session, during which
a multi-disciplinary team performs the following steps [84]:
1) Determining the main items or components of the system.
2) Select an item and define its design intent and its parameters or attributes.
3) Locate a deviation that can lead to a hazard, by combining a suitable guide word
with an item’s parameter.
4) Identify the cause and consequence of the defined deviation.
5) Suggest remedial measures.
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6) Record the outcomes in a worksheet.
7) Repeat steps 2 to 6 for each item.
Using Time: HAZOP should be used in the early design stage, but it entails that de-
tailed system design is near completion to be analysed effectively, i.e., identify the possible
recommendations that reduce the possibility of the hazards.
Disadvantages: HAZOP, though gives guidance to the analysis session by its flexible
guide words, requires a trained and experienced multi-disciplinary teamwork. HAZOP
also lacks guidance on determining the causes and effects of deviations. Furthermore,
focusing on guide words lead to ignoring some hazards not associated with a guide word
[96].
HAZOP, like FTA, ET, and FMEA techniques, focuses on a single part of a system
design instead of considering the system as a whole. Moreover, this technique suffers from
repetition.
3.3.3 System Theoretic Process Analysis
Definition and Application Areas: System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a
safety analysis technique that is designed with the aim of providing more advantages over
traditional safety analysis techniques, through changing the analysis focus from a single
component failure into a whole system dynamic behaviour [149]. In fact, STPA is similar
to FTA in terms of following a top-down analysis strategy, but instead of identifying only
the hazard causes (scenarios) that originate from a failure, STPA adds an extensive causes
set, including causes related to failed interactions among non-malfunctioning components,
human behavior mistakes, software errors, system design and requirement flaws [152].
STPA technique was originally applied to analyse a complex software-intensive sys-
tem in aerospace, which was unmanned space vehicle, known as H-IB Transfer Vehicle
(HTV) [126], but has since then been used for many systems in different application areas,
including but not limited to: Aircraft Wheel Braking system [154], Adaptive Cruise Con-
trol system [16], PROSCAN Proton Therapy system [29], Space Shuttle Operations [185],
Robotic Telesurgical System [26], etc.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: STPA uses a type of accident causation model,
called System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) [146, 147]. STAMP
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changes the accident causation models from being chain-of-failure-event causality mod-
els, which underlie most of traditional safety analysis techniques, into systematic mod-
els, whereby accidents emerge when the interactions among the system components: hu-
man, social, physical, software, violate the safety constraints related to these components.
STAMP is built on systems theory, which deals with a complex system by structuring it
as a hierarchical controlled levels. This is different from the traditional reliability theory,
which handles the behavioral complexity of a system by dividing this system into separated
components and proving the functions for each component [152].
Based on STAMP, STPA deems safety as a system control problem instead of a compo-
nent failure problem. In a typical manner, STPA models a system as a functional control
loop (or what is called functional control structure), and it views accidents as the con-
sequence of inadequate control. Figure 3.2 presents a simple control loop. For complex
systems, this loop may contain multiple controllers ordered hierarchically. The simple loop
is formed of a controller, actuator, sensor and controlled process. The controller includes
a model of the process which it is controlling its behavior. The process model helps the
controller to decide which control action to be issued. The actuator executes this action
on the controlled process, and the sensor updates the process model for the controller by
returning to it the current status information about the controlled process. By this sys-
tem theoretic view, the accidents can be investigated though checking when the controlled
process may produce unsafe behavior, and the conclusion can then be made by consid-
ering that the behaviors of other components are hazardous and the main causes for the
controller process outputs.
In addition to identifying the potential causes of a predicted accident, STPA helps to
elicit safety requirements (safety constraints) which will be imposed on the system design to
generate safe behavior. Safety requirements are elicited by examining each control action,
that changes the controlled process status, under different timed provision conditions which
affect the safety of action, and determining whether this action associating with these
conditions is a hazardous one [149]. As a result, eliciting safety requirements by STPA is
based on a what-if query on every control action.
Process: STPA has a guided and systematic process. The main terminology that has
been used with STPA process are [149]:
• Accident: An undesired event that occurs unintentionally (but not necessary unex-
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Figure 3.2: A basic control loop (adapted from [146])
pectedly) and brings an unacceptable loss.
• Hazard: A set of system conditions that, if combined with a specific set of worst-case
environmental conditions, will result in an accident (loss).
• Unsafe control action: A hazardous command which might happen when it is
provided or not provided as required from the human or automated controller.
• Process model: A set of system and environmental variables updated by different
status feedback of the system’s components. This set is utilized to take a decision by
a controller to provide or not provide a control action.
• Safety constraints: Safety conditions that safeguard a system against potential
accidents.
• Causal Factors: The main causes that would explain the accident scenarios for how
unsafe control actions might violate safety constraints.
• Controlled process: A system’s process or a component that is under the control
of the activities for human or automated controller.
• Controlled variable: A variable whose values manipulated by the actuator when
the action is provided.
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• Monitored variable: A variable whose values that are set by the human or envi-
ronmental controller.
• Measured variable: A variable which keeps the state of the controlled process to
be used by the sensor.
STPA process is described in two steps [149]:
Step 1 Identify the possible control actions that could lead to a hazardous situation, as
follows:
Step 1.1 Construct the analysis foundation by identifying the expected accidents of
a system, and the possible hazards which likely give rise to these accidents.
Step 1.2 Draw an exploratory safety control loop diagram, which shows the system’s
components and their control and feedback tracks.
Step 1.3 Ask an expert about how could each control action related to each controller
leads to the identified system hazard(s). An expert is guided by the following four
conditions to identify unsafe actions:
• An essential control action for safety is “not provided” or not issued.
• An unsafe control action is “provided” when it is not required and this causes
a hazard.
• A safe control action is provided “too early” or “too late” in wrong order or
time.
• A safe control action (only continuous action) is “stopped too early” or “ap-
plied too long”.
Step 1.4 Document each unsafe control action in a table whose columns representing
the provision conditions for each unsafe action, see Table 3.3. The entries of this
table can then be mapped into high-level safety requirements or what are called
safety constraints.
Step 2 Identify the causal factors (scenarios) for each unsafe control action defined in Step
1 to realize how these actions could occur. This step is guided by the functional control
loop. Each causal factor can then be translated into low-level safety requirements that
help to mitigate against the severity of unsafe actions.
Our work for analysing safety-critical systems focuses on the first step of the STPA process.
The methodological procedure for achieving STPA Step 1 was extended into a more
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systematic one which gives enough guidance for identifying unsafe control actions based
on a defined formal structure for every action. An unsafe control action is formalized as a
four-tuple (CA, C, T , CO), where:
• CA is the control action that should be analysed.
• C is the controller that issues the CA control action.
• T is the type of the CA which can be either Provided at any time, too early, too late,
or Not provided.
• CO is the context of providing/not providing CA, which can be constructed by com-
bining values for the variables in the process model. More precisely, CO = (CO1, CO2,
..., COn), where each COi is a pair of the Vi variable in the process model that has
vi,j value, i.e., COi =(Vi, vi,j).
In general, the extended method for STPA Step 1 is a formal process for generating
tables, known as context tables facilitating the safety evaluation for every action. The
first column of a context table is the control action under analysis. The second column
represents the process model variables for this control action, which can be filled depending
on the values of these variables. While the last column denotes the decision that should be
taken by an expert on whether this action is hazardous. The extended method for STPA
Step 1 can be summarized into the following steps:
1. Determine the relevant variables of the process model for each control action which
is issued from a controller in the functional safety control loop.
2. Construct context table for each action with respect to the four provision condition.
Table 3.2 is a generic context table for evaluating the CAi control action.
3. Review and evaluate each row in the context table by an expert. An expert can
use yes/no to denote the presence of a hazard or not. However, we find that the
evaluation is not a closed-ended process since providing/not providing some actions
with a specific context will not lead to a hazard, but there is a flaw with the system’s
function, see Chapter 5.















v11 v21 ... vn1 yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no
... ... ... ... yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no
v1n v2n ... vnn yes/no yes/no yes/no yes/no
Table 3.2: A generic context table of providing the CAi control action
STPA has been applied to train door controller example [227]. As the work in this
thesis focuses only on the first step, we present the results from the first step in Table 3.3,
which must be converted into a safety requirement using must/must not. For example,
the unsafe action: open action is not provided once the train stops at a platform, can be
translated into the following safety requirement: open action must be provided once the
train stops at a platform. Accordingly, Table 3.3 shows the outcomes (unsafe actions) that
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moving




Table 3.3: Unsafe control actions for train door controller example (adapted from [227])
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Using Time: STPA technique can be applied at the development stage, as it can be used
to analyse a system that is already available or it is under design.
Disadvantages: We observe that STPA has no means to identify the accidents and haz-
ards of a system and to ensure the completeness of these hazards.
3.4 Evaluation of Safety Analysis Techniques
Given the complexity of modern safety-critical systems and their increasing reliance on
software, this section evaluates the safety analysis techniques with respect to their ability
to analyse the safety for modern critical systems. In Table 3.4 though, we summarize the
main features of these techniques based on their application, which is show in A, to the
TDC example.
FTA and FMEA techniques are considered as failure-based methods, as they are gen-
erally developed to capture the causes of accidents that are component failures-originated.
However, when a component of a system is a software, then these techniques, in almost all
instances, can not address the software errors for this component, or in their best situation
they will only provide a general cause labeled as undeveloped software failure [145].
In addition to determining the component failure causes, HAZOP technique emphasizes
the deviations, which are based on guide words, from the component design aim during
identifying hazard’s causes. The HAZOP success depends on the choice of guide words that
point out deviations, the availability of the design details, and the understandability of the
system’s behavior. Concerning software systems, the HAZOP guide words are insufficient
to address software errors, like the wrong value of delivered data, and the modern software
systems behavior is unexpected or unanticipated and slightly understandable [197].
A variety of modifications have been added to these techniques to better identify the
software-related hazards, such as Software FTA (SFTA) [151], Software FMEA (SFMEA)
[196].
SFTA [151] is an extended version of FTA, that is employed to detect the possible
safety-related code errors and software bugs for the system under analysis. SFMEA [198]
is an advanced form of FMEA that is applicable to a system contained software faults
which could cause failures and it is capable of stating the effects of these failures. SHARD
[196] is originated from the HAZOP technique with some extra variations regarding the
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employed guide words and the guidance for identifying the potential software failure causes.
SHARD was applied to analyse the data(information) flows in a software system.
Despite these extensions, the techniques with a single software failure focus, seem
less useful to capture the major causes of the accidents for modern systems which are:
the flawed requirements and misapprehension about the hazards that are associated with
software functionality [148, 160]. In fact, unlike the hardware, the software is not harmful
by itself. It fails only functionally but not haphazardly [96].
All the above techniques can not analyse multiple failures at a time and deal with
the dynamic interactions between components. Thus, these limitations together with the
inability to address software-related hazards make them limited in analysing the modern
complex systems.
STPA is a relatively new analysis technique as compared with these techniques. It is
capable of capturing more hazard causes than the transitional techniques, in particular,
those are pertaining to requirement flaws, design errors, inadvertent human behavior,
component interaction failures, and software errors [149, 150, 105].
The key advantage of STPA is taking into account functional interactions among system
components during the analysis of expected system accidents. In other words, unlike other
techniques that consider accidents stemming from a component failure chain, STPA relates
accidents to the un-imposing safety constraints on functional interactions among system
components.
The capability of identifying the requirement flaws and locating safety constraints re-
lated to functions enables the STPA to analyse the software safety of a system. Moreover,
the safety constraints identified by STPA has been mathematically formalized and this
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3.5 Security Analysis Techniques
This section reviews a number of analysis techniques from the security domain. The
key features of these techniques are discussed together with the main principle of their
processes. Some of the reviewed techniques were originally developed to analyse security
protocols in an informal way, but the formal analysis techniques for protocols will be
surveyed and discussed later in Chapter 4.
3.5.1 Attack Tree
Definition and Application Areas: The Attack Tree (AT) is a way of depicting and
investigating the security of a system based on the possible attacks [211, 213]. This tech-
nique models a system’s attack in a way that helps to describe how an attacker would carry
out potential attacks, and to identify the countermeasures to thwart them. An AT con-
stitutes the base of understanding the security process for hardware and software systems
belonging to any domain [211].
Distinctive Features and Advantages: Although AT is similar to FTA in terms of
employing graphical logic-based diagram, it is rather a security breach analysis technique,
not a failure analysis one. In particular, it uses a tree structure to represent attacks upon
a system, where the topmost node (root) is the attacker goal, and the nodes below are
sub-goals or different ways of attaining the main goal. As in FTA, the AND and OR
gates are used to describe the relationship between the parent node and its children. It is
possible to assign values to tree nodes, starting from the leaf nodes and then moving up to
calculate the cost of an attack and probability of the success, or to estimate the need for
special equipment, the possibility, and the legality of the goal, and so on [211].
Process: An AT has an ad-hoc and repetitive process consisting of the following steps
[211]:
(1) Define the anticipated attack goals (possible attacks on a system).
(2) Construct a separated tree for each goal, where the root of the constructed tree is
further refined into sub-goals, and the refinement process is repeated for each sub-goal
node until no more refinement is possible and the top attack goal is achieved.
(3) Optionally assign a value (numerical or boolean) to each node in every tree to deter-
mine the probability of attacks success.
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Using Time: AT can be applied in the late stage of the development process, to have
enough knowledge about the components that might be assaulted [211].
Disadvantages: Seemingly, AT lacks adequate guide for identifying all the attacker goals
and for thinking about all the ways for achieving the goals. Hence, it needs knowledgeable
and experienced analyst.
3.5.2 Vulnerability Identification and Analysis
Definition and Application Areas: Based on HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP) and
Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) techniques, a Vulnerability
Identification and Analysis (VIA) technique was designed for the security protocols domain
[107, 108]. VIA aims to analyse and extract further requirements for security protocols,
starting with the initial requirements that must be achieved by them.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: VIA allows analysing both initial and more
detailed requirements to identify vulnerabilities and weaknesses at a various level of ab-
straction. VIA is similar to the HAZOP and SHARD techniques in terms of employing a
set of guide words for pinpointing the deviations, and a tabular worksheet for documenting
the analysis output. However, the guide-words for VIA were chosen in a way that enables
to address issues relating to protocols, such as disclosing secret message and repeat send-
ing a message, see Table 3.5 which enumerates the VIA guide words and their meaning.
In general, the guide words aid at determining deviations to protocol requirements which
may lead to a situation in which the protocol is vulnerable to an attack and its desired
properties are violated. Furthermore, the worksheet includes the following column head-
ings: Guide word-Deviation, Causes, Effects, Recommendations, and Comments, which are
slightly different from the ones for HAZOP. Typically, it does not include the parameter
column heading, as the deviation is identified by combining a guide word with functional
requirement instead of the parameter, and it has an extra column heading which is Com-
ments for noting down assumptions about the analysis, which do not suit other headings.
Process: VIA has a structured and iterative process adopting core ideas from both HA-
ZOP and SHARD techniques. The process of VIA can be described through the following
steps [84]:
Chapter 3. Safety and Security Analysis Techniques 65
Guide Word Meaning
Omission The event does not occur
Inclusion (spurious) The unexpected event occurs once
Inclusion (repetition) The unexpected event occurs several times
Value The information in the event has incorrect value
Disclosure (external) The information in the event has been revealed to an intruder
Disclosure (internal)
The information in the event has been revealed to participants
taking part in the protocol
Early (absolute) The event occurs earlier than the intended real-time deadline
Early (relative) The event occurs earlier than another intended event
Late (absolute) The event occurs later than the intended real-time deadline
Late (relative) The event occurs later than another intended event
Table 3.5: VIA guide words
(1) Determine the high-level functional requirements of a protocol under analysis. The
functional requirements are determined by defining what the protocol should achieve
with respect to the protocol’s parties and their actions.
(2) Select a high-level functional requirement and combine it a guide word to locate a
deviation.
(3) Analyse the causes of the located deviation based on the Primary-Secondary-Command
rule, adopted from FTA. This rule helps to identify causes originated from the failure
of the participant to carry out its particular action (primary cause), the failure of the
communication medium (secondary cause), or the failure of the event which prompts
the next action to be carried out (command cause).
(4) Highlight the effects of the identified deviation using the question: “Does this devia-
tion have any security implication on the protocol?”. This question can be answered
while testing how can the messages, message components, the protocol’s run, an at-
tacker’s and participants’ knowledge be affected.
(5) Suggest a recommendation to address the defined deviation. The recommendations
represent low-level requirements, which elicit by putting forward a measure that could
prevent a violation to the assumed security property of a protocol, or that could detect
when such a deviation has occurred and how to recover from it.
(6) Select another guide word, combine it with the functional requirement, and repeat
step 3 to 5 until no more guide words left.
(7) Select another high or low-level requirement and combine it with a suitable guide
word and repeat step 3 to 6 until no more requirements left.
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Using Time: VIA should be used at the early stage of the development process, i.e.,
before the actual design of a protocol is produced [108].
Disadvantages: VIA, despite providing guidance for identifying the vulnerabilities using
a set of guide-words, it seems to be restrictive to specific vulnerabilities determined by this
set. Furthermore, VIA is time-consuming and suffers repetition in the elicited requirements.
3.5.3 Requirements Analysis and Elicitation
Definition and Application Areas: The Requirements Analysis and Elicitation (REA)
is a tree technique for analysing and eliciting requirements for security protocols [108]. It
is developed depending on a number of tree based analysis techniques from safety and se-
curity domains, including fault tree analysis, event tree, threat, and attack tree techniques.
REA can be applied to any security-critical system, in addition to security protocols, for
identifying vulnerabilities which in turn facilitates the elicitation of more detailed require-
ments.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: REA is a goal decomposition technique for in-
vestigating the potential vulnerabilities of the protocol. It starts from an undesired event
(negated protocol goal) and decomposes it down to the basic events (basic vulnerabilities)
that lead to its occurrence. This allows traceability of the identified vulnerabilities. REA
documents its findings in a graphical tree similar to the one used in fault tree analysis tech-
nique in terms of using graphical representation for basic, intermediate, and undeveloped
events, and employing boolean gates for showing the relationships between these events.
However, it adds an oval shape for incorporating assumptions made by the analysis into the
tree diagram. The documented assumptions provide a clear description of when a specific
issue emerges in the analysis.
Process: The analysis process of REA is structured, systematic, and repetitive, where it
is conducted in two steps [108]:
(1) Identify the top-level undesirable events, by negating the high level security protocol
requirements.
(2) For each insecure event, do the following:
(a) Construct an REA tree, for the chosen event, through determining the combi-
nation of intermediate, basic and undeveloped events that may cause the chosen
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event using Boolean logic gates. The determination of these events is performed
by asking the question “What do we mean by [the event under consideration]?”
and answering it based on two ways. Either by checking various security prop-
erties, such as availability, confidentiality, authenticity, and etc., or by using the
Primary-Secondary-Command rule, adopted from FTA, which help to identify
the events originated from malicious and non-malicious actions. Any assumption
made during the analysis must be linked to the appropriate basic event.
(b) For each determined event, repeatedly define further low-level events until the
events cannot be further decomposed.
(c) For each basic event, identify the recommendations for overcoming the discovered
vulnerabilities in the security protocols.
Using Time: REA should be used at an early development stage, i.e., before the actual
design of a protocol is produced.
Disadvantages: As REA starts by negating the protocol’s goal, it may overlook some
vulnerabilities during the analysis [108]. Accordingly, if REA is integrated with another
technique for identifying all the possible undesirable situations of a protocol, then this will
positively enhance the REA findings.
3.5.4 System Theoretic Process Analysis for Security
Definition and Application Areas: The System Theoretic Process Analysis for Secu-
rity (STPA-Sec) is an extended version of the STPA technique that includes security anal-
ysis for cybersecurity problems [242]. It was designed to control the vulnerabilities that
could be exploited by threats instead of identifying all threats that can potentially cause
security incidents. It has been applied to safety-critical cyber-physical systems, such as
ballistic missile defense system.
Distinctive Features and Advantages: STPA-Sec is a top-down technique used to iden-
tify the security vulnerabilities for a system and the main causes that lead to violating its
security constraints. It considers security as a system vulnerabilities control problem rather
than a threat guarding problem. Controlling vulnerabilities means preventing incidents
that arise from known (inside the system) and unknown (outside) threats. STPA-Sec, like
STPA, employs functional control diagram which is structured hierarchically to model a
system. In this diagram, the control actions issued from higher level controllers will be
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executed via actuators at the lower level processes, whereas feedbacks are provided from
the lower level to the higher level via sensors. STPA-Sec investigates how could the func-
tions of the system’s components (controller, actuator, sensor, and controlled process) be
affected by the external attacks.
Process: STPA-Sec has a process similar to that used by STPA. Though all the steps
in both techniques are identical, the STPA-Sec includes terminology suitable for security
contexts, such as losses, vulnerabilities, and insecure control actions, in addition to terms
of accidents, hazards, and unsafe actions that are used by STPA. The process of STPA-Sec
can be described through the following steps:
Step 1 Identify the possible control actions that could lead to a hazardous situation, as
follows:
Step 1.1 Identify the losses of a system whether intentional or not, the hazards, and
the vulnerabilities.
Step 1.2 Create an exploratory functional control loop diagram, which shows the
system’s components and their control and feedback tracks.
Step 1.3 Determine unsafe control actions that could lead to hazards or insecure
control actions that could lead to the identified vulnerabilities.
Step 1.4 Ask an expert about how could each unsafe/insecure action lead to the
identified hazards/vulnerabilities. Answering this question is based on the fol-
lowing four conditions:
• A required control action is “not provided” or missed.
• An incorrect control action is “provided”.
• A correct control action is provided “too early” or “too late”.
• A correct control action is “stopped too early” or “applied too long”.
Step 1.5 Document each unsafe/insecure control action in a table whose columns
represent the provision conditions for each action. The entries of this table can
then be mapped into high-level safety/security requirements.
Step 2 Identify the causal factors (scenarios) for each unsafe/insecure control action de-
fined in Step 1 to realize how could these actions occur. This step is guided by checking
the correctness, appropriateness, and provision of the information for components in
the functional control loop. Each causal factor can then be translated into low-level
safety/security requirements.
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To understand the above steps, we can illustrate then to our given example that we
called a Single Authentication Protocol (SAP). This example is an authentication proto-
col for two participants: initiator and responder. The protocol aims to authenticate the
responder to the initiator through exchanging two messages. In the first message, the
initiator sends its identity together with a randomly chosen nonce to the responder, i.e.,
the initiator tells the responder, This is my identity and I want to communicate with you.
The nonce is my challenge. Upon receipt, the responder encrypts the nonce with a secret
key shared between it and the initiator. Once the second message is decrypted and the
nonce checked by the initiator, this will confirm that the responder is an authenticated
participant.
By applying the first step of the process for STPA-Sec technique to the SAP protocol,
we obtain the following losses for this protocol:
L1 The initiator wrongly believes that the responder is an authenticated participant.
L2 The responder incorrectly believes that it is communicating with the true initiator.
The vulnerabilities related to the above losses are:
V1 The inability of the responder to prove that the initiator is alive at the executing
protocol run.
V2 The initiator is unable to guarantee the freshness of the responder’s message.
V3 The association of the nonce with its legitimate participant is not explicitly stated
Based on the identified vulnerabilities, we document the insecure control actions in Table
3.6.
Using Time: STPA-Sec should be used at an early development stage and in situations
where a specific system’s component is not available.
Disadvantages: STPA-Sec does not provide enough guidance to determine the vulnera-
bilities of a system and the main causes of insecure actions. It also can not address some
critical problems, like non-repudiation, confidentiality, and anonymity. We believe that a
significant improvement could be made on STPA-Sec by extending the functional control
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Table 3.6: Insecure control actions for single authentication protocol
3.6 Evaluation of Security Analysis Techniques
As one of the concerns for this thesis is analysing security protocols, we evaluate the security
analysis techniques reviewed here, in terms of their applicability to analyse the security
protocols and to elicit the security requirements for these protocols. The application of
these techniques to the single authentication protocol is shown in Appendix A. We recap
the general features of these techniques in Table 3.7.
Attack Tree technique helps to identify the effects of attacks on a system, and to
determine the route that an attacker may take to attain its goals. Regarding security
protocols, AT can provide a description of the possible attacks on the protocol that shows
the attacker’s capabilities. However, it guarantees neither describing all the possible attacks
upon a protocol, nor covering the attacker’s capabilities comprehensively.
VIA is a systematic technique tailored for analysing security protocols. It inductively
applies a set of guide words for eliciting requirements to avoid the possible vulnerabili-
ties. However, this technique suffers from repetition in the extracted requirements and its
analysis is seemingly restricted to specific vulnerabilities determined by the utilized guide
words.
REA is another technique aids to analyse security protocols. Its intersecting feature
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is the clarity of showing the exact path for exploiting a potential vulnerability. However,
being solely dependent on decomposing the negated protocol goal into vulnerabilities could
result in overlooking some vulnerabilities during the REA analysis.
STPA-Sec is a useful technique when applied to software-intensive system where both
safety and security aspects are considered. Concerning the security protocols, we can
say that the four questions used by the STAP-Sec are insufficient to address all possible
requirements to control vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the starting point of the STPA-
Sec lacks the guidance to identify losses and vulnerabilities which consequently impacts
the completeness of the analysis outputs. Moreover, the four questions can identify the
vulnerabilities in only an abstract way without showing their types and nature.
All the above techniques can identify only known flaws and vulnerabilities, but no new
ones. Furthermore, they are applicable in early development stages, where the actual design
is not decided yet. Even though, developing formal notations for the output statements of
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3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we review some of the common and well-known techniques that are used
for safety and security analysis. We compare their strengths and shortcomings.
This review gives rise to several observations about analysis techniques, such as:
• There is a kind of resemblance among the safety analysis techniques in terms of using
the same concepts to conduct the analysis.
• Traditional safety analysis techniques with their main focus on a single component do
not analyse the interactions among components or trace the failure to requirements
flaws.
• Safety analysis techniques are seemingly more systematic than the security analysis
techniques, and security techniques either take inspiration from the ideas of the safety
techniques, or they have foundations in safety analysis techniques.
• Security analysis techniques need more extensions to be useful for security protocols.
• A major benefit from the STPA technique is taking into account the whole system
behavior and the requirement flaws.
• The what-if query of STPA associated with providing conditions can be developed





Security protocols, also called cryptographic protocols, are predefined and distributed proce-
dures making use of cryptographic operations to accomplish one or more security services,
such as data secrecy, in an insecure environment. More precisely, a security protocol is a
description of a communication transaction over a computer network, that involves mul-
tiple participants acting cooperatively according to the predetermined series of send and
receive actions.
The security protocols can be used to provide one or more of the following services:
• Confidentiality or Secrecy: It means that the message content should not be read
or sniffed by a deceptive participant, i.e., the sent message should remain secret and
only the intended addressee is able to read it.
• Integrity: It denotes the ability to ensure that the message content has not been
tampered or modified during the transition.
• Authentication: It refers to the ability to confirm the origin of the sent message
and obtain proof about liveness or activeness of the communicating participants at
the time the protocol is executed.
• Non-Repudiation: It points out an assurance that a participant is not able to
repudiate having sent or received a message, and this merges authentication and
integrity.
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• Anonymity: It concerns the inaccessibility to the identities for the protocol’s par-
ticipants, which must be unknown.
Designing a correct and secure protocol is notorious for being difficult and error-prone
task. This is due to many silent assumptions on the environment and participants’ capa-
bilities together with the presence of an intruder that can exploit subtle flaws in the design
to launch its attacks. As a consequence, the researchers have been developed different
analysis methods for assisting in designing a correct protocol as possible.
This chapter provides some background information on the security protocols field. It
starts by presenting the key concepts of the cryptographic primitives. Then, it introduces
some terms and notations which are used for describing security protocols. It also illustrates
a number of external attacks upon security protocols. Next, it presents some protocol
examples that have been used as case studies throughout Chapter 6. Finally, it provides
an overview of the formal analysis methods and tools which have been applied to security
protocols. The reviewed methods have been classified into four categories: the reasoning
using logic methods that are used to reason about participants’ belief and knowledge,
the model checking-based methods that have been developed to use the general purpose
model checking techniques for analysing security protocols, the term-rewriting rules-based
methods which uses the term-rewriting rules to represent the security protocols and to
search about insecure state, and the simulation-based methods which apply the simulation
to discover attacks against protocols.
4.2 Cryptographic Primitives
As building and developing security protocols involve using cryptographic primitives to
achieve its security-related goals, this section briefly introduces the fundamental definition
of these primitives.
Cryptographic primitives are algorithms used for securing messages of online commu-
nications and providing a means of achieving protocol’s services [137]. A cryptographic
algorithm employs mathematical function to perform encryption, decryption, or hashing
operation on sensitive messages. Generally, an encryption operation is a process of con-
verting an ordinary text, called plaintext, for a message into an obscured form, called
ciphertext. While the decryption is an operation of reverting back the ciphertext into its
original plaintext. Both operations depend on using an additional parameter known as key.
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A key is a piece of data that enables only the participants that hold it to carry out the
above operations on a message. A hashing operation is an irreversible process of producing
a shorter fixed-length output from the input text of undefined length.
Based on the number of keys that are used for encryption and decryption operations,
the following cryptographic primitives are distinguished:
Symmetric Key Cryptography: is conventional cryptography that uses a single key
for both encryption and decryption operations [237]. Usually, the key is kept secret
and shared between two communicating participants. These methods can operate
in either stream mode or block mode. With a stream mode, one symbol of a data is
encrypted/decrypted at a time. While with a block mode, a fixed-size block of a data
is encrypted/decrypted at a time. The symmetric key cryptographic methods entail
that the symmetric encryption key is exchanged between the involved participants
before it can be used for decryption. The well-known symmetric key algorithms are
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES), Rivest
Cipher 4 (RC4), and Rivest Cipher 5 (RC5).
Public Key Cryptography: is also known as asymmetric key cryptography, where no
secret key is shared between participants [90]. Typically, the public key cryptography
uses a pair of keys: a public key which is publicly known to each communicating
participant, and a private key which is known only to its owner. For every public
key, there is a corresponding private key. In public key cryptography, the encryption
process is available for anyone to encrypt messages using a known public key, while
the decryption process is kept private to the owner of the corresponding private key.
Some public key paradigms allow also to use the private key for encryption, and the
corresponding public key for decryption. Note that, when a message is encrypted
with a private key for a participant, it is said that this message is signed by this
participant. Besides encryption and decryption services, public key cryptography
can be used for providing a digital signature, message sender authentication, key
agreement, and so on. The common algorithms that use public key cryptography are
RivestShamirAdleman (RSA) and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).
Hashing Function: is also called as message digest or one-way hash function, which does
not use key [170]. A hash function maps an input message of arbitrary length into
the message of a fixed length, such that it is impossible to recover the content or
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the length of that input. It is beneficial for detecting whether a message has been
modified during the transition. This can be through sending the original message
with its hash value to the receiver, which can then calculate the hash value for the
original message and compare it with the received one to deduce if the message has
been altered. The most common hashing algorithms are the Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, etc.) and the Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm.
4.3 Algebraic Properties of Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic primitives may exhibit particular algebraic properties to reflect their behav-
ior, such as commutativity, homomorphic, associativity, etc [83]. In this section, we will
only present the commutativity property, as our work which is presented in Chapter 6 deals
with this property (for further details about these properties and the protocol examples
that use them see [83]).
A cryptographic primitive is called commutative if its encryption function satisfies the
following property [166]:
{{m}k1}k2 = {{m}k2}k1
where m is a plaintext message, k1 and k2 are encryption keys. This property means that
the encryption operations which are accomplished using different keys produce the same
results regardless of the order for the used keys.
In the commutative cryptographic, the encryption and decryption functions are some-
times the same, i.e., this cryptographic satisfies the following property:
J{{m}k1}k2Kdk1 = J{{m}k2}k1Kdk1 = {m}k2
where dki is a decryption key that corresponds to the encryption key ki, and J{m}kiKdki
denotes an decryption operation performed on the encrypted message {m}ki . Furthermore,
the double encryption with this cryptographic returns the same message, i.e., it satisfies:
{{m}k1}k1 = m
The common ciphers that use commutative function are one-time-pad [166], Massey-
Omura [165], and Pohlig-Hellman ciphers [194].
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4.4 Protocol Notation
For the sake of readability, we use the basic notation, called Common Syntax(CS) [132],
that is commonly adopted in the literature to describe the security protocols [128].
A protocol is a finite sequence of message exchange steps. Each step is of the following
form:
i. Xi → Yi : Mi
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the ith step of protocol, n is the protocol steps number, Xi is the
supposed sender of step i, Yi is the supposed receiver of that step, and Mi is the message
of step i. This form means Mi is sent from participant X to participant Y . Xi and Yi
could be legitimate participants with identities A,B,C,D, etc., or a trusted third-party
server with identity S, S0, S1, etc.
A protocol message may contain one or more components, sometimes called fields. A
component can be categorized into two types:
• Unencrypted component that may contain one of the following components:
Identity: is an identifier representing a participant of a protocol. It is usually de-
noted by a capital letter, such as A,B, or S as illustrated above.
Fresh Component: is a newly generated and non-repeating component which is
employed as a proof of message freshness. A fresh component is distinguished
into:
Nonce (Number-Used-Once): : is a random number that is used in only
one communication session of a protocol. It is denoted by NX , where X is
the participant who created the nonce N .
Timestamp: is a numeric value taken from system clock to ensure accurate
timeliness of a message. The notation TX denotes a timestamp sent by X.
Key: is a key for encryption, decryption, or performing both processes on a message
based on the used cryptographic method. Accordingly, it is classified into:
Symmetric Key : is a key, as its name suggests, used in symmetric key en-
cryption method [237]. The symmetric key is shared between two protocol
participants. In this thesis, ssk(X,Y ) is a key shared between X and Y .
Asymmetric Key: is a key utilized in public key encryption method [90]. As
this method uses public and private keys, we denote them by pk(X) and
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prk(X), respectively. Where pk(X) is a key belongs to X, and publicly
known, and prk(X) is owned and known only by X.
Hash Value: is a value produced from applying a hash function h on a message M .
In this thesis, a hash function is denoted by h(M).
Text: is any text component.
• Encrypted component, often represented as {M}k, is a protocol message or sub
message encrypted using the key k, which is either ssk(X,Y ), pk(X), or prk(X).
In the protocol specification, the participant identities and the message components are
represented as variables. A single session of a protocol is an instantiation of these variables
to generate a sequence of concrete identities and message content. By multiple sessions we
understand several instantiated sequences (possibly interleaved) with their own identifier
numbers. These numbers are used to differentiate between sessions.
A protocol run is a concrete instantiation for a sequence of protocol steps resulting
from a single session or from a fixed number of multiple sessions. Within a protocol
run, each participant plays a specific role. In our work, we consider only three roles
which are initiator, responder, and server. An initiator is the protocol participant who
initiates a protocol run. A responder is the protocol participant that the initiator intends
to communicate with. A server, also called certification authority, is the participant who
responsible for generating fresh key, or storing the secret keys of the participants and
distributing these keys on request.
4.5 Protocol Attacks and Attack Scenarios
An attack on a protocol is a protocol run that satisfies an undesirable property, such as
breaching the authentication, or revealing a secret. Launching an attack on a protocol is
performed by a deceptive participant called intruder (or attacker) with identity I. The
I(X) notation means that the intruder impersonates the legitimate participant with X
acting.
Usually, an attack exploits certain flaws of a protocol to be succeeded. The common
protocol flaws are as follows [188, 92, 239]:
• The liveness of the protocol’s participants is not proved. A protocol’s participant is
said to be alive if it has indeed participated in the run of this protocol.
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• The freshness message component, which is either timestamp, nonce, or fresh key, is
not guaranteed to be freshly generated for the current protocol run.
• The association of the freshness component with its generator and receiver is not
clearly stated.
• The perfect distinctness of messages is unachievable by the protocol participants.
Typically, the participants are unable to distinguish the content of messages and to
associate them with their proper intended steps of the protocol. The non-distinction
arises from the similarity in the type, structure, length, or content between the
expected message and the one belonging to the same or other protocol.
• The incorrect order of encryption and signature or insecure sending for signature.
Typically, when a signature is affixed to an encrypted message, an intruder can
impersonate the signer and resigning the encrypted message with its private key.
Furthermore, if a signature is sent without secrecy guarantee, it inspires an intruder
to use its signature instead.
• The encryption method exhibits a particular algebraic property that could be easily
exploited to decrypt the encrypted message.
• The authentication and secret distribution are not interleaved. This flaw can be
noticed when a protocol is designed in such a way that a key is distributed after
successful authentication between participants. In this situation, an intruder can
take over the protocol session after the authentication and before the secret reaches
its intended participant.
• The use of repeated authentication. In this case, an intruder can successfully attack
the subsequent authentication without breaching the initial one.
There are many skillful attacks launched on protocols by the intruder that has complete
control over the communication between the honest participants. These attacks are broadly
subsumed under two categories: passive attack and active attack [222]. In the passive
attack, the intruder only eavesdrops and analyses the protocol run without altering it.
Conversely, the intruder that launches active attack alters the protocol run by impersonat-
ing any other participant, or by deleting, inserting, manipulating, and replaying messages.
The active attack can further be subdivided into the following types:
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• Man in The Middle (MITM) Attack: It is an attack where the intruder aims to
secretly intercept, replay, alter messages between two participants and leaving them
to believe that they are only communicating with each other. With this attack, an
intruder resides between two participants. Often this attack occurs by exploiting one
or more of the following protocol flaws: liveness, freshness, and association. A known
example of this attack is upon the Needham-Schroder public key protocol which is
shown in Figure 4.2b.
• Replay (REPL) Attack. It can be classified with respect to its goal into:
– Denial of Service Replay (DoS REPL) Attack. It aims to overwhelm
the responder of the session with excessive messages by running several parallel
sessions with it. Typically, these sessions start by replaying the first message
intended to the responder. In this case, the honest initiator is deprived of access
to its required service. Often this attack occurs by exploiting the liveness and
freshness flaws. As an example of this attack, the one against the Denning-Sacco
protocol [89], see Figure 4.4b.
– Simple Replay (Simple REPL) Attack. In this attack, the intruder fraud-
ulently replays any eavesdropped message or sub-message from the old sessions.
In fact, the first session is performed without impersonation, while in the next
session the impersonation occurs when the discovered non-fresh message is sent.
This attack is feasible when the authentication and the secret distribution are
not interleaved. As an example, the Andrew Secure Remote Procedure Call
protocol [205] is vulnerable to this attack [77], see Figure 4.6c.
– Reflection (REFL) Attack. This attack is based on reflecting the exact
overheard message (or just some parts of it) back to its original sender. In
other words, when the initiator sends a message to the responder, the intruder
intercepts it and re-sends it back to the original sender in another session. This
attack also exploits the liveness and freshness flaws. As an example, the Three
Pass protocol [214, 166] is vulnerable to this attack, see Figure 4.5b.
• Interleaving (INTRL) Attack. In this attack, the intruder interleaves the si-
multaneous executions of a protocol when it has a repeated authentication part.
Typically, the intruder uses the responder as an oracle to obtain some freshness in-
formation that the intruder cannot generate by its own. The intruder makes use of
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this information to counterfeit new messages that are inserted to another parallel
session. The Kehne Langendorfer Schoenwalder protocol is vulnerable to an attack
of this type, see Figure 4.7b.
• Type Flaw Attack: In type flaw attack, the intruder manipulates the type of a
message in a way that causes the receiver to misinterpret the intended type. The
receiver accepts the manipulated message as valid and fails to discover the type
mismatch. This attack exploits the lack of proper message type checking by the
receiver. As an example, the Andrew Secure Remote Procedure Call protocol [205]
is vulnerable to this attack [132], see Figure 4.6b.
An attack scenario is an abstracted protocol run where the message content is ab-
stracted away. In fact, a scenario does not specify the message content, except the rep-
etition case of previously sent messages which can be identified [129]. Attack scenarios
are specified according to known attacks by considering their related pattern of arranging
the protocol steps for the involved sessions. A scenario has predefined information about
assigning the participant identities and the intruder impersonations to each participant’s
role, see Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: An example of MITM attack scenario
Figure 4.1 presents an example of Man In The Middle (MITM) attack scenario. The left
column of this figure shows a pattern of ordering the protocol steps for the involved sessions
in which an assignment of the identities and intruder impersonation to each participant’s
role has been defined. While the right column manifests a metavariable Mi, which has a
value specified by the intruder or the honest participants.
4.6 Protocol Examples
This section introduces different protocol examples which have different goals.
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4.6.1 Needham-Schroder Public Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroder Public key (NSPK) protocol [174] is a classic example of the au-
thentication protocols, shown in Figure 4.2a. It uses public key encryption approach [90].
NSPK protocol is intended to achieve mutual authentication between an initiator A and a
responder B.
(a) The NS protocol’s messages
(b) The MITM attack on NSPK protocol
Figure 4.2: The NSPK protocol example
In NSPK protocol, A sends the first message to B which involves a nonce NA and
its identity A, together encrypted with B’s public key. Upon receiving this message, B
decrypts it, gets the nonce NA, and generates it’s nonce NB. Next, B confirms that it is
the one who decrypts A’s message, by sending to A the concatenation of the two nonces
encrypted using A’s public key. A’s decrypts B’s message when the message is received and
verifies it contains the right nonce. Then, in order to prove that it is the true participant
who decrypts B’s message, it sends the B’s nonce back encrypted using B’s public key.
At the end of this protocol, both A and B share the secret nonces NA and NB, and both
participants believe that they only know about the secret nonces. Unfortunately, this is
not a correct assumption, as the protocol is subject to the MITM attack reported in [156],
which occurs when the initiator communicates with a dishonest participant that exploits
the absence of the B’s identity in the second message. The attack is shown in Figure 4.2b
4.6.2 Needham-Schroder Symmetric Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroder Symmetric Key (NSSK) protocol [174], is an authentication pro-
tocol that is based on the symmetric key encryption approach [237]. It is designed to
distribute a fresh session key shared between two participants A and B, with the aid of
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a trusted server acting as a certification authority, and to authenticate the participants’
liveness.
In the NSSK protocol, as shown in Figure 4.3, the participant A randomly generates a
nonce NA for the current protocol run and informs S that it wants to communicate with
B. Then, S generates a fresh key ssk(A,B) to be shared between A and B for this run,
and sends this key to A within an encrypted message under ssk(A,S), and to B within
an encrypted sub message under ssk(B,S). Upon receives this message, A verifies NA,
trusts S’s liveness for this run, and accepts ssk(A,B) as a new shared session key. Next,
A forwards the B’s sub message as a third message. When this message is received, B
decrypts and picks the new session key ssk(A,B). Later, B generates a nonce NB, encrypts
it with the gained key to show its possession of this key to A. Following that, A decrypts
the encrypted none, increases the decrypted nonce by one, encrypts the increased nonce
with the new session key ssk(A,B), and sends the encrypted output to B. Upon receiving,
B believes A is alive due to the freshness of the nonce NB.
Figure 4.3: The NSSK protocol example
The main problem in this protocol is that B has no way of confirming the freshness of
the third message. As a consequence, the intruder can replay the third message in another
session and deceive B into accept the key in the replayed message as a new session key.
This is possible in the case that the intruder is able to guess (by cryptanalysis) or steal the
old session key ssk(A,B), which is required to decrypt the fourth message and construct
the fifth message for the new session.
4.6.3 Denning-Sacco Protocol
The Denning-Sacco (DS) protocol is a key distribution protocol invented for rectifying the
freshness problem in the NSSK protocol [89]. It adds timestamps to handle this problem.
DS protocol also reduces the number of messages for the NSSK protocol as shown in Figure
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4.4a.
As you can see in Figure 4.4a, the nonces have been not used in DS protocol. There-
fore, the fourth and fifth messages in NSSK protocol are deleted here. Furthermore, the
timestamp, which is generated by S, is included in the second and third messages to con-
firm their timeliness. Despite that this protocol fixes the freshness problem of the NSSK
protocol, it faces replaying problem [158]. In other words, the intruder can replay the third
message and fool B into believing that A is attempting to launch another session with it.
The replay attack on this protocol is shown in Figure 4.4b.
(a) The DS protocol’s messages
(b) The DoS REPL attack on DS protocol
Figure 4.4: The DS protocol example
4.6.4 Three-Pass (TP) Protocol
The Three-Pass (TP) protocol [214, 166], shown in Figure 4.5a, is designed to transmit
a secret message over an insecure network, without the need to share, or distribute the
encryption keys. TP works using the commutative encryption method which satisfies the
following property: {{m}prk(A)}prk(B) = {{m}prk(B)}prk(A), where the encryption is order
independent.
This protocol is called Three-Pass, since it consists of three exchanged messages. Firstly,
A sends an encrypted message with its private key to B. Secondly, B encrypts the received
message with its own key, and sends it to A. Lastly, when the second message is received,
A decrypts it and sends the decryption output to B. Despite the advantage of not sharing
keys, this protocol is subject to several attacks that exploit the commutativity property
used by this protocol. For example, the reflection attack in Figure 4.5b exploits this
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property to compromise the secret message. This attack can be prevented if A checks that
it does not receive a message encrypted with its own key. However, a MITM attack with
one session can be launched to circumvent the A’s check, see Figure 4.5c.
(a) The TP protocol’s messages
(b) The first attack on TP Protocol
(c) The second attack on TP protocol
Figure 4.5: The TP protocol example
4.6.5 Andrew Secure Remote Procedure Call Protocol
The Andrew Secure Remote Procedure Call (AS RPC) protocol [205], shown in Figure
4.6a, is a security protocol utilizing the symmetric key encryption approach [237]. It is
designed to distribute a new session key ssk(A,B)
′
between two participants A and B who
already share a ssk(A,B) key.
In this protocol, the first three exchanged messages are dedicated for achieving mutual
authentication between two participant A and B. Where B authenticates itself to A, by
increasing the A’s nonce (NA) by one and encrypting the output together with the B’s
nonce (NB) by the shared key ssk(A,B). In a similar way, A authenticates itself to B,
but this time the B’s nonce is increased. The last message is devoted to distribute a new
generated key, i.e., B generates a fresh secret key ssk(A,B)
′
and sends it to A. Notice
that, the N
′
B nonce is a nonce generated by B to be used in the subsequent communication.
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(a) The AS RPC protocol messages (b) The type flaw attack on AS RPC protocol
(c) The Simple REPL on AS RPC protocol
Figure 4.6: The AS RPC protocol example
Although this protocol is seemed to be carefully designed, it has two issues. The first
one is an implementation-related issue [132, 77], while the second one is a freshness-related
one [67]. More precisely, in [132], it was said that if the NA+1 nonce and the ssk(A,B)
′
key
are both implemented using the same length bit sequences, then the protocol is vulnerable
to the type flaw attack, whereby the NA + 1 can be simply injected as the new session key,
see Figure 4.6b. In [67], it was stated that there is no guarantee that the new shared key
ssk(A,B)
′
is fresh and it has been generated in the same session. Therefore, the intruder
can simply replay the fourth message in another session, see Figure 4.6c.
4.6.6 Kehne Langendorfer Schoenwalder Protocol
The Kehne Langendorfer Schoenwalder (KSL) protocol [138], is a security protocol that
was originally introduced in [138]. KSL is based on the symmetric key encryption to achieve
its dual aim: establishing a new session key between two authenticated participants and
allowing a repeated authentication process through a generated ticket, which contains a
generalized timestamp. KSL consists of two parts and eight messages. The first part
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attaining by the first five messages is the key and ticket distribution part. While the
second part, which is attained by the last three messages, is the repeated authentication
part. The protocol is detailed in Figure 4.7a.
(a) The KSL protocol messages
(b) The INTRL attack on KSL protocol
Figure 4.7: The KSL protocol example
The first part of the protocol can be outlined as follows. Firstly, A asks B to com-
municate with it by plainly sending its identity and its nonce (NA) in the first message.
Next, B inquires about proving the identity of A, through linking A’s message with its
identity and NB nonce and sending them together to S. Now, the server generates a new
session key ssk(A,B) and retrieves from its database the two secret key ssk(A,S) and
ssk(B,S). Following that, the server sends message 3 to B which proves the A identity.
Upon receiption of the third message, B decrypts the first part of it, checks the presence
of its nonce NB, and agrees that the key ssk(A,B) is a new session key. Next, B generates
a ticket which contains three components encrypted under a key ssk(B,B) known only
to B. These components are a generated timestamp TB (an advocated expiration time
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for the authentication), A’s identity, and the new session key ssk(A,B). After that, B
forms message 4 and sends it to A. When the fourth message is received, A performs its
verification by decrypting the first part and checking whether the session key ssk(A,B) is
the same as the key that has been used to encrypt the fourth part of this message. If they
are the same, A trusts the session key ssk(A,B), accepts the ticket and sends the fifth
message as an evidence of its acceptance. At this point, the first part of the protocol is
successfully finished, and the second part of it can be started if A wants to use the session
key again. In fact, the second part can be repeated many times as long as the ticket is not
expired.
The second part can be summarized as follows. When a ticket in the sixth message is
received, B compares the time in TB with the current time of its local clock and if they
match, the ticket is accepted and a new nonce, which is N
′
B, is generated. This nonce is
exchanged through message 7 and 8 to mutually authenticate A and B. The second part
is susceptible to the interleaving attack, see Figure 4.7b.
Not all the illustrated attacks at the mentioned protocol examples can be discovered by
the reviewed methods below, while our method, described in Chapter 6, can detect them
all except the type flaw attack.
4.7 Protocol Analysis Methods and Tools
In Chapter 3, we discussed two informal methods for analysing security protocols, while
in this chapter, we discuss the methods for analysing security protocols in a formal way.
Typically, different formal methods and tools have been adapted or developed to specify and
analyse security protocols. These methods attempt to prove that a protocol specification
meets its established goals. In fact, the formal methods help to raise our confidence in the
security of a protocol, but they cannot utterly provide assurance of its security.
This section reviews some of these methods. All the methods reviewed here are based
on the Dolev-Yao intruder model [91]. This model assumes that the intruder cannot
decrypt the encrypted message except if it has the decryption key, i.e., the encryption
method is perfect. In addition, it is assumed that the intruder has complete control over
the communication between the participants. Due to its complete control, the intruder
can carry out many actions to compromise the security of a protocol, limited only by its
knowledge. For example, the intruder can generate any message based on its knowledge
and it can overhear and intercept any sent message.
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The reviewed methods here can generally be categorized into the following categories:
• Reasoning Using Logic Methods: are those employing belief and knowledge
logic to reason over security protocols. With these methods, the protocol is directly
specified in the logic, and the logical inference rules are used to derive assertions
about the beliefs or knowledge of the participants, which are then analysed to ensure
the satisfaction of protocol goals.
• Model Checking-Based Methods: are those using model checker for brute force
exploring all the states of a system running the protocol in order to detect attacks
upon it. A general model checker is an automatic verification technique allowing to
decide whether a system model satisfies a certain property. To this end, it entails
a finite-state model of the system, a temporal logic property, and a brute force
exploration algorithm. This algorithm checks whether the given model satisfies the
stated property or not. When the model fails to satisfy a required property, the model
checker generates a faulty trace called counter-example representing a system’s run
for the unsatisfied property. To apply a model checker to security protocols, it takes
an additional input which is a model of the intruder actions, together with a protocol
model and a formal security property for that protocol. An attack upon the protocol
is detected if a property is not satisfied. A satisfied property means there is no attack
on the finite given model, but it may exist on the infinite one.
• Term-Rewriting Rules-Based Methods: are those using term-rewriting rules
for expressing the security protocol, the intruder, and for searching about an inse-
cure state. Generally, the term-rewriting rules are reduction rules applied to terms
consisting of variables and constants, where the left-hand side of the rule is not a
variable, and the right-hand side is either a constant or a subterm of the left-hand
side. These rules do not require limiting the number of variables for terms, instead,
they gradually rewrite (reduce) the initial term into a simple term that cannot be
further reduced. This is very fruitful for analysing security protocols, due to allowing
to start with an unbounded search space, and sometimes to reduce it to a finite one,
without a need to limit the number of protocol sessions.
• Simulation-Based methods: are those applying simulation to uncover hidden
flaws in the design of protocols and discover attacks against them. Simulation refers
to the process of executing a specified design to explore the state space in a scalable
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and non-exhaustive way in order to assess the correctness of the invariant conditions
on that design. In other words, simulation performs partial exploration that is simu-
lated by a planned and specified control flow part for the design under analysis. The
partial exploration which is guided by the specified control flow patterns does not
mean missing attacks that have been looked for by simulation. This is an advanta-
geous way to analyse large protocols where the exhaustive verification methods are
impractical to apply.
In Table 4.1, we summarize the main features of the methods and tools for analysing
security protocols.
4.7.1 BAN logic
A well-known formalism for analysing authentication protocols is BAN logic, which was
named according to its inventors: Burrows, Abadi, and Needham [67]. It is the initial
endeavor to employ logic for reasoning about authentication protocols. In particular, the
logic is used for describing the beliefs and actions of the honest participants involved
in a protocol, and investigating how the evolution of these beliefs can help to uncover
flaws and redundancies in that protocol. BAN logic is popular for its simplicity, ease of
implementation, and operability at high level of abstraction.
The main purpose of BAN logic is to answer questions about what the exact achieve-
ment of the protocol under analysis, what the necessary assumptions needed to be assumed,
and which redundant data in messages or redundant encryption operations must be elim-
inated.
BAN logic is a many-sorted model logic which consists of a set of constructs that
is used to build the initial statements of the beliefs for the participants, and a set of
five inference rules which derives further belief statements from the initial ones. The
BAN logic is based on a number of assumptions, in particular, the encryption mechanism
is unbreakable without the related decryption key, and the exchanged messages can be
tampered and received by the intruder.
Some constructs, that are used in BAN logic, with their associated notations are:
(below, M is a formula (representing a message), P , Q are participants, K is a key)
• P |≡ M : P believes M , such that participant P may act as if M is true.
• P / M : P sees M , or P has received and read a message M .
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• P |∼ M : P once said M , or P believes that it has sent M in one of the previous
sessions or in the current one.
• P |⇒ M : P has control over M . The participant P should be trusted according to
M . For example, it may be stated by the assumption that the participant Q believes
that P has the authority to generate M .
• #(M): The message M is fresh; that is, M has not been sent at any time prior to
the current protocol run.
• P K↔ Q: P and Q may share the key K to communicate, or the key K is generated
by a trusted party for P and Q communication.
While some samples of the inference rules, also called logical postulates, are:
• Message meaning rule for shared keys: which says that if a participant, P , sees an
encrypted message, M , under the key, K, and P believes that this key is a good key
for communicating with Q, then it can be inferred that P believes that M was once
said by Q. This is formally stated as:
P |≡ P K↔ Q,P / {M}K
P |≡ Q |∼M
• Message components rule: which says that If a participant, P , sees a message, M ,
then it can be deduced that P also sees components of M . This is formulated as:
P / (M,N)
P /M
The actual analysis process of BAN logic consists of the following stages:
• BAN Specification of Beliefs and Goals: The informal protocol’s goals and
the beliefs of the participants are formalized into statements written in BAN logic
notation.
• Idealization Process: The common protocol specification is transformed into an
idealized form using BAN logic notation. The idealized form is produced by replacing
protocol’s messages with logical formulae that omit the message parts which are not
involved in determining the beliefs of their receivers. The plaintext components of a
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message are usually deleted from the idealized form, as they can contribute to giving
hints of what the encrypted messages might be contained.
• Step-wise Derivation: The inference rules are applied after each received message
to check whether all the goals are derived from the initial beliefs.
To develop a good understanding of the above stages, we will use a BAN analysis of the
AS RPC protocol mentioned in the original paper [67]. The first stage includes expressing
statements about initial beliefs and goals. The initial beliefs for the AS PRC participants
in the BAN logic are:
• A and B initially share a key, ssk(A,B):
A |≡ A ssk(A,B)←−−−−→ B
B |≡ A ssk(A,B)←−−−−→ B
• A trusts B to generate a good communication key, ssk′(A,B):
A |≡ B |⇒ A ssk(A,B)←−−−−→ B
• A and B gnerate fresh nonces:
A |≡ #(NA)
B |≡ #(NB)
B |≡ #(N ′B)
• B generates a fresh key, ssk′(A,B):
B |≡ A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B
The goals for AS PRC in BAN, which are generating a secret key by B which is known
only to A and B, and both of these participants are willing to use this key, can be stated
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as:
B |≡ A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B
B |≡ A |≡ A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B
In the second stage, the AS RPC protocol is converted into the idealized version, see Figure
4.8. Notice that, in the idealized form in Figure 4.8, the numerical increments in NA and
NB nonces are deleted, due to their little significance for the subsequent use of the fresh
session key.
1. A! B: {NA}ssk(A,B)
2. B ! A: {NA, NB}ssk(A,B)
3. A! B: {NB}ssk(A,B)
4. B ! A: {A ssk
0
(A,B)     ! B,N 0B}ssk(A,B)
rf(x)  µX 1e+ A(x)   z = 0,
c(x) = 0,





rf(x) + A(x)   2z = 0,
c(x) = 0,
 µX 1e+ z = 0,
x > 0
z > 0
1.A! B : A, {NA}ssk(A,B)
2.B ! A : {NA + 1, NB}ssk(A,B)
3.A! B : {NB + 1}ssk(A,B)
4.B ! A : {ssk0(A,B), N 0B}ssk(A,B)
The original AS RPC protocl
=)
1.A! B : {NA}ssk(A,B)
2.B ! A : {NA, NB}ssk(A,B)
3.A! B : {NB}ssk(A,B)
4.B ! A : {A ssk
0
(A,B)     ! B,N 0B}ssk(A,B)
The idealized AS RPC protocl
2
Figure 4.8: The Application of Idealization Process to AS RPC Protocol
The last stage implies the application of the inference rules to each message. For
brevity, we show the application of these rules to only the fourth message of the idealized
AS RPC protocol (Figure 4.8). This message can be stated as:
A / {A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B,N ′B}ssk(A,B)
As we have the assumption:
A |≡ A ssk(A,B)←−−−−→ B
the message meaning rule for shared keys can be applied to yield the following:
A |≡ B |∼ (A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B,N ′B)
Now by applying the message components rule to the above statement, we can add the
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following statements to the initial beliefs set for AS RPC protocol:
A |≡ B |∼ A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B
A |≡ B |∼ N ′B
At this point, no further rule can be applied, and according to the output, the goal:
B |≡ A |≡ A ssk
′
(A,B)←−−−−−→ B, can not be obtained. The reason for that is no information
available in the fourth message that leads A to believe that the ssk
′
(A,B) key is fresh.
In [67], it has been concluded that there is a freshness flaw in the AS RPC protocol.
This means that there is a possibility of replaying the fourth message in an old session as
a new session message in which the session key is compromised. As a result, the AS RPC
protocol has been revised in [67], such that the nonce is used in the last message and the
encryption for the first and fourth messages is deleted. However, the revised BAN version
of the protocol was analysed by the work in [157], and it was shown that the revised
protocol is subject to the REFL attack, see Fig. 4.9b.
(a) The BAN’s revised AS RPC protocol
(b) The REFL attack on BAN’s revised AS RPC
protocol
Figure 4.9: The BAN’s revised AS RPC protocol and its attack
Despite of its ability to locate flaws in protocols, BAN logic has been widely criticized.
Essentially, the idealization process was criticized for its informal implementation. In
other words, the idealization process has been verbally demonstrated in [67] depending on
a number of examples; without giving formal rules to follow. As a result, the idealized
statements obtained from implementing the idealization process to the original protocol
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specifications may be stated in many different ways, with the possibility of not conforming
to the original specifications [164].
Another informal aspect in the BAN logic is the selection of the initial set of beliefs
and assumptions. It has been noted in [164] that the final analysis conclusion is based on
this set, and there is no way in BAN logic to show that this set is necessary or adequate
to achieving the analysis.
In addition, BAN logic is criticized for its inability to handle the following: 1) modeling
a message or part of a message that should not be known by a participant [175]; 2) detect-
ing attacks where the participant is fooled by an intruder into decrypting or encrypting
messages which are sent to another participant [175]; 3) differentiating between possession
and belief in a message, as it is assumed that the participants believe that every message
sent by them is authentic [113]; 4) formally distinguishing between a good session key
required for secure communication between participants, and a good session key required
to be used timely by the participants, e.g., in the current protocol run [163].
The limitations of BAN logic open the door to accommodate other logics, which either
attempt to overcome these limitations or to extend BAN logic. However, these logics are
notorious for their complexity and difficulty to apply.
4.7.2 GNY logic
The Gong, Needham, and Yahalom (GNY) logic is an extended and improved version of
the BAN logic [113]. Thus, GNY logic introduces many features over BAN logic, that
enable to analyze a wider collection of protocols, including the ones employ one-way hash
function. This logic adds new rules and constructs which facilitate its generalization.
GNY logic eliminates some assumptions presumed by BAN logic, such as GNY logic
does not assume that a participant believes every received message based on the encryp-
tion key, instead it assumes that a participant believes a message that conforms with its
expectation. GNY logic makes a formal and clear distinction between what a participant
possesses and what a participant believes in. This allows separating the reasoning about
the actual message content from the one about the participant’s beliefs in it.
Despite the fact that GNY logic is more expressive and elaborated than BAN logic, it
is more difficult to apply, and its rules can sometimes lead to incorrect conclusion.
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4.7.3 Casper/FDR
The Casper/FDR, which is an abbreviation of Compiler for Analysis of Security Protocol-
s/Failures Divergences Refinement, is an approach for discovering attacks automatically
on security protocols [93]. It is based on using two tools: the Casper compiler [159] for
security protocols, and the FDR model checker for Communicating Sequential Processes
(CSP) description [201].
The process algebra CSP [121] has been used in [200] to describe and model the security
protocols in a generic manner. The general description consists of three aspects: 1) a set
of processes representing the participants and the intruder of a protocol; 2) a number of
channels between these processes dedicated for passing messages; and 3) a specification of
the desired security properties that must be met by the protocol. Verifying the satisfaction
of these properties’ specification is performed by feeding the CSP description into the FDR
tool1.
The FDR tool, which is dedicated to CSP, differs from other model checking tools in the
way it works. Generally, instead of checking whether a system meets a property specified
in a language different from the system specific language, the FDR checks CSP refinement.
More precisely, the FDR checks whether the CSP specification for a system is a refinement
to that of a property. If a check fails, then a trace is generated by this tool showing a list
of events that have caused this failure. In the case of the security protocol, the trace shows
a list of actions performed by the intruder.
As the manual construction of the CSP description is a laborious and fallible task,
the Casper/FDR method employs the Casper tool, which automatically translates the
common protocol specification into CSP description suitable for direct checking by FDR
tool. This translation is performed by using the Casper input script file. The Casper input
file consists of two parts: the generic protocol template part and the template instantiation
part. The protocol template part includes a declaration of the variables that the protocol
utilizes, protocol description written in Common Syntax, and specification of the protocol
requirements (desired properties). While the template instantiation part instantiates the
former part and specifies the intruder knowledge.
The applicability of the Casper/FDR method to analyse security protocols has been
proven in [93]. Typically, authors of this work analysed 49 out of 50 protocols in a library
of [132], and reported that they re-detected 20 attacks of the previously detected 25 attacks
1FDR is a product for Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd.
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of insecure protocols, detected attacks on 10 protocols known to be secure, and discovered
6 new attacks on dubious protocols, and failed to recognize attacks on the rest protocols.
They stated that the analysis failed with the rest protocols due to the inability of this
method to detect type flaw and repeated authentication part attacks. In addition, it is
infeasible with this method to analyse large protocols that require growing storage space
for the generated messages, nonces, and keys.
In general, Casper/FDR method has the ease of usage feature, but it can only analyse
finite and small models and it is unable to detect type flaws and repeated authentica-
tion attacks. Furthermore, this method requires that a user has a good understanding of
specifying the security requirements in Casper, to obtain correct analysis outputs.
4.7.4 SPIN
The SPIN, which stands for Simple Promela INterpreter (SPIN), is a general purpose model
checking tool that automatically verifies the correctness of the design for asynchronous and
distributed software systems [122].
In SPIN, the system design must be written in a modelling language known as PROMELA
(PROcess MEta LAnguage), and the required properties must be specified in the LTL (Lin-
ear Temporal Logic) formula [193].
Promela is a process modeling language that allows for synchronizing and coordinat-
ing concurrent processes. A Promela model consists of processes, message channels, and
variables. Processes specify a finite behavior of the system’s components. Message chan-
nels are employed to transfer data between processes. Variables define the environment in
which the processes are executing, and these variables must have finite values.
The LTL formula models time in a manner similar to Natural Numbers, N. The
LTL model can be described as a sequence of infinite states, where each state is a set
of propositional symbols. Those symbols are satisfied at the ith moment time.
SPIN verifies the fact that a given Promela model satisfies a given LTL property, by
checking whether that property holds on all the execution traces of the model. In the
violation case, SPIN reports a counter-example showing the erroneous execution path of
the model, i.e., the path that does not match the desired property. SPIN covers safety,
liveness, deadlock, and invariant correctness properties.
The idea of how to extend SPIN to consider security protocol verification is presented
in [131]. The main benefit of this extension is to investigate certain protocol errors that are
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undiscoverable by BAN logic method; in particular, investigating protocol manipulations
which emerge from replay attacks. An extension is presented by specifying a process for
every protocol participant and the intruder together with imposing limitations on the
complexity of the resulted specification to avoid the state space explosion problem.
The theoretical idea was converted into a concrete one in [162], where the authors
described a general methodology, illustrated on the NSPK protocol, for building a Promela
model ofr the protocol and the intruder’s abilities. With this method, several formal steps
for building the protocol model are defined, and informal procedure for constructing the
intruder model of the NSPK protocol is described. Later, several endeavours emerged to
develop the intruder model into a generic one which can be used for different protocols
[47, 73].
In general, SPIN is praised for being an automated verification way that produces
either a ‘true’ answer when a property is met or a ‘false’ answer and diagrammatic/textual
output showing a sequence of messages related to the discovered attack. Although it can
verify authentication and secrecy properties for different protocols, SPIN can only discover
attacks on protocols with a limited number of sessions and messages and restricted intruder
model. The intruder model is restricted by only generating fixed length messages and
storing limited eavesdropped messages due to its bounded storage space.
4.7.5 NuSMV
The NuSMV, abbreviated for New Symbolic Model Verifier, is a symbolic model checking
for finite state systems. It supports checking properties expressed either as LTL (Linear
Temporal Logic) formulas or as CTL (Computation Tree Logic) formulas. NuSMV provides
the SMV modelling language which is tailored to describe finite models of systems in a
modular way. The input for the NuSMV tool is a textual program that describes the SMV
model and the temporal logic properties. NuSMV returns either a ‘true’ answer when
the property is satisfied or a ‘false’ answer and textual output representing the execution
sequence for the unsatisfied property. It has been used to analyse the security protocols
in [189, 155, 21], where its ability to check secrecy and authentication properties has been
shown. Unfortunately, this model checker shares with SPIN checker the same limitations
of detecting attacks only with bounded settings.
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4.7.6 ProVerif
ProVerif is an automatic tool for verifying cryptographic protocols [51, 54, 8]. It aims at
verifying protocol runs for an unbound number of sessions and message space. This aim
was accomplished by using a simple protocol representation and resolution algorithm.
The protocol representation is a set of Prolog rules. Each rule has the following form:
P1 ∧ P2 ∧ ... ∧ Pn → P
where P, P1, .., Pn are predicates used to represent facts about terms (messages), and the
predicates on the left-hand side of the arrow is a hypothesis of the rule while that on the
right-hand side is the conclusion of the rule. If a rule has no hypothesis then it is simply
written as P [51]. The set of rules represents the following:
1. The computation intruder’s capabilities. An example of that would be decrypting a
message when the intruder has a ciphertext for this message and the decryption key.
2. The protocol steps themselves which are written in Common Syntax. The user must
add one rule for each step.
3. The facts about the initial intruder’s knowledge. For example, the intruder knows
the public keys for all participants.
The protocol representation for ProVerif originally stems from the Horn theory [53]. A
horn theory is a theory in which each axiom is a Horn clause [124]. A Horn clause is a set
of predicates that has disjunction or implication form.
The resolution algorithm is that used to determine whether a given fact(s) can be
inferred from the representation rules or not. More precisely, the resolution algorithm ap-
plies the representation rules to construct a sequence of steps that shows how the intruder
achieves the stated fact(s). During this sequence constructing, a non-termination problem
arises due to the unbounded depth of the nesting terms for facts. The resolution algorithm
alleviates this problem by using the unification of rule pairs that could be combined to-
gether. This is possible when the unified facts of the two rules, that are applied one after
the other, are not of the form for the given fact. In that case, a new rule is generated by
resolving the second rule with the first one upon the given fact. The unification can limit
the search space, but can not guarantee the termination. Therefore, the algorithm enforces
termination by limiting the depth of terms appearing in the rule for participants but not
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for an intruder, so that each term is checked and will be replaced with a new variable if
its generation exceeds this limit [51].
ProVerif analyses protocol specifications which are written in several languages. Cur-
rently, the formal input language for this tool is the applied pi calculus [54]. The applied
pi calculus is an extension of pi calculus where new semantics are added to define the
cryptographic primitives either as a set of rewrite rules or equations [15].
There are two inputs for ProVerif tool: a model of the protocol which is written in
the applied pi calculus, and the security properties that must be met. The rules for
the intruder’s capabilities are built-in to ProVerif. ProVerif can verify different prop-
erties, including secrecy, correspondence assertions, and observational equivalence (only
with bounded sessions number). Correspondence assertions are the properties of the form;
if one participant ever executes an event in a protocol, then in the past some other par-
ticipant has executed some other events in this protocol. The observational equivalence is
used to prove that there two processes having the same structure, but the message content
is different. These properties are specified as queries.
Internally, ProVerif translates the applied pi calculus model into a set of Horn clauses.
It also translates the queries into derivability queries on the obtained clauses [53]. Later,
ProVerif applies the resolution algorithm to examine whether a query is derivable from the
clauses. ProVerif produces true (if the query is not derivable by the intruder) to indicate
that the query is proved and there is no attack against the protocol. Otherwise, ProVerif
produces false and an attack trace showing the intruder’s actions that lead to disproving
the query. However, ProVerif is not complete and does not always produce true/false
output, as it sometimes presents false attack. False attach is a textual description of a
situation in which the query is true, but ProVerif could not prove it. Reporting false
attack is due to using approximation measure for the translation into Horn clauses [52].
The approximation means modeling the Horn clauses as a linear logic model that ignores
the number of repetitions required for each clause during the application.
The attack trace which is produced by ProVerif is very detailed and verbose. Therefore,
understanding this trace for protocols that have more than three steps could be a tedious
task.
ProVerif can not terminate during analysing protocols in which participants initially
exchange encrypted secret data and then they reveal it in later protocol steps.
ProVerif also can not terminate its analysis when the analysed protocol is based on
cryptographic primitives with a certain algebraic property that requires an equivalence
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relation between terms. The non-termination originates from the way of modelling this
property as an equation formalism directed from left to right, where the right hand side
is a constant or a simple term, and the left hand side is the most complex term. How-
ever, ProVerif has been extended to support the algebraic properties for Exclusive-Or and
modular exponentiation operators using two different translators, namely XOR-ProVerif
[140] and DH-ProVerif [139], respectively. Both of these translators translate the protocol
specification, which is written in Prolog language into Horn clauses to be compatible with
ProVerif. The two translators require the SWI-Prolog (version 5.6.14) tool in order to
work. These tools takes long execution time when the number of the variables involved in
these operators is more than eight variables.
4.7.7 Tamarin
Tamarin is a relatively new tool for the symbolic modeling and analysis of security protocols
[168, 85, 9]. It is able to handle an unbounded number of sessions by considering the logic
of protocol interactions. It also supports the equational specification of two cryptographic
operators: the Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and the Exclusive-or.
Tamarin takes three inputs: a model of the protocol, specification of the intruder
capabilities, and specification of the security properties. Based on multiset rewriting rules,
Tamarin provides an expressive language for specifying its inputs.
In Tamarin, protocols are modelled as a collection of multiset rewriting rules that
defines a state machine with labelled transitions. A rewrite rule is expressed as a multiset
of facts. Facts are predicates used to store information about the machine’s state, such
as the sent and received messages, or the public key possession. A rewrite rule is defined
by a specific name and three types of facts: premises, actions (or labels), and conclusions.
Premises are facts for characterizing a machine’s state before executing the rule. They are
situated on the left-hand side of the rule. Conclusions are facts resulted after executing
the rule. They are situated on the right-hand side of the rule. Action facts are used to
label execution traces (transitions). Once a rule is executed at a time point, the actions are
appended to that time point which then will be used as a reference to define the property
trace. A transition to a new state is decided by a rule, and that is performed through
replacing the instantiated conclusions of this rule with its premises if the later exist in the
current state.
Concerning the intruder, Tamarin offers built-in rewriting rules for specifying all the
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possible intruder’s actions, such as intercepting messages, generating arbitrary messages,
and eavesdropping all sent messages. While analysing a protocol using Tamarin, the in-
stances of the protocol’s rules are interleaved in parallel with those for the intruder.
Tamarin employs trace properties to specify the protocol properties. A trace of the
protocol is a record of action facts defined by the applied rewrite rules in a particular
execution. A trace property is a description of a set of traces. This description is defined
as a guarded fragment of first-order logic which allows quantification over action facts and
time points. Tamarin proves that a trace property holds for a protocol when it holds in
all traces of the protocol. The main properties that can be analysed using Tanamrin are:
secrecy, authentication, and observational equivalence.
Tamarin’s language is more expressive than that of ProVerif in specifying security
properties, as it supports direct modelling for temporal properties. However, Tamarin is
seemingly slower than ProVerif on analysing secrecy and authentication properties, as its
way in modelling adds complexity to the analysis procedure [141].
Tamarin analyses the given security properties in two modes: automatic and inter-
active. In the automatic mode, Tamarin terminates and returns either a proof showing
the correctness of the stated property or a counter-example representing an attack which
falsifies the given property. While in the interactive mode, Tamarin can not terminate and
the user must intervene to manually inspect the proof states and the attack graphs. For
example, Tamarin cannot terminate on proving the secrecy of nonce for the NSPK protocol
[85].
The cryptographic primitives and their properties are modelled in Tamarin based on
a fixed set of built-in function symbols and equations. This set supports modelling the
following: hashing, public-key encryption, symmetric key encryption, diffie-hellman, and
xor. Due to its use the built-in functions, Tamarin is not flexible to model another primitive,
such as commutative encryption. Apart from the built-ins, Tamarin only supports the
specification of subterm-convergent educational theories, in which the right-hand side of
the equation is a simple term or a sub-term of the left-hand side. This per se leads to
undecidable verification problem when a more complex property, which requires equivalence
relation between its terms, is analysed.
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4.7.8 Simulation Based Attack Scenarios
The idea of attack scenarios, described in Section 4.5, is introduced in [129] with the aim
of making the protocol verification process decidable. This is achieved by simulating the
security protocols using scenarios of known attacks. The attack scenarios allow reducing
the number of explored runs of a protocol while looking for an attack by simulation.
In [129], five schemes of the origin and destination attacks from [224], including MITM,
REFL, DoS REPL, Simple REPL, and INTRL attacks, had been defined. For each of
the above schemes, a generic algorithm is designed, which when given parameters of the
protocol, such as its steps number, sessions number, and other parameters particular for
a type of attack, it will produce a scenario of an attack for this scheme. The algorithms
also need to define an assignment of the participant’s identity together with the intruder’s
impersonation to each role. In the beginning, the produced scenario is written in Common
Syntax [128] and then it is translated into an Estelle specification [65], to return the concrete
simulated scenario. The honest participants and the intruder construct the messages in a
scenario.
The practical application of the simulation based attack scenarios method has been
shown for several protocols. However, the intruder in this work composes messages using
only type matching restriction, which can still increase the message space with unaccept-
able messages. In addition, this work does not show how to analyse protocols that make
use of certain algebraic properties and it only checks the correspondence assertion prop-
erty. Furthermore, in this work, the designed scenarios are all simulated even those whose
simulation is definitely not leading to produce attacks. Accordingly, we aim to adopt this
method while addressing these limitations.
4.8 Conclusion
Security protocols are key elements of secure communications. However, there are often
subtle flaws and vulnerabilities in their design attract malicious intruder to breach the
security objectives of the protocols. In this chapter, we introduced the foundations of
security protocols and details some known flaws and attacks on such protocols. Further-
more, we reviewed some methods used for security analysing the protocols. In particular,
we recapitulated the methods that use the beliefs and knowledge logic, the model checker,
the term-rewriting rules, and the simulation.
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We have deduced the following strengths and drawbacks of these methods. The reason-
ing using logic methods are useful to reason about the beliefs of the participants involved in
protocols and to locate some flaws in their designs. Unfortunately, BAN logic was criticized
for the informality associated with its operation semantics, and the ambiguity associated
with its idealisation process step. Model checking methods find attacks on protocols by
exhaustively search all the reachable states and checking that the undesired property is
unreachable. However, these methods entail a finite model for a protocol under analysis
and bounded instances of its execution in order to work successfully. In the term-rewriting
rules-based methods, an unbounded analysis for protocols are achieved, but at the cost of
the non-termination and undecidability problems, which are emerged at analysing some
protocols and algebraic properties. Simulation-based methods help to reduce the number
of the explored runs while searching for attacks by means of simulation. Our work pays
particular attention to these methods as they guarantee the termination at the analysis













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter presents a systematic methodology for developing safe designs of safety-
critical systems by combining the Abstract State Machine (ASM) method with the System-
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) technique. The main aims of this methodology are
developing safe ASM specifications together with adequate and concise temporal formal-
izations of the STPA requirements.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ASM method has been used to model and analyse
safety-critical systems in [33, 30, 35]. In these works, it has been shown how the ASM
method, within the open source ASMETA framework, supports different development ac-
tivities, including designing, simulating, validating, and verifying the ASM model. The
verification activity in these works focuses only on proving the functional requirements
to produce a correct model. Nevertheless, the correctness of the model is not enough to
ensure its safety. As a result, the verification activity must be guided by the safety require-
ments alongside the functional requirements during the development process. The safety
requirements can be elicited by applying an appropriate safety analysis technique.
As illustrated in Chapter 3, the STPA technique is able to identify a wide range of safety
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requirements emerging from unsafe component interactions and inadequate control in the
systems design. Recently, the STPA technique has been used, in [17, 19], as an integrated
tool with the verification activity, by supplying it with the formulated safety requirements.
However, the formalization process of safety requirements is both cumbersome and not
accurately capturing some of the temporal aspects of the requirements.
For these reasons, we present a methodology for developing correct and safe critical
systems, that is based on the ASM method, the STPA technique, and temporal logic. It
starts with modelling the system in the AsmetaL and simulating it by AsmetaS to obtain
an accurate mathematical representation. Then, using the AsmetaV validation tool, the
model validation process is applied to ensure that it meets the functional requirements.
Next, the STPA technique is utilized to elicit safety requirements. These requirements
are formalized into Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that can be verified against an AsmetaL
model using the AsmetaSMV verification tool.
We apply this methodology to two case studies which are the Train Door Controller
(TDC) [227] and the Insulin Pump Control System (IPCS) [220].
The main contributions of this chapter are:
1) a systematic methodology for developing safety critical systems through combining
ASM with STPA, with the target of developing safe specifications; and
2) adequate and concise temporal formalizations of the STPA requirements.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: 5.2 details our methodology. Section 5.3
presents the application of our methodology to the TDC case study, while Section 5.4
illustrates this application to the IPCS case study. Then in Section 5.6, we evaluate our
methodology. Section 5.7 reviews the related work. Section 5.8 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The Proposed Methodology for Developing Safe Design
This section presents the ASM-STPA-SA methodology that combines the ASM method
with the STPA technique to develop safe designs for systems. This methodology is based
on some of ASMETA tools, STPA, and temporal logic. The ASMETA tools that have been
utilized in the ASM-STPA-SA methodology are as follows: (1) The AsmetaS tool [112],
which executes ASM models that are written in AsmetaL. (2) The AsmetaV tool which
validates AsmetaL specifications by scenarios written in Avalla [69]. (3) The AsmetaSMV
Chapter 5. Safe Design Development Methodology for Safety-Critical Systems 109
model checker tool which formally verifies the AsmetaL specifications [31]. Note that, the
AsmetaSMV can be used to verify both functional and safety requirements, but in our work
which focuses on verifying safety requirements, we use only it to verify these requirements.
Using this methodology, we aim to guide the modeller to improve the ASM model,
depending on the detection of any violations to the functional and safety requirements via
the validation and verification tools, and to provide the verification tool with the STPA
requirements in a formal way.
Figure 5.1 shows an overview of our methodology which includes the following stages:
Figure 5.1: The safe design development methodology
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(1) Modelling the System Behavior via AsmetaL and Simulating the Resul-
tant Model: Through this stage, we aimed at modelling the system under analysis
in AsmetaL specification in order to provide the formal foundation for our methodol-
ogy. In addition, we intended to simulate the AsmetaL specification by the AsmetaS
tool. The reasons for that are to check whether there is a state in which incorrect
rule may be executed and to gain enough confidence that the AsmetaL captures the
desired informal requirement.
(2) Validating the AsmetaL Model: This stage attempts to validate that the As-
metaL model satisfies the functional requirements, which relate to the user needs
about the system by using the AsmetaV tool. This tool allows constructing particu-
lar scenarios that describe the interactions between the system and its environment
to represent informal functional requirements. Avalla has several constructs to write
the scenario, such as set, step, check, etc. The AsmetaV tool reads a scenario written
by the user in Avalla and invokes the AsmetaS tool to simulate this scenario and
checks if the AsmetaL model satisfies this scenario or not. In the event that any
of these scenarios are not satisfied, the AsmetaL model must be modified. The As-
metaV tool and its associated language have already been described in Chapter 2;
Section 2.4.9.
(3) Eliciting safety requirements for the system via STPA: This stage involves
eliciting the informal safety requirements by applying the STPA procedure, which
consists of the following steps:
• Indicating the main expected accidents for the system.
• Identifying the possible hazards that can lead to accidents in the previous step.
• Drawing the schematic safety control loop which describes the interactions be-
tween the software controller and other system’s components, such as hardware,
software, or human factors.
• Using the control loop as a guide to determine the main control actions issued
by the controllers that can lead to the identified hazards.
• Identifying the process model for the controller. We define it as a set of moni-
tored and controlled functions of the AsmetaL model, such that this set affects
providing the control actions. Each member in this set consists of the function
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name and its values. As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, the functions of the
process model for a controller represent the environmental and system states
that affect the safety of the control actions. These functions can be derived
from the identified system hazards. For instance, from the hazard which is a
door opens when the train moving or stopped unaligned to a platform, we can
deduce that the train motion and position are ones of the monitored functions
that must be considered in the process model because they affect the safety of
open the door action.
• Evaluating the combination of the function values for each control action under
four contexts: ‘Provided’, ‘Provided too early’, ‘Provided too late’ and ‘Not
Provided’. The evaluation process is performed through asking a question to
an expert in the following form: if the controller receives a certain combination
of function values, will (provide, provide too early/too late, not provide) the
action in the next state by the controller lead to a hazard or not. The results
of the evaluation are documented in the context table.
• Translate each combination that has yes answer in the table into informal safety
requirements using the phrases must (for ‘Not Provided’) and must not (for
‘Provided’, ‘Provided too early’, ‘Provided too late’.
(4) Formalizing the Elicited STPA Safety Requirements: In this stage, the infor-
mal STPA requirements are formulated into LTL specifications using the following
steps:
• Identify the main function combinations that have yes answers in only the ‘Not
Provided’ condition, in order to reduce the number of the requirements but
without ignoring the safety issue. Typically, the function combinations that have
yes answers in the ‘Not Provided’ condition are translated into the requirements
for providing an action, hence, by ensuring that the action always satisfies these
requirements not too early, on time, and not too late, then there is no need
to check that the action is not provided with the combinations in the other
conditions. Thanks to the if and only if operator that helps us to ensure that,
see the next point.
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• Use the identified combinations to write the following formula:
((comi1 ∨ comi2 ∨ ...comin)↔©(CAi)) (5.1)
where: CAi is the i
th control action, comin is the nth combination that relates
to the ith action, and it has yes answer in the ‘Not Provided’ condition. Each
combination is connected by ∨ operator. The formula informally means, that
the control action is always provided in the next state, if and only if, one of the
determined combinations occurs. The ↔ operator puts a strong condition on
providing the action, i.e., the action will not be provided with another combina-
tion or later/earlier than satisfying the determined combination. Furthermore,
employing the ↔ and ∨ operators help to reduce the number of properties to
be verified.
• Rewrite the formulated requirements, which are based on 5.1, into other ones
using the syntax of the AsmetaSMV tool, i.e., the syntax of its propositional
and future-time connectives.
(5) Verifying the Formulated Safety Requirements: This stage is intended to
verify that the AsmetaL model satisfies the formulated STPA safety requirements.
If any of these requirements is not satisfied, then a counter-example will guide the
modeller to improve the AsmetaL model.
5.3 Case Study: The Train Door Controller System
In this section, we show how to apply the ASM-STPA-SA method to the Train Door
Controller (TDC) case study. This case study, presented in Section 2.3.1, has been used
in [227] as a simple illustrative example to introduce the analysis procedure of the STPA
technique. While in our work, we focus on feeding the AsmetaSMV model checker with
the STPA analysis results to verify them and to build a safe design for this example. In the
following, we will describe the detailed steps and the results of applying the ASM-STPA-SA
method to the TDC system.
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5.3.1 Modelling the system Behavior via AsmetaL and Simulating the
Resultant Model
The complete model for the TDC system is shown in Code 2.1 which is presented in Chapter
2. In which, we specify changing the door state using several rules and also we specify the
main rule that controls the whole system behavior. As there are two states for the TDC:
sensing and executing, the main rule starts by checking these states. When the state
is sensing, then in parallel, the controller receives information from the sensors, and the
state is changed into executing. While when the state is executing, then firstly the
emergency is checked whether it exists, to open the door immediately, but if it does not
exist, then the rulers for changing the door state are fired in parallel, see Code 5.1a.
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]
s t a t e :=SENSING //Only here the




(a) The wrong update
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]




i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]
endpar
endif
s t a t e :=SENSING
endpar
endif
(b) The correct update
Code 10: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(a) The wrong specification
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emerg cy=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]
s t a t e :=SENSING //Only here the




(a) The wrong update
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]








r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]
endpar
endif
s t a t e :=SENSING
endpar
endif
(b) The correct update
Code 10: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(b) The correct specification
Code 5.1: The main rule for TDC example
The simulation of the TDC which is produced by running the AsmetaS tool shows that
when there is an emergency, the system work is terminated without checking whether the
emergency has been handled to resume the system to its usual work, see Figure 5.2.
The notations used in Figure 5.2 are: the question mark indicates that the value of
the monitored function must be entered by a user, and the hyphen sign denotes that the
user has not been asked for the value of the monitored function. In Figure 5.2, at state
0, the user is asked to enter the value of the emergencySensor function which is exist.
Following that, the simulator calculates the update set to produce state 1. Since the value
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of the emergency is exist in this state, the simulator updates the value of the doorStatus
to opened in order to produce state 2. After that, the simulator finds the state 3 has a
similar update sets to those in state 2, therefore it terminates the run. This happened
because, at the specification for the main rule in 5.1a, the system state is not changed
into sensing state and it remains at executing state when the emergency exists. This
gave us an indication to correct the main rule in Code 5.1a, such that the state function
is updated to sensing even when there is an emergency, see Code 5.1b, in order to ensure
that the system can resume its normal work when there is no emergency.























































Figure 5.2: Part of the simulation for the TDC model with incorrect main rule
5.3.2 Validating the AsmetaL Model
We have then built a scenario corresponding to the informal requirement of checking that
the door state is changed from closing to opened when there is an obstacle. The scenario
is written in Avalla to be an input to the AsmetaL, see Code 5.2. It permits to drive
the execution of a model in a way which facilitates producing a run that is expected to
satisfy the desired requirement. The scenario in Code 5.2 can be described as follows: the
emergency, train motion, and train position sensors must be set into the following values
(before moving into a new step): notexist, stopped, and aligned, respectively; after
that several simulation steps must be made until reaching the state in which the train
is stopped and it is aligned with the platform. At this state, the door state is checked
whether it is opening. Following that, the system will be at the sensing state such that
the emergencySensor is set to notexist. Next, the door state is changed to opened.
When there is no emergency and obstacle, the door state is updated to CLOSING. At that
state, when the sensor of an obstacle returns exist value, then the door state is checked
whether it is opened.
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s c ena r i o CheckOpenStateAfterObstacle
load . / Tra inDoorContro l l e r .asm
set emergencySensor := NOTEXIST;
set t ra inMot ionSensor :=STOPPED;
set t r a i nPo s i t i onSen s o r :=ALIGNED;
set obs ta c l eSen so r :=NOTEXIST;
step until s t a t e=SENSING and tra inMotion=STOPPED and
t r a i nPo s i t i onSen s o r=ALIGNED;
check doorStatus=OPENING;
set emergencySensor := NOTEXIST;
step
check s t a t e=EXECUTING;
step
check doorStatus=OPENED;
set emergencySensor := NOTEXIST;
set obs ta c l eSen so r :=NOTEXIST;
step
check s t a t e=EXECUTING;
step
check doorStatus=CLOSING;
set emergencySensor := NOTEXIST;
set obs ta c l eSen so r :=EXIST ;
step
check s t a t e=EXECUTING;
step
check doorStatus=OPENED;
Code 19: The scenario which corresponds to the requirement that entails the open door action still in operation as long as
the door is not fully openedCode 5.2: The scenario which corresponds to the requirement that entails the door is
opened when there is an obstacle























































































































Figure 5.3: Simulation of the scenario in Code 5.2
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main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
r c a n c e l a c t i o n [ ] / / This rule must be
// de l e t ed
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]




(a) The wrong update
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]




(b) The correct update
Code 10: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(a) The wrong specification
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
r c a n c e l a c t i o n [ ] / / This rule must be
// de l e t ed
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]




(a) The wrong update
main rule r Main =
i f s t a t e=SENSING then
par
r EmergencySensing [ ]
r TrainMotionSens ing [ ]
r Obs tac l eSens ing [ ]
s t a t e :=EXECUTING
endpar
else
i f emergency=EXIST then
r HandleEmergency [ ]
else
par
r c l o s e d t o op en i n g [ ]
r open ing to opened [ ]
r o p en ed t o c l o s i n g [ ]
r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d [ ]




(b) The correct update
Code 10: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(b) The correct specification
Code 5.3: The r Main rule for TDC example
The simulation of this scenario returns a successful verdict, see Figure 5.3, since at
state 6 in Figure 5.3, the door state is closing and there is an obstacle at the doorway,
therefore the door state is changed to opened and the validation is succeeded.
5.3.3 Eliciting safety requirements for the system via STPA
Following the validation, we elicit the safety requirements by applying the STPA procedure
which implies the following steps:
• Identifying the main accidents. The system has the following accidents:
– A closing door traps a person.
– A person is enclosed in the train during an emergency.
– A person is injured by falling out of a train.
• Indicating the main hazards related to the identified accidents. The system
has the following hazards:
– A door closes on a person while (s)he is still in the doorway.
– A person is unable to leave the train during emergency.
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– A door opens when the train is moving or stopped unaligned to a platform.
– A door does not open when it should.
• Drawing the schematic safety control loop. Figure 5.4 shows the safety control
loop diagram for the TDC case study.
Figure 5.4: Safety control loop for automated train door controller case study from [227]
• Determining the main control actions. The control actions here are open and
close the door.
• Identifying the process model. We define the process model as a set of the
following functions: trainMotion, trainPosition, emergency, obstacleStatus, doorStatus.
• Evaluating the combination of the function values and documenting the
results in a context table. The evaluation results are documented in Table 5.1.
The no/fun answer in Table 5.1 means the action will not lead to a hazard, but
providing or not providing it includes a flaw in the system function. For example,
when the door is already opened, the train is stopped such that it is aligning with
the platform, and the person is not in the doorway, then providing the open action,
in this case, implies that there is a flaw in the controller’s function.
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• Translate each combination that has yes answer in the table into informal
safety requirements using must/must not phrases. For example, the the open
action must be provided when the door is closing on a person in the doorway.
Process Model Hazardous Control Action?







Stopped Not Exist Aligned Not Exist Closed no no/fun no/fun nos
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Not Exist Opened no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Not Exist Closing no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Not Exist Opening no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Stopped Not Exist Not Aligned Not Exist any yes yes yes no
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Exist Opened no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Exist Opening no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Stopped Not Exist Aligned Exist Closing no no/fun yes yes
Stopped Not Exist Not Aligned Exist any no/fun no/fun no/fun no/fun
any Exist any any Closed no no/fun yes yes
any Exist any any Closing no no/fun yes yes
any Exist any any Opening no/fun no/fun no/fun no
any Exist any any Opened no/fun no/fun no/fun no
Moving Not Exist any any any yes yes yes no
Table 5.1: The context table for the open door action
5.3.4 Formalizing the Elicited STPA Safety Requirements
After applying the STPA procedure, we formulate the STPA requirements using the fol-
lowing the steps:
• Determine the combination of the main functions according to the yes answers in the
‘Not Provided’ condition only. The purpose for that is to ensure that the action is
provided (not too early, on time, not too late) with these combinations not with the
other. For example, if we ensure that the open door action is only given when there
is an emergency or the train stopped in a way to the platform and there is no an
obstacle, and these circumstances always imply providing this action, then there is
no need to check whether the open action is not provided when the train is moving.
With regard to Table 5.1, the combinations that have been identified are:
1. doorStatus=closing, obstacleStatus=exist, emergency=notexist,
trainPosition=aligned, and trainMotion=stopped.
2. doorStatus=closed, and emergency=exist.
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3. doorStatus=closing, and emergency=exist.
• Formulate the above combinations using formula 5.1, to produce the following LTL
formula:
 (((doorStatus=closing ∧ obstacleStatus=exist ∧ emergency=notexist ∧
hghjktrainPosition=aligned ∧ trainMotion=stopped) ∨
hghj(doorStatus=closed ∧ emergency=exist) ∨
hghj(doorStatus=closing ∧ emergency=exist)) ↔©(doorStatus=OPENED))
5.3.5 Verifying the Formulated Safety Requirements
In this stage, we use the AsmetaSMV tool to perform the verification activity. As a result,
we rewrite the resulting formulated requirements in the previous stage into another one
accepted by this tool. Accordingly, the LTL property in the previous section is rewritten
into the following form:
LTLSPEC g(((doorStatus=closing and obstacleStatus=exist and emergency=notexist
and trainPosition=aligned and trainMotion=stopped) or
(doorStatus=closed and emergency=exist) or
(doorStatus=closing and emergency=exist)) iff x(doorStatus=OPENED)).
The LTLSPEC means that the property is from linear time temporal logic. The prop-
erty informally means that the door is OPENED in the next state if and only if one of the
identified combinations occurred. This property is not met by the AsmetaL model for the
TDC case study, as the door is opened with one more combination: doorStatus=opened
and emergency=exist. The failing trace for this property is shown in Figure 5.5.





















































// s e t t i n g the i n i t i a l 250
s t a t e s
s t switchMode := fa l se ;
set valS :=22;
step
check cR=22 and cS=ANLSCAL;
step until cS=TST;
check cD=22;
set switchMode := fa l se ;
set pas (30) :=true ;
set f l := fa l se ;
set r sv :=PRS;
set ndl :=PRS;
step until sC30=20;
check spn=fa l se ;
set switchMode := fa l se ;
step
check cS=SNS ;
set switchMode := fa l se ;
set valS :=34;
step
check cR=34 and cS=ANLSCAL;
step








Code 3: The scenario that has a fail verdict

























Figure 5.5: Failing trace of running open door action
At state 1.1 in this Figure, the door state is closed, the emergency does not exist,
the system state is sensing, and the emergency sensor detects that there is an emergency.
The system state is changed into executing at state 1.2 and the emergency function is
updated to exist. At state 1.3, the door state is changed to opened. The loop starts at
120 Farah Al-Shareefi
state 1.4 showing that the door state is updated to opened when there is an emergency
and the door state is already opened. This happens because the AsmetaL specification
of the case study includes a rule, called r HandleEmergency, in which the the door state
is changed to opened without checking if it has already been opened, see Code 5.4a. In
order to avoid the unnecessary opening of the door when the door is already opened, we
updated the r HandleEmergency rule such that the door is only opened when it has not
been opened before, see Code 5.4b.
rule r HandleEmergency=
doorStatus :=OPENED
(a) The wrong update
rule r HandleEmergency=
i f doorStatus !=OPENED then
doorStatus :=OPENED
endif
(b) The correct update
Code 11: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(a) The wrong specification
rule r HandleEmergency=
doorStatus :=OPENED
(a) The wrong update
rule r HandleEmergency=
i f doorStatus !=OPENED then
doorStatus :=OPENED
endif
(b) The correct update
Code 11: Update the Integer controlled function: AsmetaL model
(b) The correct specification
Code 5.4: The r HandleEmergency rule for TDC example
5.3.6 Evaluation of the TDC Case Study
The application of the ASM-STPA-SA methodology to the TDC case study helps to im-
prove the model for this case study by utilizing the outcomes of this methodology stages.
With the simulation stage, we were able to notice that the system cannot resume its normal
work after handling the emergency. This happens because the TDC model was wrongly
specified such that when there is an emergency, the system stops its work and never goes
to the sensing state.
The validation stage helped to increase our confidence that the TDC model reflects the
user requirement which is related to ensure that the door must be opened while there is
an obstacle in the doorway.
The verification stage aided at observing that the door is also opened with a non-
mentioned combination which is the emergency exists and the door is already opened.
This observation enables us recognizing that the model does not consider checking the
state of the door before opening it.
5.4 Case Study: The Insulin Pump Control System
The second case study of this work is the Insulin Pump Control System (IPCS). The IPCS
is chosen because its design is more complex than the one for TDC case study, and the
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investigation of its safety aspects is still ongoing. In this section, we will introduce this
case study and we will show in details how to apply the ASM-STPA-SA method to it.
5.4.1 The IPCS Case Study Description
The Insulin Pump Control System (IPCS) is a therapeutic system used to improve diabetes
treatment. The problem with traditional treatments is the possibility of taking an insulin
overdose or insufficient dose due to focusing only on the current glucose value and ignoring
the last insulin injection time. It has been utilized as a case study for software analysis of
safety-critical systems in [220].
The IPCS consists of sensor, software controller, pump, and insulin reservoir. The
sensor measures the current glucose value and delivers it to the controller. The controller
analyses the received value, calculates and delivers the required dose, and tests the hard-
ware units. The dose is delivered by sending a signal to the pump for each insulin unit.
The maximum capacity of the insulin reservoir is 100 units. The IPCS works in three
different modes: automatic, manual, and switching off.
In the automatic mode, the software controller can implement one of the following
two activities at a time: running which is performed every 10 minutes, or testing which
is performed every 30 seconds. In addition, the software controller resets the cumulative
dose to 0 every 24 hours.
The running activity starts with sensing the current glucose value, then this value is
analysed by comparing it with two saved values (10 and 20 minutes prior) in order to
calculate the required dose. Typically, the controller computes and delivers a dose through
carrying out the following checking steps: (in the steps below, v2 is the current glucose
value, v1 is the glucose value 10 minutes before, and v02 is the glucose value 20 minutes
before)
(1) If the current value is less than the minimum safe limit (6), then the computed dose
is equal to zero.
(2) if the current value is within the safe range (6..14, i.e., minimum safe limit=6 units,
and maximum safe limit=14 units), then the insulin dose will be computed depending
on the following:
(a) If the glucose level is decreasing or stable (v2 ≤ v1), or the glucose level is
increasing (v2 > v1) but the rate of glucose level increase is decreasing ((v2−v1)<
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(v1 − v0)), then the computed dose is equal to zero.
(b) If the glucose level is increasing (v2 > v1) and the rate of glucose level increase
is rising ((v2 − v1)≥ (v1 − v0)), then the computed dose will either be equal to
the minimum dose (1 unit) if the rounded division of the ((v2 − v1)/4) is equal
to zero; otherwise, it is equal to the rounded division itself.
(3) If the current value exceeds the maximum safe limit, the glucose level is falling, and
the rate of decrease is increasing, then no dose must be delivered; otherwise, a dose
must be computed such that it will bring down the glucose level. More precisely, the
computed dose is calculated as follows:
(a) If the glucose level is stable or it is falling but the rate of decrease is decreasing,
then the computed dose is equal to the minimum dose.
(b) When the glucose level is increasing, the computed dose will either be equal to
the minimum dose (1 unit) if the rounded division of the ((v2 − v1)/4) is equal
to zero; otherwise, it is equal to the rounded division itself.
(4) When there is a dose must be delivered to the patient (the computed dose is not
equal to zero), three safety checks must be examined before delivering it.
(a) If the summation of the computed dose and the cumulative dose is greater than
the maximum daily dose (25 units), then the computed dose must be equal to
subtracting the cumulative dose from the maximum daily dose.
(b) If the summation of the computed dose and the cumulative dose is less than
the maximum daily dose and the computed dose is greater than the maximum
single dose (4 units), then the computed dose must be equal to only 4 units.
(c) If the summation of the computed dose and the cumulative dose is less than the
maximum daily dose (25 units) and the computed dose is less than or equal to
the maximum single dose (4 units), then the computed dose is delivered as it is
without modification.
Within the running activity, the warning alarm must be run when the received glucose
value is less than the minimum safe limit, the available insulin is less than or equal to the
four maximum single doses, or delivering the dose will exceed the maximum daily dose.
The testing activity involves detecting any hardware unit failure, including sensor, battery,
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needle, and insulin reservoir, to suspend the IPCS work and to run a failure alarm. In the
manual mode, the system will deliver the dose manually, hence the software controller will
not perform safety checking, but it will update the quantity of the available insulin and
the cumulative dose. The maximum manual dose is 5 units. The complete requirements
are documented and specified in the Z language in [219], and part of the specification is
provided in [220].
In the following, we will describe the detailed steps and the results of applying the
ASM-STPA-SA method to the IPCS system.
5.4.2 Methodology Applied to IPCS Case Study
In this section, we apply our methodology to the IPCS case study.
5.4.2.1 Modelling the System Behavior via AsmetaL and Simulating the Re-
sultant Model
In this stage, we show how to model the IPCS via AsmetaL and how to exploit the AsmetaS
tool to simulate the obtained model.
Specification. As a simplified model for the IPCS was already presented in [220, 219],
we focus here on modelling issues unaddressed by these works, such as switching between
the system operation modes (automatic, manual, or switching off) at any state by the user,
and timing details of the software controller activities, which include: testing, running, and
setting the cumulative dose to 0, occurring every: 30 seconds, 10 minutes, and 24 hours,
respectively. As a result, in this section, we discussed the specifications for these issues1.
Specifications of the switching off mode and the running activity stages, that include
sensing the glucose value, analysing it, calculating the insulin dose, checking the calculated
dose and delivering it, are not presented here, since they are detailed in [220, 219].
Code 5.5 shows the r main rule for the IPCS, in which changing the system operation
modes at any state by the user has been modelled. In this code, we defined the boolean
monitored function switchMode to denote whether a user wants to change the system’s
operation mode. This function drives the transition from any state into another one in
the whole model. We also declared the btn controlled function that represents the oper-
ation mode of the system, which can be on (automatic mode), manual (manual mode),
1The complete model for the IPCS together with the Avalla scenarios are available in [25]
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or off (switching off mode). The value of the btn function is updated by the button mon-
itored function when the switchMode function has true value. While when this function
has false value, three rules are executed in parallel, which are: r Automatic[], r Manual[],
and r Switchoff[], that represent the system’s operation mode: automatic, manual, and
switching off, respectively.
enum domain Button={ON, OFF, MANUAL}
monitored button : Button
monitored btn : Button
monitored switchMode : Boolean
main rule r Main =
i f switchMode=true then
par
btn :=button




r Automatic [ ]
r Manual [ ]
r Sw i t c h o f f [ ]
endpar
endif
Code 12: Specifying the maximum bu↵er size in the client sideCode 5.5: The r main rule for the IPCS case study
The r Automatic[] rule, shown in Code 5.6 is fired when btn is on.
controlled spn :Boolean
rule r Automatic=
i f btn=ON then
par
i f ( spn=fa l se ) then
par
r Running [ ]




r Check Rese rvo i r [ ]
r Check Needle [ ]
endpar
endif
r Update Timecycle [ ]
r Cance lAct ion [ ]
endpar
endif
Code 13: Specifying the maximum bu↵er size in the client side
Code 5.6: The r Automatic rule for the IPCS case study
In this rule, when the system is not suspended from its work (the spn function false
value), it, depending on the time constraints and software controller state, either implement
the running activity by the r Running[] rule or the testing activity by the r Testing[] rule.
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While, when the system is suspended due to a hardware unit failure, it must not implement
any of these activities but it keeps checking whether the failure is managed to resume its
work again. In the r Automatic[] rule also, whether the system is suspended or not, the
time must be updated through the r Update Timecycle rule which we will explain it later.
As the running and testing activities are based on the state of the software controller,
we defined the cS function to represents this state, which can be sns (sensing the current
glucose value), anlscal (analysing the current glucose value and calculating the dose),
sftck (safety checking for the computed dose before delivering it), dlvr (delivering the
dose), or tst (testing). Using this function we modelled the running activity by the
r Running rule, see Code 5.7. This rule starts when the controller state is sns. If it is so,
then the current glucose value is obtained from the sensor via the valS function, it is saved
in the cR function, and the state of the controller is set to anlscal. After calculating the
dose, the value of cS function becomes sftck. When the safety checking for the computed
dose is finished by the r SafetCheck rule, the cS value changes into dlvr. At the time that
the full dose has been delivered, the running activity ends and the cS function turns into
tst to perform the testing activity.
enum domain Cont r o l l e r={SNS , ANLSCAL,
SFTCK, DLVR, TST}
domain Dose subsetof I n t eg e r
controlled cS : Con t r o l l e r
controlled cR : Dose
controlled mSD: Dose
controlled mDD: Dose
controlled cD : Dose
controlled comD: Dose
controlled dD: Dose





i f ( ( iA>=mSD) and (cD<mDD) ) then









i f comD=0 then
dD:= 0
else
i f (comD+cD)>mDD then
dD:=mDD cD
else











case SNS : r Sense [ ]
case ANLSCAL: r AnalyseAndCalculate [ ]
case SFTCK: r SafetyCheck [ ]
case DLVR: r De l i v e r [ ]
endswitch
Code 14: The AsmetaL ground model for IPCSCode 5.7: Specification of running activity f the IPCS case study
Performing the testing activity will be through inspecting the values for the iA, ndlExist,
126 Farah Al-Shareefi
rsvExist, and failure functions in the r Testing rule, see Code 5.8. The iA function is the
available insulin value, which must not be less than the maximum single dose (mSD=4).
The rsvExist function records whether the reservoir exists (prs) or not (not), and the same
role for the ndlExist function of the needle. The failre function records whether there is a
failure in any hardware unit, such as the sensor, pump, needle, or battery. When there is
no failure in the system, the needle exists, and the reservoir exists, the returned values by
the fl, ndl, and rsv monitored functions must be kept checked, respectively. If the returned
values show that the system has a hardware failure or no existence state, then the system
must be suspended by updating the value of the controlled function spn to true, and at
the same time the alarm command must be run through the alarmCommand function and
a convenient message must be sent via msgCommand function as well.
enum domain Message={NOINSULIN |
NORESERVOIR | FAILURE |NONEEDLE}
enum domain Present={PRS | NOT}
monitored r sv : Present
monitored ndl : Present
monitored f l :Boolean
controlled r svEx i s t : Boolean
controlled f a i l u r e : Boolean
controlled nd lEx i s t : Boolean
controlled alarmCommand : Boolean
controlled msgCommand : Message >Boolean
controlled d i sp l ay1 : Message
rule r Te s t i ng=
i f cS=TST then
par
i f f a i l u r e=true then
par
msgCommand(FAILURE) :=true
d i sp l ay1 :=FAILURE
endpar
else
i f ( f l=true ) then
f a i l u r e :=true
endif
endif
i f r svEx i s t=fa l se then
par
msgCommand(NORESERVOIR) :=true
d i sp l ay1 :=NORESERVOIR
endpar
else
i f r sv=NOT then
r svEx i s t := fa l se
endif
endif
i f nd lEx i s t=fa l se then
par




i f ndl= NOT then
nd lEx i s t := fa l se
endif
endif
i f iA<mSD then
par
msgCommand(NOINSULIN) :=true




i f ( f a i l u r e=true ) or ( r svEx i s t=fa l se ) or







Code 15: The AsmetaL ground model for IPCSCode 5.8: Specification of testing activity for the IPCS case study
Executing the testing and running activities are also restricted by time (30 seconds and
10 minutes). This is carried out by the r Update Timecycle rule, see Code 5.9.
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controlled sC30 : ThirtyC
controlled mC10 :TenC
domain ThirtyC subsetof I n t eg e r




rule r Update Timecycle=
i f ( sC30=1) and ( cS !=TST) then







i f ( pas (30)=true ) then





















Code 16: The AsmetaL ground model for IPCSCode 5.9: Timing aspects specification of the IPCS case study
As there is no tool to deal with time within the ASMETA framework, we treat time in
an abstract manner. To achieve this, we use the controlled function sC30 to represent the
number of 30 second cycles in 10 minutes. The maximum value for this function is 20. As
the controller performs the running activity every 10 minutes and the testing activity every
30 seconds (but running and testing can not take place at the same time), one of these
20 cycles is for running and the other cycles are for testing. During the running activity,
the controller sets the cumulative dose cD to 0 every 24 hours. We use the controlled
function mC10 to represent the number of 10 minute cycles in 24 hours (its maximum
value is 144). When this function reaches 144 and the sC30 function reaches 20, then the
controller will set the cumulative dose to 0. Furthermore, we deal with increasing these
functions in an abstract manner via the boolean monitored function pas(30). This means,
when the pas(30)=true, some function should be increased, and at the same time, some
activity should be performed. For example, if sC30=20 and 30 seconds has passed since
the last update of sC30 to 20, then the running activity must be started by changing cS
into sns, sC30 becomes 1, and at the same time mC10 is checked. If it has reached 144, it
is set to 1, otherwise it is increased to the next value. If 30 seconds has passed since the
last update of sC30 to a value within 1-19, then the testing activity must be performed
and sC30 is increased to the next value.
Regarding the manual mode for the IPCS, we specified this mode by the r Manual rule,
see Code 5.10. In the r Manual rule, when the monitored function mD returns a value
within the range of the manual dose (1..5), the available insulin is updated by providing
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i f btn=MANUAL then
i f ( exist $md in Dose with
( ($md=mD) and ($md>=1 and $md<=5)) )
then//Here the re i s no check ing whether
the a v a i l a b l e i n s u l i n i s equal or











updateiACommand:= fa l se
updatecumDCommand:= fa l se
endpar
endif
Code 16: Specifying the maximum bu↵er size in the client side
Code 5.10: Specification of the manual mode for the IPCS case study
Simulation. Concerning the simulation of the IPCS model by the AsmetaS tool, it
enabled us to identify the incorrect ASM state that emerges from firing inaccurate specified
rule. This rule is the r CheckReservoir. It is specified for checking that the reservoir has
been returned back after removing it, where the reservoir is removed when it becomes
empty. The specification for this rule is shown in Code 5.11a.
Note that the monitored and controlled functions used for the IPCS are enumerated in
Table 5.2 with their descriptions.





























































rule r Check Rese rvo i r=
i f r svEx i s t=fa l se then
i f r sv=PRS then
par
iA :=100
r svEx i s t : true




(a) The incorrect specification
rule r Check Rese rvo i r=
i f r svEx i s t=fa l se then
i f r sv=PRS then
par
iA :=100
r svEx i s t : true
i f ( nd lEx i s t=true ) and (cD<mDD)
and ( f a i l u r e=f a l se ) then





(b) The correct specification
Code 3: The r Check Reservoir rule
(a) The wrong specificatio





























































rule r Check Rese rvo i r=
i f r svEx i s t=fa l se then
i f r sv=PRS then
par
iA :=100
r svEx i s t : true




(a) The incorrect specification
rule r Check Rese rvo i r=
i f r svEx i s t=fa l se then
i f r sv=PRS then
par
iA :=100
r svEx i s t : true
i f ( nd lEx i s t=true ) and (cD<mDD)
nd ( f a i l u r e=f a l s ) then





(b) The correct specification
Code 3: The r Check Reservoir rule
(b) The correct specification
Code 5.11: The r Check Rese voir rule









alarmCommand Alarm action Controlled
True
False
Alarm action is provided






















Switching off operation mode
cD Cumulative dose Controlled 0 to 35 -
cR
Current read of the
glucose value
Controlled 0 to 35 -






Sensing the current glucose value
Analysing the current glucose
value and calculating the dose
Safety checking for the computed
dose before delivering it
Delivering the dose
Testing
dD Delivered dose Controlled 1 to 100 -




The failure does not exist




The failure does not exist
iA
The amount of the
available insulin
Controlled 1 to 100 -
mC10
The number of 10
minute cycles
in 24 hours
Controlled 1 to 144 -
mD Manual dose Monitored 0 to 35 -
mDD Maximum daily dose Controlled 0 to 35 -
minD Minimum dose Controlled 0 to 35 -













The needle does not exist
nP Number of pulses Controlled 0 to 35 -
pas(30) Passing 30 seconds Monitored
True
False
The 30 seconds are passed




prior to the current one
Controlled 0 to 35 -
sC30
The number of 30
second cycles
in 10 minutes








The reservoir does not exist








The work of the system is
suspended















Monitored 0 to 35 -
Table 5.2: The function for the IPCS and their denotations
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In Code 5.11a, the monitored function rsv is used as a sensor to return feedback about
the reservoir’s presence. When it has the prs (present) value, the controlled function
rsvExist is updated to true and the function spn is changed to false in order to make the
system resumes its work again. After simulating the AsmetaL code that includes this rule,
there is a chance of an incorrect ASM state emerging from hardware failure that coincides
with the reservoir returning process, then changing the value of the spn function without
prior check is inaccurate, because that means the system might return to its operating
conditions even with a failure. The specification of the r CheckReservoir rule in Code
5.11a was inspired from [220], in which the system resumes its work when the reservoir is
returned back to the system with 100 units, without considering that there is a possibility
of a hardware unit failure at the same time as the reservoir is returned back.
Figure 5.6 shows part of the simulation trace for the AsmetaL that includes the
r CheckReservoir rule with inaccurate specification. In this Figure, state 7 manifests that
the value of spn is updated to false even when the value of the failure function is true.
According to this simulation, the specification for the r Check Reservoir rule is updated to





rule r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d=
i f doorStatus=CLOSING then
i f ob s t a c l eS ta tu s=NOTEXIST then
par
doorStatus :=CLOSED
provide ( c l o s e ) := fa l se
tra inMotion :=MOVING




provide ( c l o s e ) := f a l se
ob s t a c l eS ta tu s :=EXIST





(a) The correct specification
rule r c l o s i n g t o c l o s e d o r o p e n e d=
// c an c e l l i n g c l o s e ac t i on i s d i s r ega rded
// here
i f doorStatus=CLOSING then








ob s t a c l eS ta tu s :=EXIST





(b) The wrong specification
Code 1: The r closing to closed or opened rule





















































Figure 5.6: Part of the simulation for the IPCS model with incorrect rule
5.4.2.2 Validating the AsmetaL Model
Following the simulation, we specify different scenarios to validate that the AsmetaL model
satisfies them. A scenario describes the identifiable interactions between the system and
its environment to represent informal functional requirements. These interactions for the
IPCS are represented by the current glucose value and the delivered dose. We identify 14
scenarios that correspond to the delivered dose quantity requirements, which are introduced
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in Section 5.4.1. From these scenarios, we only discuss the scenario that has a fail verdict2.
This scenario corresponds to the following requirements: if the cumulative dose does not
exceed the maximum daily dose, and the computed dose itself is less than or equal to the
maximum single dose, then the delivered dose is equal to the computed dose.
// s e t t i n g the i n i t i a l 250 s t a t e s
set switchMode := fa l se ;
set valS :=22;
step
check cR=22 and cS=ANLSCAL;
step until cS=TST;
check cD=22;
set switchMode := fa l se ;
set pas (30) :=true ;
set f l := fa l se ;
set r sv :=PRS;
set ndl :=PRS;
step until sC30=20;
check spn=f a l se ;
set switchMode := f a l se ;
step
check cS=SNS ;
set switchMode := f a l se ;
set valS :=34;
step
check cR=34 and cS=ANLSCAL;
step




Code 2: The scenario that has a fail verdict
Code 5.12: The scenario which corresponds to the requirement of delivering the computed
dose if it was less than or equal to the maximum single dose and the total amount not
exceeding the maximum daily dose
The scenario in Code 5.12, which is written in Avalla, can be described as follows: the
system is operating in automatic mode and remains in this mode, the current glucose value
is 34, the previous glucose value from 10 minutes earlier is 22, the cumulative dose is equal
to 22, the system is not suspended from its work, the computed dose is 3 units, and the
requirement that must be checked is: the delivered dose should be equal to the computed
dose.
The simulation of the scenario in Code 5.12 is illustrated in Figure 5.7. In this figure, the
comD and dD functions represent the computed dose and the delivered dose, respectively.
The simulation shows that we obtain the success verdict for the first received glucose value
(22), the cumulative dose, no suspension, the second received glucose value (34), the sum
of the computed dose and the cumulative dose that is equal to the maximum daily dose
(25), and the computed dose is less than the maximum single dose (4), while a fail verdict
is obtained at state 283, due to missing the equality operator in the safety condition
on the computed dose before delivering it (see r SafetyCheck rule in Code 5.7). This
condition checks whether the summation of the computed dose plus the cumulative dose
is greater or less than the maximum daily dose, but it does not checks equality situation
2The specifications of the 13 scenarios that have success verdicts are available online in [25], see Code
5.12, and the corresponding requirement for each scenario is in Appendix B
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((comD+cD)=mDD, i.e. 3+22=25). Therefore, the delivered dose is not calculated and
we obtained a failed verdict. Thus, we have shown that ignoring the equality testing in
the [219] specification may lead to a serious issue in the IPCS. As a result, we updated
the specification for r SafetCheck rule in Code 5.7, such that the if-then condition, which
is if (comD+cD)<mDD then, is changed to include the equality check, i.e. if (comD+cD)
≤ mDD then.

























































































































































































Figure 5.7: Simulation of the scenario shown in Code 5.12
5.4.2.3 Eliciting safety requirements for the system via STPA
After performing the validation activity, we elicit the safety requirements by applying the
following steps of the STPA process:
• Identifying the main accidents. The IPCS has the following accidents:
– A patient is prone to transient or permanent dysfunction or even death when
an unnecessary insulin dose is given.
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– Damage to the patients eyes, kidneys, nerves, or heart if the required insulin
dose is not given.
– Exposure to allergic reactions or infections.
• Indicating the main hazards related to the identified accidents. The IPCS
has the following hazards:
– The users unawareness of warning signs or system failure conditions.
– The given insulin dose exceeds the maximum single or daily dose.
– The delivered insulin dose is less than the requisite computed dose.
– The decision to deliver or not an insulin dose has been taken without checking
the current glucose value.
– The insulin dose is delivered at the wrong time.
– The shown dose value on the display unit is different from the actual delivered
one.
– Unintended switching to the manual mode without showing that on the display
unit.
– The insulin pump control device is still working even while a hardware failure is
located, the available insulin is less than the maximum single dose, the insulin
reservoir is removed, or the needle does not exist.
– The first display unit shows messages unrelated to the actual hardware unit’s
situation.
• Drawing the schematic safety control loop. Figure 5.8 shows the safety control
loop diagram for the IPCS case study.
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Figure 5.8: Safety control loop for the insulin pump control system
• Determining the main control actions. The control actions here are run the
alarm, update the available insulin, deliver the dose, display messages, and test the
hardware units.
• Identifying the process model. We define it as a set of monitored and controlled
functions affecting providing the analysed actions. Each member of this set consists
of the function name and its values, e.g., the process model that affects the run
warning alarm action is: {switchMode=(true, false), btn=(on, off, manual), spn=
(true, false), cR=(≥sMin, <sMin), cS=(sns, anlscal, sftck, dlvr), nP=(0, 1, 2,
3, 4), iA=(>4×mSD, ≤ 4×mSD), sCC=(>mDD, ≤mDD)}. Where the meaning of
cR is: current read of glucose, sMin is: minimum safe limit (6), mDD is: maximum
daily dose (4), sCC is: summation of computed and cumulative dose, and nP: pulses
number issued by controller to deliver the insulin.
• Evaluating the combination of the function values and document the re-
sults in a context table. The evaluation process is through asking a question to an
expert in the following form: if the controller receives a certain combination of func-
tion values, will (providing, providing too early/too late, not providing) the action
Chapter 5. Safe Design Development Methodology for Safety-Critical Systems 135
in the next state by the controller lead to a hazard? The results of the evaluation are
documented in Table 5.3. This Table is only for the run warning alarm. Note that,
the alarm action is issued for patient’s warning and system’s suspension purposes.
We consider only the warning purposes in Table 5.3 in order to keep the table as
simple as possible. The no/fun answer in this table represents no actual hazard will
happen, but there is a flaw with the system function, e.g., it is not hazardous if the
alarm action is provided earlier than realizing that the current glucose is less than
the minimum safe limit.
• Translate each combination that has a yes answer in the table into informal
safety requirements using must/must not phrases. According to Table 5.3,
we have 6 safety requirements corresponding to the 6 yes answers. For example, the
warning alarm action must be provided when the system is in the automatic mode,
this mode is not changed, and the current glucose value is less than the minimum
safe limit.
5.4.2.4 Formalizing the Elicited STPA Safety Requirements
The next stage is formalizing some of the obtained STPA requirements through performing
the following steps:
• Determine the main functions combination according to the yes answers in the ‘Not
Provided’ condition only. The purposes for that, are: to ensure that the action is
provided with these combinations, not with the other. With regard to Table 5.1, the
combinations that have been identified are:
1. switchMode=false, btn=on, spn=false, cS=dlvr, nP=0, and iA≤ 4mSD.
2. switchMode=false, btn=on, spn=false, cS=sftck, and sCC>mDD.
3. switchMode=false, btn=on, spn=false, cS=anlscal, and cR<sMin.
• Formulate the above combinations using formula 5.1, to produce the following LTL
requirement:
 (((switchMode=false ∧ btn=on ∧ spn=false ∧ cS=dlvr ∧ nP=0 ∧ iA≤ 4mSD) ∨
hghll(switchMode=false ∧ btn=on ∧ spn=false ∧ cS=sftck ∧ sCC>mDD) ∨










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.3: The context table for the run alarm action with warning conditions
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5.4.2.5 Verifying the Formulated Safety Requirements
This stage is intended to verify the resulted formulated requirements against the AsmetaL
model. The output of this stage is either a true answer confirming that a given formulated
requirement is satisfied, or a counter-example showing how this requirement is unsatisfied.
We model checked the original model for the IPCS case study, and we faced an issue of
a large state space, hence we have somewhat modified our model to reduce the state space
but without affecting the results of the IPCS. To do that, we made the testing and running
activities less frequent such that testing activity will be done every 2 minutes instead of
every 30 seconds and running activity will be performed every 40 minutes (after 19 tests),
and the cumulative dose will be set to zero every 36 runs instead of 144.
We verified the requirements by running the AsmetaSMV tool on 64-bit Windows 10
PC with 1.8 GHz Intel Core i7-4500U processor, 8 GB main memory, and 1000 GB virtual
memory.
In the following, the main safety requirement that we verified, such that the first two
are the unsatisfied requirements while the rest are the satisfied ones. Furthermore, the first
requirement is obtained from Table 5.3, but the rest are not produced from this table. We
do not show the STPA tables and how to repeat the analysis steps for these requirements
in order to make reading them easier.
(1) LTLSPEC g(((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=dlvr and
nP=0 and iA<=4*mSD) or (switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and
cS=sftck and sCC>mDD) or (switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and
cS=anlscal and cR<sMin)) iff x(alarmCommand=true)).
This property informally means that the warning run alarm action is provided in the
next state if and only if one of the warning combinations occurs. Part of the formula
is in bold font to indicate that this part (combination which is in bold) is the reason
for unsatisfying this property.
In Figure 5.9, we show the failing trace for providing the run alarm action when
the available insulin quantity is equal or less than 4 times the maximum single dose.
The new abbreviation that we use in this figure is: pR (previous glucose reading).
From state 1.1, onwards the system is operating under the automatic mode shown
by the value on. Furthermore, this mode is not changed within these states, as
the value of the switchMode function is false. At state 1.1, there is no alarm ac-
tion (alarmcommand=false) and the insulin quantity is 18 (iA=18). At state 1.2, the
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controller receives the current glucose value (cR=22) from the sensor (valS=22), and it
computes the dose at state 1.3 (comD=((cR=22)-(pR=14))/(mSD=4)). Delivering the
dose starts at state 1.4, and at state 1.6 it finishes and the available insulin becomes 16
which is equal to (4×(maximum single dose=4)). The loop starts at state 1.6 showing
that the warning alarm action is not provided (alarmCommand=false), when iA=16.
This happens because the initial version of the AsmetaL model relies on the specifica-
tion in [219], which does not consider running the alarm at the cautionary situations
for the available insulin quantity, i.e. iA ≤(4×(maximum single dose=4)).




























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.9: Failing trace for running alarm action when the available insulin is equal to
the 4 maximum single doses
(2) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=manual and iA<=100 and mD!=0) iff
hgfhhggjhhjhjhggjhgfgfgfghfjhjhgjhghgjhgghfhgfhgfhgfghg x(updateiACommand=true)).
Where the mD is the manual dose, and the property informally means that the action
of updating the available insulin according to the manual dose is always provided in
the next state, if and only if the system works under the manual mode, the operation
mode is fixed, the available insulin is less than or equal the capacity (100 units),
and there is a manual dose. In Figure 5.10, we provide a failing trace for providing
the update available insulin action when the system is in manual mode. From state
1.1 onwards, the system is in the manual mode via the value manual. At state 1.1,
the insulin quantity is 9 (iA=9), the manual dose is 5, and updating the available
insulin action is not provided (updateiACommand=false). At state 1.2, the action is
provided and the value of iA is changed to 4. The loop starts at state 1.2 showing
that the insulin quantity is not updated, when the iA=4 and the mD=5. The loop
arises from a lack of a constraint, in the [219] specification, on the available insulin
before delivering the manual dose (see r Manual rule in Code 5.10). This constraint
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must check if the available insulin is equal or greater than the maximum manual dose
(5) before delivering it.




























































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.10: Failing trace for updating available insulin action when the manual dose is
greater than the available insulin
Hence the r Manual rule must be modified such that the quantity of the available insulin
is checked with respect to the value of the manual dose, i.e., the condition in this rule,
which is if (exist $md in Dose with (($md=mD) and ($md>=1 and $md <=5))) then,
must be modified into if (exist $md in Dose with (($md=mD) and ($md>=1 and $md
<=5) and iA>= $md)) then.
(3) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and (iA≤mSD∗4) and
cS=DLVR and nP=0) iff x(msgCommand(insulinlow)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying low insulin message is
always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under the
automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
state is delivering the dose, and the available insulin is equal or less than 4 times the
maximum single dose.
(4) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=TST and
(iA<mSD)) iff x(msgCommand(noinsulin)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying no insulin message is
always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under the
automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
state is testing, and the available insulin is less than the maximum single dose.
(5) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=anlscal and
(cR<sMin)) iff x(msgCommand(sugarbloodlow)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying sugar blood low message
is always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under the
automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
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state is analysing and calculating the dose, and the current glucose value is less than
the minimum safe limit (6).
(6) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=tst and
(needleExist=false)) iff x(msgCommand(noneedle)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying no needle exist message
is always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under the
automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
state is testing, and the needle does not exist.
(7) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=tst and
(failure=true)) iff x(msgCommand(failure)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying hardware failure existence
message is always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under
the automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
state is testing, and the failure exists.
(8) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=tst and
(rsvExist=false)) iff x(msgCommand(noreservoir)=true)).
This property informally means that the action of displaying no reservoir exist message
is always provided in the next state if and only if the system is operating under the
automatic mode, the operation mode is stable, there is no suspension, the controller
state is testing, and the reservoir does not exist.
(9) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=false and btn=on and spn=false and cS=dlvr and
(nP!=0) and (dose!=0)) iff x(pulse=true)).
This property informally means that the action of sending pulses by the controller to
deliver a dose (one pulse to each unit of dose) is always provided in the next state if
and only if the system is operating under the automatic mode, the operation mode is
stable, there is no suspension, the controller state is delivering a dose, the amount of
dose is not equal to zero, and the number of pulses dedicated to delivering a dose is
not equal to zero.
(10) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=true and button=on) iff x(btn=on)).
This property informally means that the system’s operation mode is always changed
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to automatic in the next state if and only if the user wants to change the mode and
selects the on button for that.
(11) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=true and button=off) iff x(btn=off)).
This property informally means that the system’s operation mode is always changed
to switching off in the next state if and only if the user wants to change the mode and
selects the off button for that.
(12) LTLSPEC g((switchMode=true and button=manual) iff x(btn=manual)).
This property informally means that the system’s operation mode is always changed
to manual delivering in the next state if and only if the user wants to change the mode
and selects the manual button for that.
The properties from number 3 to 12 are satisfied by the AsmetaL specification for the
IPCS, but the first two properties are not. As a result, he AsmetaL specification for the
IPCS needs to be modified with respect to just the first two properties, such that the
r Manual rule must be modified to include a check on whether the available insulin is
graeter than or equal to the current manual dose. In addition, the r Running rule must
also be modified to add the statement of providing the alarm action alarmCommand=true
when the iA ≤(4×(maximum single dose=4)).
5.4.2.6 Evaluation of the IPCS Case Study
To evaluate the IPCS case study, we can compare our methodology results with the results
in [220]. Our methodology starts with specifying the system via AsmetaL, while the work
in [220] employs the Z language for specification. Our specification tries to represent the
timing aspects for the system via using an abstract time representation, while the [220]
specification uses the input variable clock? to obtain the current time, but it does not
specify how the implementation of RUN and TEST schemas responds to this variable. In
our methodology, we use the simulation, validation and verification tools to develop a
safe system, whereas [220] utilizes the safety arguments method for performing manual
verification. This method starts with an unsafe state, then all paths in the system code
must be proven to be contradictory to this state. This method does not address the unsafe
conditions determined by our methodology, which includes: (1) The patient does not take
the automatic dose when the sum of the computed dose and the cumulative dose equals
the maximum daily dose. (2) The system can deliver a manual dose even if it exceeds
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the available insulin. (3) The system does not give an alarm if the available insulin in the
reservoir is less than the sum of 4 maximum single doses. (4) The system resumes its work
again when the insulin reservoir is returned back, after filling it with 100 units, even when
there is a failure in the hardware unit. We believe that these unsafe conditions are not
highlighted by other methods.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the ASM-STPA-SA methodology. We evaluate our methodol-
ogy by comparing the formalization process for the STPA requirements of [19] and ours.
In [19] four types of safety requirements have been elicited and formalized, which are:
• The control action must always be provided at the next state (without being too
early or too late), when a specific combination occurs. It has been formalized as
follows:
 (Comij →© (CAi)) (5.2)
where: CAi is the ith hazardous action, and Comij is the jth combination that relates
to the ith action. Such formulae are formulated for each combination of conditions
presented in a line of context table with yes answer in ‘Not Provided’ column.
• The control action must always be provided not later than a certain combination
occurrence. This requirement is elicited according to the combination line with yes
answer in ‘Provided too late’ column of the context table. The corresponding safety
property is formulated as:
 ((Comij → CAi) ∧ ¬(Comij U CAi)) (5.3)
The authors of [19] claim that this formalization of the requirement “the software
controller should always (...) not provide a control action CAi too late while the
occurrences of the critical set of combinations has become previously true in the
execution path.”. However, a simple semantics analysis does not support their claim.
Indeed, the right hand side of conjunction ensures that either (1) there is no action
occurred, or (2) there should be an action occurred such that at some point before
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that a combination should not hold, which is different from the statement of the
claim.
• The control action must always be provided not earlier than the occurrence of a
combination. This requirement is specified according to the combination line with
the yes answer in ‘Provided too early’ column of the context table. The corresponding
safety requirement is formulated as:
 ((CAi → Comij) ∧ ¬(CAi U Comij)) (5.4)
The authors of [19] claim that this formalization of the requirement “a software
controller should always (...) not provide control action CAi before the occurrence
of critical combinations set (...) still not become true in the execution path and
that it well provides the CAi when the combination of (...) holds. ”. However, a
simple semantics analysis does not support their claim. Indeed, the right hand side
of conjunction ensures that either (1) there is no combination satisfied, or (2) there
should be a combination such that at some point before that a control action should
not occur, which is different from the statement of the claim. Furthermore, the left
hand side of conjunction can not be ensured when the control action emerges from
more than one combination.
• The control action must always not be provided, when a combination occurs. It has
been formalized in the following form:
 (Comij → ¬CAi) (5.5)
This formalization is formulated for each combination line with yes answer in ‘Pro-
vided’ column of the context table.
In our approach all these requirements are captured by a single formula (5.1):
((comi1 ∨ comi2 ∨ ...comin)↔©(CAi))
With this property, the action will not be provided with another combination or
later/earlier than satisfying the determined combination.
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5.6 Related Work
Here, we discuss related work that uses hazard analysis techniques, formal methods, or
both for analysing safety-critical systems. In [229], an integrated approach for combining
the results of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
techniques into the requirements specification. The FTA results are the identification of
combinations of component failures, while the FMEA identifies the failure modes and the
minor errors that lead to component failure. That paper uses statecharts to bridge the
semantics gap between the results of safety analysis and software requirements. In [204], a
method for formalizing and verifying the safety requirements elicited by the FTA technique,
is presented.
The safety analysis techniques that have been used for eliciting safety requirements in
these papers rely mainly on component failure, and only partially on unintended interac-
tions between system’s components. Leveson [126] presents the STPA technique to identify
the safety requirements for inadequate control actions that affect whole system functions
and its components’ behavior. According to STPA, the accidents do not simply arise from
sequences of component failures, rather, they arise when the safety constraints related to
the functional interactions among system components are not enforced. In [17, 19] the
authors propose a software safety verification methodology based on the STPA technique
to elicit the safety requirements and verify them to identify software risks. First, they elicit
and formalize the STPA requirements (with respect to providing and not providing actions)
into LTL properties and they verify them based on an SMV manual constructed model.
Next they formalize the STPA requirements (with respect to providing actions too early
and too late), and they build a safe behavior model of a software controller constrained by
the STPA results with UML statechart, as well as they provide an algorithm to transform
the safe model into an input model of the NuSMV model checker. However, the formaliza-
tion process does not reflect the requirements for too early/late actions. In our work, we
reformulate the four STPA requirements (‘provide’, ‘provide too early’, ‘provide too late’,
and ‘not provide’) into one formula capturing these requirements, and we exploit ASMs to
model the functional behavior of the system and we do not constrained the ASM model
by STPA results. We choose ASM method as it supports several characteristics, including:
flexibility in modelling any algorithm at an appropriate level of abstraction, and feasibility
of being used in an automatic and tool supported manner during the system development
process. Furthermore, ASMs have simple and well-defined formal semantics [64].
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In [234] a Structured Object-Oriented Formal Language (SOFL) is adopted to build a
formal specification for the IPCS. That paper shows that the SOFL provides an effective
means to allow the developer to take a gradual process to build a formal specification for
the system, but it does not show how to verify or validate the resulted specifications.
In [30, 33], it is shown how the ASM method serves in supporting the design, validation,
and verification activities within the ASMETA framework. However, in this work the
verification of safety requirements is guided only by the modeller experience, not by a safety
analysis technique. Our approach utilizes the same framework (ASMETA) for developing
systems, but we employ the STPA procedure for deriving the safety requirements.
Recently, the paper in [125] presents a methodology for combining the STPA technique
with the Event-B method to analyse critical systems. The work in [125] couples the STPA
with an intruder modelling concept to generate safety and security requirements which are
then validated by applying the Event-B formal method. An intruder modelling concept is
stated by identifying the main intent and actions for the intruder and parts of the system
that are accessible by the intruder. This identification helps to determine the requirements
for mitigating the intruder’s behavior.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we combine the ASM method and STPA technique in a development
methodology. Our methodology shows how the simulation-based validation, the scenario-
based validation of the functional requirements, and the verification of the STPA require-
ments help us to modify the ASM specification.
We have demonstrated how the disjunction and if and only if operators adopted in our
formalization help to capture the four STPA requirements.
The application of our methodology has been illustrated through the TDC and IPCS
case studies.
We have shown how the timing aspects for the IPCS have been modelled in an abstract
manner. We modelled the start point of the controller activities via using two controlled
functions mC10 and sC30, and we modelled the time passing since last activity by a boolean
monitored function pas. This abstract handling specifies when the activity starts but it
ignores dealing with durative action, while a certain activity is performed, e.g. run alarm
for 10 seconds during running activity. However, we can specify the durative actions using
a monitored function similar to the pas function, but this is at the cost of making the
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model more intricate.
In the specification analysis presented here, we did not consider the static analysis for
the completeness and consistency properties. This by applying the AsmetaMA tool [32] to
the specification.
With respect to the applicability of our methodology, it is important to show which
system our methodology is applicable to. Based on the generality feature of ASM and as
the first stage of our methodology implies using this method , there is no restrictions for
selecting the system under analysis, except for the real-time system. While during the
stage at which our methodology requires applying the STPA technique, the system under
analysis must contain a controller which issues actions that any failure in their functions
could lead to a hazardous state.
The stage of eliciting STPA requirements in our methodology is performed manually.
Although an automatic tool has been proposed to achieve this [18], it seems only to work
for up to 6 variables in a process model for the software controller. Hence, further work





In chapter 5, we introduced a methodology to develop safe designs of safety-critical systems
relying on the idea of combining the formal methods via ASMs with a safety analysis
technique. This combination aims at verifying that the ASM model developed for a system
satisfies the STPA outcomes which are the answers of the informal STPA queries. This
chapter considers a similar combination but in a way that serves the security protocols
domain.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 the STPA queries, whose main concern is timing provision,
will help to address possible unsafe aspects of the system behaviour. Despite that, they are
insufficient to fully address the insecure aspects related to the security protocols. Clearly,
the timing provision of messages is not the only factor that affects the security of protocols.
Furthermore, analysing the time factor gives an abstract insight into the presence of an
insecure state, without precisely uncovering it, e.g., receiving a message too late implies
a protocol flaw, but this does not give an insight into what type of flaw is. Recall from
chapter 4 the reviewed formal analysis approaches for security protocols depend on the
intruder Dolev-Yao model [91], which assumes the following:
1) the intruder can generate any message it wants basing on its knowledge;




3) the intruder can launch an unbounded number of sessions.
The first assumption may lead to some superfluous messages with wrong format or type,
which are likely to be rejected by honest participants. The second assumption may be too
strong in some contexts. In particular, some encryption mechanisms when they have cer-
tain algebraic properties can be broken [141], for instance, commutative encryption [166].
The third assumption and also the first one generally lead to the non-terminated verifi-
cation problem due to unbounded state space to be analysed. Some protocol verification
tools which are based on the general purpose model checkers treat the infinite state space
problem by imposing limitations on the number of executed runs and the number of gen-
erated messages. Though, when the protocol under analysis is relatively complex, e.g., it
consists of more than six actions, or its model includes a range of variables, this can result
in a state explosion problem, which in turn will inhibit the analysis process termination.
Other verification tools, e.g., ProVerif and Tamarin [51, 168], have addressed the state
space explosion problem but at the cost of possible non-termination of the analysis, partic-
ularly in the presence of non-trivial algebraic properties, such as the one of commutative
encryption. The work in [129] deals with the infinite state space problem by simulating
security protocols using scenarios designed for known attacks. This approach helps to
reduce the number of protocol runs needed to be explored with guaranteed termination.
However, the intruder in work [129] constructs messages using only a type matching re-
striction. This still may increase the message space with unacceptable messages by the
receiver, which eventually increases the number of protocol runs. Furthermore, in work
[129], the user needs to simulate all specifications for the designed attack scenarios while
looking for attacks including those that will definitely not compromise the protocol under
analysis. Moreover, this work does not show how to analyse a protocol in the presence of
an algebraic property.
Taking into account the above limitations, we propose a methodology for analysing
security protocols. It consists of two phases: manual analysis, and automatic analysis
phases. For the manual analysis phase, we develop the Flaws and Attack Types Identifica-
tion (FATI) method to help at selecting the attack scenario specification whose simulation
is likely to produce an attack. The FATI is STPA-like method which is based on a set of
developed queries whose answers are capable of capturing the main flaws for security pro-
tocols. At the automatic analysis phase, we implement the attack pattern scenarios idea in
Chapter 6. Security Protocols Analysis Methodology 149
the ASM methodology. We also further reduce the number of protocol runs by modelling
a “clever” intruder who generates only acceptable messages restricted by the supposed
message type format and the expected message content. Furthermore, we consider the
commutative property.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
1) An STPA-like method that enable us to simulate only the attack scenario specification
whose simulation is likely to produce an attack.
2) Formulating a principle for generating messages by the intruder according to the
receiver’s expectations taking into consideration the message type format and the
expected content.
3) Using the attack pattern scenarios in the actual verification/validation process based
on simulation in the ASM methodology.
4) Modelling commutative encryption and analysing protocols in the presence of this
algebraic property.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 details the FATI method
developed for attack types identifications. Section 6.3 introduces our methodology with
respect to its two phases and discusses the aspects of its second phase in details, including
modelling of the protocol, the intruder, the attack scenarios, as well as specifying the
invariant conditions. Results and discussion are discussed in Section 6.4. While, Section
6.5 reviews related work. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Flaws and Attack Types Identification Method
In this section, we present the Flaws and Attack Types Identification (FATI) method to
identify potential flaws of protocols and the expected attack types upon them.
The FATI technique adopts the principles of two key features for the STPA technique.
The first one is using a set of what-if queries on provision conditions to each action in order
to identify system flaws. This feature can be utilized for security protocols, as any protocol
is a sequence of actions that the what-if queries are applicable to them. The second fea-
ture relates to considering the system failing components together with the dysfunctional
interactions among non-failing components as causes of system accidents. Likewise, the
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components of any security protocol are the participants involved in it whereas the ex-
changed messages between participants represent the interactions. Based on that, possible
attacks underlie any functional deficiency in a protocol that is related to the participants
and/or to their interactions (messages).
According to the above two features, we developed the FATI method which proceeds by
asking queries about each protocol action in a way that facilitates flaws to be recognized,
and in turn be assessed collectively to show which type of attacks could exploit these
flaws. In the light of attacks reviewed in Chapter 4 (except the type-flaw attack), we
realized that queries based on timing provisions would not directly address flaws that lead
to these attacks. For example, in a protocol, when a participant receives a message too
early (before the required time for constructing and sending this message) this may give
an indication that there is a flaw in this protocol, however true, but this does not give
an insight into what the flaw is, or from where it arose. Furthermore, early, late, or non-
received messages do not necessarily imply protocol flaws, rather, they may refer to flaws in
the communication medium. This spotlights the need for specific queries that can identify
flaws related to the protocol itself.
We were capable of identifying flaws by considering queries about the liveness of pro-
tocol’s participants and about the freshness of messages sent by the participants. These
queries are deemed to be flaw identifiers due to the following reasons. First, security pro-
tocols mostly aim at authenticating their participants and/or distributing secrets between
them. Second, the attacks reviewed in chapter 4 intend to compromise the authentication
and/or secrets distribution aims. The answers to these queries are according to the re-
ceiver’s perspective. We developed guidelines to facilitate answering these queries and to
determine the attack types.
The process of the FATI technique consists of two steps:
Step 1 Identify the possible flaws that affect the protocol functionality through perform-
ing the next sub steps:
Step 1.1 Apply the following queries to each protocol’s action:
Participant Liveness Is the sender of a message related to this action alive
(truly participated) from the receiver’s perspective? Our guideline to an-
swer this query is to check whether the sender sends an encrypted message
containing a freshness component generated by the receiver, and this mes-
sage is encrypted either with a shared key between the sender and the
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receiver, or public key of the receiver.
In case that the sender sends an encrypted subcomponent asking the re-
ceiver to pass it to another participant, the liveness of the first sender from
the later participant’s perspective must also be enquired about.
Message Freshness Is the message related to this protocol action fresh?. Our
guideline regards a message fresh when every freshness component in this
message is fresh and its association is clearly shown. The freshness of a
component can be deduced from its existence in a message encrypted under
a receiver’s public key or shared key between the sender and the receiver,
and this component is generated originally by the receiver. While the as-
sociation of a freshness component can be deduced either from attaching
the freshness component to the identity of its generator or from associat-
ing the freshness component to the key used to encrypt the message that
contains this component. In the case that there is more than one freshness
component in an encrypted message, then the association of one of these
components must be deduced by the key while the rest by their generators’
identity.
Step 1.2 Document the answers of the above queries in a table, called identified
flaws table, consists of columns for the index of action, the sender, the receiver,
the message components, the queries, and comments. The comments column is
for illustrating the reasons of the negative answers.
Step 2 Determine the expected types of attacks that can exploit the identified flaws. The
determination is directed by the following guidelines:
Simple REPL Attack Guideline. We expect a protocol is vulnerable to the Sim-
ple REPL attack when the following conditions are satisfied. First, there is a
message which the liveness of its sender is not proved. Second, the message
in the first condition comes after two successive messages with proved their
senders’ liveness. Last, all the messages in the first and second conditions are
between the same two participants.
DoS REPL Attack Guideline. The DoS REPL attack arises when both two fol-
lowing conditions are met:
• The liveness of the initiator for a protocol is not proved for all its sent
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messages.
• The first message sent to the responder whether from the initiator or the
server is not fresh, and this message is intended to authenticate the initiator
to the responder.
REFL Attack Guideline. The REFL attack usually occurs when:
• The liveness of the initiator is absent for all its sent messages.
• All the messages been sent to the initiator are not fresh.
MITM Attack Guideline. It is likely to occur when the initiator sends a non-
fresh message to the responder, and the responder’s replay to this message is
not fresh as well.
INTRL Attack Guideline. It is usually against protocols with repeated authen-
tication part, more precisely, this attack occurred when there is, in the first
authentication part, an encrypted message or sub-message containing freshness
component and this message is being re-sent in the second authentication part,
i.e., this message or sub-message is not fresh.
6.2.1 Application of the FATI Method to the AS RPC Protocol
In this section, we illustrate the FATI method by applying its steps to the AS RPC pro-
tocol. We identify the possible flaws of the AS RPC protocol by applying the liveness and
freshness queries, and we document the answers to these queries in Table 6.1. By assessing
the results in Table 6.1, we conclude that the AS RPC protocol may be subject to the
Simple REPL attack. This is because B does not prove its liveness to A in the fourth
action, and this action comes after two successive ones with established sender’s liveness.









1 A B A, {NA}ssk(A,B) No No
The liveness





as NA is not
generated byB
2 B A {NA + 1, NB}ssk(A,B) Yes No
The freshness
of this message
is not proved as
the association of
NB is not shown
i.e., it is not
associated with its
generator’s identity
3 A B {NB + 1}ssk(A,B) Yes Yes
4 B A {ssk′ (A,B), N ′B}ssk(A,B) No No
The liveness


















B is not shown
i.e., it is not
associated with its
generator’s identity
Table 6.1: The identified flaws table for the AS RPC protocol
6.2.2 Application of the FATI Method to the NSPK Protocol
In this section, we illustrate the FATI method by applying its steps to the NSPK protocol.
We identify the possible flaws of the NSPK protocol and we show the identification results
154 Farah Al-Shareefi
in Table 6.2. By evaluating the results in Table 6.2, we conclude that the NSPK protocol
may be subject to the MITM attack. This is because A sends a non-fresh message to B









1 A B {A,NA}pk(B) No No
The liveness of A
from B’s perspective
is not proved as there
is no freshness
component generated
by B, and this
message is not fresh
since NA is not
generated by B
2 B A {NA, NB}pk(A) Yes No
The freshness of this
message is not proved
as the association of
NB is not shown
i.e., it is not
associated with its
generator’s identity
3 A B {NB}pk(B) Yes Yes
Table 6.2: The identified flaws table for the NSPK protocol
6.3 The proposed Methodology for Analysing Security Pro-
tocols
This section presents a methodology for analysing security protocols and developing secure
designs for them. It extends the simulation based attack scenarios method in [129] via:
1) avoid wasting unnecessary efforts in simulating all the specified attack scenarios by
prior identification of the expected attack types;
2) presenting our implementation in ASM methodology;
3) modelling a “clever” intruder that will generate acceptable messages only; and
4) considering the commutative property of encryption mechanism during protocol anal-
ysis.
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Our methodology assumes the following:
(1) There is a specific format for each message, and the honest participants only accept
the messages conforming with this format.
(2) The intruder is presumed to be as powerful as possible, where it can (a) intercept and
eavesdrop any sent message; (b) generate new messages according to its knowledge
and the allowed messages’ format and content; (c) decrypt an encrypted message
when it knows the decryption key or when the execution of a protocol depends on
an algebraic property of the encryption method.
Figure 6.1 shows an overview of our methodology which includes the following phases:
(1) The Manual Analysis Phase. This phase is mainly aimed at avoiding the waste of
effort unnecessarily for simulating all the specified attack scenarios, that the majority
of will not lead to attacks. It is worth to carry on a simple manual analysis that helps
to identify the possible attack types before undertaking the simulation task. As a
result, this phase applies the procedure of the FATI method to produce the types of
expected attacks against the protocol under analysis.
(2) The Automatic Analysis Phase. This phase is devoted to the accomplishment
of analysis for security protocols in an automatic way. It is made up of two stages:
(a) The Formal Specification Stage. This stage represents the base for the next
stage. It comprises four aspects:
• The Protocol Aspect: represents a modular model for any protocol al-
lowing to add different participants required for it.
• The Intruder Aspect: represents a general model for intruder behaviour,
taking into account updating knowledge and generating message capabili-
ties.
• The Attack Scenarios Aspect: stands for the built-in specifications of
attack scenarios, which are inspired by [129], into the intruder model to
sketch its behaviour. The specifications are used according to their related
attack types which are identified by the first phase.
• The Invariant Security Properties Aspect: represents the specifica-
tion of the invariant constraints that must be met by the resulting protocol
model.
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Figure 6.1: The safe design development methodology
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For any protocol, the intruder and the attack scenario aspects can be used
directly without any amendment, while the rest can be used only after a simple
modification based on the protocol’s requirements. Each aspect is illustrated in
details in Sections 6.3.1-6.3.4.
(b) The Simulation Stage. It employs the AsmetaS tool for simulating the ob-
tained specifications from the previous stage. This simulation produces the pro-
tocol runs which are specified by an attack scenario and shows whether there is
a violation of the invariant properties or not. In the violation case, we can go
back to our protocol specification to correct it.
In the following subsections, we detail the aspects of the formal specification stage.
6.3.1 The Protocol Aspect
This aspect represents modelling the protocol participants and their main operations
needed for message construction as AsmetaL rules.
6.3.1.1 The Protocol Participants
In this section, we model the NSPK protocol in AmetaL. We define the domain Proto-
col={NS, TP, DS, RPC, KSL} to enumerate the protocol names, note that NS refers
to the NSPK protocol, and RPC refers to the AS RPC protocol. As each participant
has a specific role, we construct a rule that corresponds to each role, such as r Initiator
rule for the initiator and r Responder rule for the responder, see Code 6.1 and Code 6.2,
respectively.
The first step to build the rules for protocol participants is defining the domain Id={AA,
BB, II } that represents the set of identities for the participants shared in the NS protocol,
including the intruder.
The second step is stating the protocol’s control flow, e.g., identifying when to send a
message. Each participant can be in two states: SEND and RECEIVE for sending and
receiving a message, respectively. The protocol’s session starts when the initiator wants
to initiate, i.e. when the Boolean function wantToInit(Id) is true. Each message has a
number stored in the msgNo controlled function (a controlled function is equivalent to
a variable in standard programming languages and a static function is equivalent to a
constant). Similarly, the running session number is stored in the sNo function. To indicate
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rule r I n i t i a t o r ( $InId in Id , $ResId in Id )=
i f s t a t e=SEND then
par
i f wantToInit ( $InId ) and msgNo=1 then
seq
s t a r t (NS, sNo , 1) :=true
r GenerateNc [ ]
ncInt ( $InId , $ResId ) := toS t r i ng (n)
r Encrypt [ [ t oS t r i ng ( $InId ) , n ] , pk ( $ResId ) ]
r Send [ [ t oS t r i ng ( cypher ) ] , $InId , $ResId ]
wantToInit ( $InId ) := fa l se
endseq
endif
i f msgNo=3 and s t a r t (NS, sNo , 3)=fa l se then
seq
s t a r t (NS, sNo , 3) :=true
r Encrypt [ [ at ( plainText , 1n) ] , pk ( $ResId ) ]





i f inBox ( $InId ) !=undef and msgNo=2 and f i n i s h (NS, sNo , 2)=fa l se then
seq
r Decrypt [ f i r s t ( inBox ( $InId ) ) , prk (pk ( $InId ) ) ]
inBox ( $InId ) :=undef
i f pla inText !=undef and
ncInt ( $InId , $ResId )=f i r s t ( p la inText ) then





Code 12: The r Initiator of the NS protocolCode 6.1: The r Initiator of NSPK protocol
a message related to a particular session is about to be sent, the start function is set to be
true. To indicate a message has been received, the function finish is set to true.
The next step shows how to define and deal with each message. The message is defined
as a sequence of Strings. To reach a specific element in this sequence, we use the predefined
function in the standard library of AsmetaL which is at. This function takes as inputs a
sequence of a determined domain and an index of the element that we want to reach, and
it returns the desired element. The participant realizes that there is a received message
when its inbox has a message. Whereas a constructed message is sent by updating the
outBox function with this message. To build a message, the participant can generate a
nonce by the r GenerateNc rule or encrypt a message by the r Encrypt rule or decrypt it
by the r Decrypt rule.
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rule r Responder ( $ResId in Id )=
i f s t a t e=RECEIVE and inBox ( $ResId ) !=undef then
i f (msgNo=1 and f i n i s h (NS, sNo , 1)=fa l se ) or
(msgNo=3 and f i n i s h (NS, sNo , 3)=fa l se ) then
seq
r Decrypt [ f i r s t ( inBox ( $ResId ) ) , sk (pk ( $ResId ) ) ]
i f pla inText !=undef then
i f msgNo=1 then
choose $ id in Id with f i r s t ( p la inText )=toS t r i ng ( $ id ) do
par
f i n i s h (NS, sNo , 1) :=true
c l a imed In i t := $id
endpar
else
i f msgNo=3 then
i f f i r s t ( p la inText )=toS t r i ng ( ncRsp ( $ResId , c l a imed In i t ) ) then









i f (msgNo=2) and s t a r t (NS, sNo , msgNo)=fa l se and f i n i s h (NS, sNo , 1)=true then
seq
s t a r t (NS, sNo , msgNo) :=true
r GenerateNc [ ]
ncRsp ( $ResId , c l a imed In i t ) :=n
l et ( $nb=toSt r i ng ( ncRsp ( $ResId , c l a imed In i t ) ) ) in
r Encrypt [ [ at ( plainText , i t on (1 ) ) , $nb ] , pk ( c l a imed In i t ) ]
endlet




Code 4: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
rule r GenerateNc=
extend Nonce with $n do
n:=$n
Code 5: The r GenerateNc Rule
Code 6.2: The r Responder of the NSPK protocol
6.3.1.2 The Operations Performed by the Participants
We model the encryption and nonce generation operations in an abstract way, by employing
the extend construct that expands an abstract domain for the operation outputs with a
new element. For instance, we define the abstract domain Nonce to represent a universe
for all nonce values, and the generated nonce will be an element returned by the extend
rule, see Code 6.3.
rule r GenerateNc=
extend Nonce with $n do
n:=$n
Code 5: The r GenerateNc Rule
Code 6.3: The r GenerateNc rule
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The specification for encryption and decryption operations utilize a similar idea, see
the specification for these operations in Code 6.4.
dynamic abstract domain Cipher
dynamic abstract domain Key
enum domain Id={AA | BB}
controlled pla inText : Seq ( S t r ing )
controlled c iphe r : Cipher
controlled key : Cipher > Key
controlled p l a i n : Cipher > Seq ( St r ing )
stat ic pk : Id > Key
stat ic sk : Key > Key
stat ic s sk : Prod ( Id , Id ) > Key
stat ic pKA: Key
stat ic pKB: Key
stat ic sSKAB: Key





function s sk ( $ id1 in Id , $ id2 in Id )=
i f ( ( $ id1=AA) and ( $ id2=BB) ) or ( ( $ id1=BB) and ( $ id2=AA) ) then
sSKAB
endif






rule r Encrypt ($m in Seq ( St r ing ) , $k in Key)=
choose $c1 in Cipher with ( p l a i n ( $c1 )=$m and key ( $c1 )=$k ) do
c iphe r :=$c1
ifnone
extend Cipher with $c2 do
par
c iphe r :=$c2
p l a i n ( $c2 ) :=$m
key ( $c2 ) :=$k
endpar
rule r Decrypt ( $c in Str ing , $k in Key)=
choose $c1 in Cipher with ( t oS t r i ng ( $c1 )=$c and $k=sk ( key ( $c1 ) ) ) do
pla inText := p l a i n ( $c1 )
ifnone
pla inText :=undef
Code 6: The r GenerateNc RuleCode 6.4: The encryption and decryption specification
In Code 6.4, first, we introduce the specification signature, which is as follows:
• The Cipher is an infinite domain for the ciphertext
• The Key is an infinite domain for the cryptographic keys.
• The unary function key represents the key for a given Cipher element.
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• The unary function plain is a sequence of Strings that stands for the plaintext of a
given Cipher element.
• The cipher function is a sequence of String representing the encryption output.
• The function ssk represents the shared key between two participants.
• The function pk is the public key for a participant.
• The function sk returns the same given key if it is a symmetric one, while if it
is a public key, it returns a corresponding private key. This has the advantage of
making our specification applicable to both public and symmetric key cryptographic
paradigms.
After the signature, we specify two rules: the r Encrypt rule for converting the presented
plain message into an encrypted one using the determined key, and the r Decrypt rule which
transforms the encrypted message into a plain text one using a specific decryption key. The
r Encrypt rule, firstly, makes sure that the given message has not been encrypted before by
choosing an element in the Cipher domain, such that the plain text for this element is equal
to the given message. This element represents the encrypted form of the given message.
When choosing an element returns nothing (the presented message has not been encrypted
previously), this rule will generate a new ciphertext (encryption outcome), given its plain
text and key, by extending the Cipher domain.
While the r Decrypt rule chooses from the Cipher domain an item that is equal to
the given ciphertext (encrypted message), and when the sk function applied to its key,
it will yield a key identical to the given decryption key. If the item was found, the rule
would return the item’s plaintext; otherwise, an undefined decryption output would not
be returned.
In addition to the specification of public and symmetric key encryption, we can specify
the algebraic property of the encryption function, such as commutativity. As mentioned
in Chapter 4, an encryption function is called commutative if it satisfies the following
condition: {{m}k1}k2 = {{m}k2}k1 , where k1 and k2 are encryption keys. Notice that
ASM specifications are abstract imperative programs and do not allow to simply state
commutativity property in declarative way. It rather has to be supported by the imperative
executable semantics of ASM rules.
The specification for the commutative encryption is presented in Code 6.5. The dec-
larations of functions used in the signature for this code are similar to those in Code 6.4,
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except the key function declaration, which is defined as a set of keys to keep track of all the
keys that are used to encrypt a given message. The encryption function is implemented
with respect to its commutative property by including or excluding the encryption key
from the keys set which must initially be empty.
dynamic abstract domain Cipher
dynamic abstract domain Key
controlled key : Cipher > Powerset (Key)
controlled p l a i n : Cipher > Seq ( St r ing )
controlled c iphe r : Seq ( S t r ing )
rule r GenNew( $n in Seq ( St r ing ) , $k in Powerset (Key) )=
extend Cipher with $e do
par
c iphe r :=[ t oS t r i ng ( $e ) ]
p l a i n ( $e ) :=$n
key ( $e ) :=$k
endpar
rule r comEncrypt ($m in Seq ( St r ing ) , $k in Key)=
choose $c in Cipher with l ength ($m)=1 and t oS t r i ng ( $c )=f i r s t ($m) do
i f conta in s ( key ( $c ) , $k ) and isEmpty ( exc lud ing ( key ( $c ) , $k ) ) then
c iphe r := p l a i n ( $c )
else
i f conta in s ( key ( $c ) , $k ) then
choose $c1 in Cipher with p l a i n ( $c1 )=p la in ( $c ) and
key ( $c1 )=exc lud ing ( key ( $c ) , $k ) do
c iphe r :=[ t oS t r i ng ( $c1 ) ]
ifnone
r GenNew [ p l a i n ( $c ) , exc lud ing ( key ( $c ) , $k ) ]
else
choose $c2 in Cipher with p l a i n ( $c2 )=p la in ( $c ) and
key ( $c2 )=inc lud ing ( key ( $c ) , $k ) do
c iphe r :=[ t oS t r i ng ( $c2 ) ]
ifnone




choose $c3 in Cipher with p l a i n ( $c3 )=$m and key ( $c3 )=inc lud ing ({} , $k ) do
c iphe r :=[ t oS t r i ng ( $c3 ) ]
ifnone
r GenNew [$m, i n c l ud ing ({} , $k ) ]
Code 7: The Commutative Encryption RuleCode 6.5: The commutative encryption specification
After the signature we specify two rules: the r GenNew and the r ComEncrypt. The
r GenNew rule generates a ciphertext for a given message by extending the Cipher domain
with one element. The r ComEncrypt rule is responsible of returning the encryption output
that satisfies the commutative property, by examining the following conditions:
1. If the message that we want to encrypt is plaintext then either a new encryption
output is returned by r GenNew, if this message has not been encrypted before, or
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the previous calculated encryption output is returned.
2. If the message that we want to encrypt is ciphertext (encrypted) then there are two
situations:
(a) The encryption key does not belong to the set of keys for this ciphertext. In
this case, the encryption key will be included in the set of keys, and the Cipher
domain is checked if it contains an element with a set of keys equals to the
obtained one, then this element represents the encryption output; otherwise the
r GenNew rule is called.
(b) The encryption key belongs to the set of keys. Then, the encryption key will
be excluded (deleted) from this set. Later, the resultant set will be checked if
it is an empty set, then the plaintext for the given ciphertext is returned as an
encrypted output, else the Cipher domain is checked to obtain an element with
the same obtained set of keys, otherwise the r GenNew rule is called.
6.3.2 The Intruder Aspect
In the classic Dolev-Yao intruder model [91], the intruder can generate and send any
message based on its knowledge. This can lead to an issue of the growing message space
with redundant messages that may be rejected by the receiver. We address this issue by
only considering the generation and sending messages that have contents and type format
based on the receiver’s expectations. For example, sending {NA}pk(B) as a third message
in the NSPK protocol, will be rejected by the responder, because it expects that it will
receive an encrypted nonce which has a value equal to the one sent before.
To do that, we first define an enumerative domain, called Type, which contains the
possible message’s component types:
d Type={ID, NC, PUBK, SECK, SHRK, ENCR, ANY }
where:
• ID is an identity;
• NC is a nonce;
• PUBK is a public key;
• SECK is a private key;
164 Farah Al-Shareefi
• SHRK is a symmetric key;
• ENCR is an encrypted component; and
• ANY is any component.
Next, we represent every protocol’s message as a syntax tree to capture the analysis
performed by the intruder. By the analysis, we mean either decomposing the message
into its components, or constructing a new message based on these components. The tree
representation is supported by the following two definitions which are illustrated in Figure
6.2.
Definition 1. Let m be a message which is a sequence of components, then the syntactic
tree of this message has the following properties:
1. its root is labelled with the message itself, while its other nodes are labelled with the
message’s sub components;
2. a node in this tree, which is a sequence of more than one component, has a number
of children;
3. the node, which is a sequence of one encrypted component, has one child which is a
sequence of its unencrypted components;
4. its leaves are single sequences of unencrypted component;
5. the root is numbered with a number equal to message number;
6. the children for each node are assigned a left-to-right ordering numbers, concatenated
to the parent number.
Definition 2. Let Ti be a tree for a message that has number i, i = {1, ..., n}. The position
of the root node for Ti is a single sequence containing only i. The position of other nodes
is the position of the parent node concatenated with the child order number for this node.
The last step is to update the intruder’s knowledge with the eavesdropped messages,
and to generate the possible accepted messages, based on the messages’ tree representation.
This step is detailed in the following subsections. Note that, the AsmetaL specifications
for updating the intruder knowledge and generating the messages are available in [22].
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Figure 6.2: Message Tree Representation Examples for the NSPK Protocol
6.3.2.1 Updating the Intruder’s Knowledge
To save all the eavesdropped messages and their components, which are sequences of String,
in the intruder knowledge, we define the function k: Seq(Seq(String)). This function is
updated by the r UpdateTheKnowledge rule.
Typically, the r UpdateTheKnowledge rule starts by saving the whole eavesdropped
message in the k function. Then it saves each element of this message in k, and meanwhile
checks whether the type of this element is encrypted, to decrypt it (if possible) and add
the decrypted components to k. The type for each component is specified as a constant for
our model by the static function type: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer))−> Type. This function
yields the type for the node that has a given position in a given protocol. For example, for
the third message in NSPK protocol that has two nodes in its tree representation, we have
the following type(NS, [3])=[ENCR], and type(NS, [3,1])=[NC ]. While k is updated, the
position of each node will be saved in the following function: position: Prod(Seq(String),
Integer, Integer))−> Seq(Integer). This function permits easy access to the desired node of
any message, by just giving the node’s value, the session number, and the message number.
6.3.2.2 Generating Messages
We restrict the intruder’s ability to generate messages by considering the type format of
the message and its expected content. By type format, we mean the component types
assumed by the receiver, e.g., for the second message in the NSPK protocol, the correct
type format would be an encrypted message by a public key. By the expected content,
we mean the values of the components that the receiver would expect, e.g., the second
message in addition to being encrypted under the receiver’s public key, the value of the
first component, which is a nonce, inside encryption must be equal to the nonce sent in
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the first message for the NSPK protocol. Notice that, in all protocols the first message has
no expected content.
Accordingly, we define the following static functions facilitating messages generation:
(the first two functions are related to each node in the message’s tree representation, while
the rest are related to the encryption key)
(1) type: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer))−> Type: is previously stated;
(2) posExpVal: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer)–>Seq(Integer): returns the position of the
expected value (if it exists) for the node that has a given position. For example,
the nonce node of the third message for the NSPK protocol, which is at the [3,1]
position, has an expected value the same as that at [2,1,2] position, i.e., posExp-
Val(NS, [3,1])=[2,1,2]. As a result, to generate the this message, the k sequence will
be checked if it contains a node with a position returned by the posExpVal function.
(3) posKeyId: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer)–>Seq(Integer): returns a specific identity for
the key of the given encrypted component/node’s position;
(4) keyType: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer)–>Seq(Type): says what is the type of the key
for the given encrypted component/node’s position;
(5) posKeyVal: Prod(Protocol, Seq(Integer)–>Seq(Integer): returns the expected key’s
position for the given position of the encrypted component.
Based on the all above functions, we specify the r GenerateMsg rule for generating the
potential accepted messages.
6.3.3 The Attack Scenarios Aspect
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the attack scenarios concept was previously presented in [129],
to reduce the number of protocol’s runs and to guarantee the termination of the analysis
process using simulation. This concept was based on designing generic algorithms for
five attack schemes, including MITM, REFL, DoS REPL, Simple REPL, and INTRL, to
return a scenario of an attack for the given attack scheme and protocol’s parameters.
The algorithms also need to define an assignment of the participant’s identity and the
intruder impersonation to each role. At the beginning, the produced scenario is written in
Common Syntax [132] and then is translated into an Estelle specification [65], to return the
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concrete simulated scenario. Despite that this work helps to reduce the protocol’s runs, the
intruder in this work generates messages based only on matching the types of message’s
components, and this can still increase the runs with unacceptable messages by the honest
receiver. Furthermore, in this work, the efforts are wasted in simulating all the attack
scenarios even those whose simulation will definitely not lead to an attack, and hence the
simulation needs to consider only the attck scenarios that will likely lead to producing
attacks.
In our work, we apply the FATI method to the protocol under analysis in order to iden-
tify the possible attack types upon it, and hence this gives guidance of which attack scenario
that needs to be simulated. We also encode the attack scenarios directly into AsmetaL,
and we restrict the messages generation action of the intruder with the expected message
content and types as well. Our AsmetaL specification of a scenario for a given attack type,
depends on the following static functions, that facilitate the assignment identification:
p: Prod(Integer, Integer, Task) –> Id, with Task={SENDER, RECEIVER}, and
imp: Prod(Id, Integer) –> Boolean
The first function restores the identity for the given task: SENDER, RECEIVER for the
participant’s role at the given session and message numbers, while the second function
says whether the given identity for a participant participated in a given session number is
impersonated. The detailed specifications for the five scenarios are available in [22].
6.3.3.1 Man in The Middle (MITM) Attack Scenario
The MITM attack aims to secretly intercept, replay, alter messages between two partic-
ipants and leaving them to believe that they are only communicating with each other.
The scenario for this attack is laid out as follows: an odd message number is put in
a sequence of session numbers arranged in the increasing order, while an even message
number is put in a sequence of session numbers ordered in the decreasing order. For ex-
ample, if we have 2 sessions and 3 messages, then the order of steps will be as follows:
(1.1)(2.1)(2.2)(1.2)(1.3)(2.3). This scenario is built using one of the three possible assign-
ments illustrated in Table 6.3, which can cause MITM attack. Note that, if a protocol has a
third participant playing server role, then this participant will not be impersonated as this
attack aims to create a fake conversation between two participants. In Table 6.3, the No
represents the number of possible assignments (assignment of the participant identities and
the intruder impersonations to each participant role). The assignment which has number
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2 in Table 6.3 causes the attack on NSPK protocol, which is shown in Figure 4.2(b). All
the tables mentioned in this chapter are based on the defined assignments in [129].
No
Odd Sessions Even Sessions
Initiator Responder Server Initiator Responder Server
1 A I(B) S I(A) B S
2 A I S I(A) B S
3 A I(B) S I B S
Table 6.3: The possible assignments for MITM attack scenario
rule r ExchangeMsgs ( $p in Protoco l )=
let ( $s=p( sNo , msgNo , SENDER) ) in
let ( $r=p( sNo , msgNo , RECEIVER) ) in
par
i f s t a t e=SEND then
par
i f $s=I I or
imp( $s , sNo , msgNo)=true then
r I n t r ud e r [NS ]
else
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $s , $r ]
r Responder [ $p , $s ]
endpar
endif
s t a t e :=RECEIVE
endpar
endif
i f s t a t e=RECEIVE then
par
i f $r=I I or
imp( $r , sNo , msgNo)=true then
par





r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $r , $s ]
r Responder [ $p , $r ]
endpar
endif






rule r MITM Scenario ( $p in Protoco l )=
seq
stop := tota lSno
begin :=1
d i r :=1
while msgNo<=totalMsgNo and
ex i s tAt tack=true do
seq
while ( ( stop=tota lSno and sNo<=stop )
or ( stop=1 and sNo>=stop ) ) and
( ex i s tAt tack=true ) do
r ExchangeMsgs [ $p ]









Code 8: The r ExchangeMsgs and the r MITM Scenario RulesCode 6.6: The r ExchangeMsgs and the r MITM scenario rules
The AsmetaL specification for the MITM attack scenario is shown in the Code 6.6.
In this Code, there are two rules: the r MITM Scenario rule, which models the scenario
arrangement, and the r ExchangeMsgs rule, which is called by the r MITM Scenario rule
to send and receive a message by the participants. In r MITM Scenario rule, the totalSno
function is a number of sessions, the totalMsgNo function is a number of messages, and
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stop, begin, and dir functions help achieving the increasing and decreasing order of the
session’s numbers.
In r ExchangeMsgs rule, two situations are in parallel execution. First, when state=SEND,
the SENDER’s identity is checked, if it is II, or it is impersonated, then the intruder will
send a message. Otherwise, in parallel the r Initiator/ r Responder rules are fired to send the
current message by either the initiator or the responder depending on the SENDER identity
of this message. Second, when state=RECEIVE, the RECEIVER’s identity is checked here,
to either update the intruder’s knowledge or to receive the current message by the initia-
tor/responder. Sending a message by the intruder can be achieved by generating all the
possible messages, and sending these messages one by one until one of them is accepted.
If not, then there is no such attack scenario.
6.3.3.2 Reflection (REFL) Attack Scenario
The constructed scenario of this attack, with respect to the pattern of ordering the message
and session numbers, is the same as that of MITM attack. While they are different in re-
gard to the assignment of participant identities and intruder impersonations, see Table 6.4.
In this table, we can see that the initiator of any odd session will be the responder of the
corresponding even session. In addition, the intruder either impersonates both the respon-
der of an odd session and the initiator of the corresponding even session, or it participates
as both legal responder of an odd session and legal initiator of the corresponding even
session without impersonation. Also, the server is not impersonated at the odd sessions in
order to use its messages in the even sessions.
No
Odd Sessions Even Sessions
Initiator Responder Server Initiator Responder Server
1 A I(B) S I(B) A I(S)
2 A I S I A I(S)
Table 6.4: The possible assignments for REFL attack scenario
6.3.3.3 Interleaving (INTRL) Attack Scenario
As the INTRL attack is launched at protocols with repeated authentication part, the
INTRL attack scenario starts from the step of beginning the second authentication part.
In general, this scenario can be described as follows. The first authentication part is
implemented without an intruder impersonation. After that, the second authentication
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part proceeds in a way that every two actions of a session are followed by the same two
actions of the following session until the last session. The assignment for this scenario is
presented in Table 6.5. The specification for this scenario is introduced in Code 6.7.
No
Odd Sessions Even Sessions
Initiator Responder Server Initiator Responder Server
1 I(A) B S I(A) B S
2 I(A) B S A I(B) S
3 I(A) B S B I(A) S
4 I(A) B I(S) I(A) B S
5 I(A) B I(S) A I(B) S
6 I(A) B I(S) B I(A) S
Table 6.5: The possible assignments for INTRL attack scenario
rule r ExchangeWithAttacker ( $p in Protoco l )=
let ( $s=p( sNo , msgNo , SENDER) ) in
let ( $r=p( sNo , msgNo , RECEIVER) ) in
while ex i s tAt tack do
seq
i f s t a t e=SEND then
i f ( $s=I I ) or
( imp( $s , sNo , msgNo)=true ) then
r I n t r ud e r [ $p ]
else
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $s , $r ]
r Responder [ $p , $s ]
r S e r v e r [ $p ]




i f s t a t e=RECEIVE then
par
i f ( $r=I I ) or
( imp( $r , sNo , msgNo)=true ) then
par
r Overhear [ $p ]




r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $r , $s ]
r Responder [ $p , $r ]
r S e r v e r [ $p ]
endpar
endif





rule r I n t r l ( $p in Protoco l )=
seq
i f r s tep>1 then
while msgNo<r s t ep do
seq




ac t s t ep := r s t ep
while acts tep<=totalMsgNo do
seq
while sNo<=tota lSno do
seq
msgNo:= ac t s t ep
x:=1
while x<=2 and msgNo<=totalMsgNo do
seq
go:=true














Code 11: The r ExchangeMsgs and the r MITM Scenario RulesCode 6.7 he r ExchangeWithAttacker and th r Intr rules
In Code 6.7, there are two rules: the r Intrl rule, which specifies the scenario pattern,
and the r ExchangeWithAttacker rule, which is called by the r Intrl rule to send and receive
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messages between the honest participants and the intruder during the second authentica-
tion part. In the r Intrl rule, the rstep function represents the beginning step of the second
authentication part.
6.3.3.4 Denial of Service Replay (DoS REPL) Attack Scenario
This scenario can be described as follows. First, the initial session is performed only
between honest participants in order to save the message that can be replayed in the next
sessions. Second, the next sessions include eliminating all initial actions in which the
responder does not participate, i.e., the next sessions start from the first action at which
the responder receives a message. The DoS REPL attack scenario has only one possible
assignment shown in Table 6.6.
rule r In t e r c ep tSend ( $p in Protoco l )=
l et ( $s=p( sNo , msgNo , SENDER) ) in
let ( $r=p( sNo , msgNo , RECEIVER) ) in
seq
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $s , $r ]
r Responder [ $p , $s ]
endpar
choose $id1 in Id , $ id2 in Id
with ( $ id1 != I I ) and ( $ id1 != $id2 )
and ( outBox ( $id1 , $ id2 ) !=undef ) do
outBox ( $id1 , $ id2 ) :=undef
r I n t r ud e r [ $p ]
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $r , $s ]
r Responder [ $p , $r ]
endpar




rule r SimpleReplay ( $p in Protoco l )=




s t a t e :=SEND
rep ly :=4
ex i s tAt tack :=true
while msgNo<=totalMsgNo do
r ExchangeMsgs [ $p ]
sNo:=sNo+1
msgNo:=1
wantToInit ( $s ) :=true
while sNo<=tota lSno do
seq
while msgNo<r ep ly do
r ExchangeMsgs [ $p ]
while msgNo<=totalMsgNo do
seq








Code 10: The r ExchangeMsgs and the Simple Scenario RulesCode 6.8: The r FirstSession and the r Dos Reply rules
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No
First Session Next Sessions
Initiator Responder Server Initiator Responder Server
1 A B S I(A) B I(S)
Table 6.6: The possible assignments for DoS REPL attack scenario
This scenario is illustrated in Code 6.8. In Code 6.8, there are two rules: the r DoS Replay
rule, which specifies the scenario arrangement, and the r FirstSession rule, which is called
by the r Dos Replay rule to perform the first session without intruder impersonation and
to save the message which will be replayed in the intruder knowledge .
6.3.3.5 Simple Replay (Simple REPL) Attack Scenario
This scenario is similar to the DoS REPL attack scenario with respect to executing the
first session without impersonation, but it differs from it by implementing the next sessions
without omitting any message. In addition, this scenario needs an input parameter called
repl that identifies the starting step which includes replaying a message by the intruder.
Messages before this step are exchanged only between honest participants, then at the repl
step the sent message is intercepted, and a message from the first session is replayed to the
receiver by impersonating its original sender. This means the impersonation occurs just
at this step. The possible assignment for this scenario is shown in Table 6.7.
No
First Session Next Sessions
Initiator Responder Server Initiator Responder Server
1 A B S A B S
2 A B S I B S
Table 6.7: The possible assignments for Simple REPL attack scenario
This scenario is illustrated in Code 6.9. In Code 6.9, there are two rules: the r SimpleReplay
rule, which specifies the scenario arrangement, and the r InterceptSend rule, which is called
by the r SimpleReplay rule to intercept a message by the intruder and replay a message
from previous session to the receiver.
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rule r In t e r c ep tSend ( $p in Protoco l )=
l et ( $s=p( sNo , msgNo , SENDER) ) in
let ( $r=p( sNo , msgNo , RECEIVER) ) in
seq
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $s , $r ]
r Responder [ $p , $s ]
endpar
choose $id1 in Id , $ id2 in Id
with ( $ id1 != I I ) and ( $ id1 != $id2 )
and ( outBox ( $id1 , $ id2 ) !=undef ) do
outBox ( $id1 , $ id2 ) :=undef
r I n t r ud e r [ $p ]
par
r I n i t i a t o r [ $p , $r , $s ]
r Responder [ $p , $r ]
endpar




rule r SimpleReplay ( $p in Protoco l )=




s t a t e :=SEND
rep ly :=4
ex i s tAt tack :=true
while msgNo<=totalMsgNo do
r ExchangeMsgs [ $p ]
sNo:=sNo+1
msgNo:=1
wantToInit ( $s ) :=true
while sNo<=tota lSno do
seq
while msgNo<r ep ly do
r ExchangeMsgs [ $p ]
while msgNo<=totalMsgNo do
seq








Code 10: The r ExchangeMsgs and the Simple Scenario RulesCode 6.9: The r InterceptSend and the r SimpleReply rules
6.3.4 The Invariant Security Properties Aspect
In order to detect whether a protocol is vulnerable to an attack following a particular
attack scenario, we use invariant checking for the security properties at simulated states
of the protocol run. We are interested in inspecting two security constraints: secrecy and
authentication.
The secrecy constraint is related to confirming that no secret information is obtained
by others. For example, in NSPK protocol we have the following constraint:
s invariant inv sec over ncRsp, k: not(contains(k, append([], ncRsp(BB, AA))))
It means that the intruder knowledge does not contain the nonce of BB which is sent
to AA.
The authentication property is defined in [238] based on the correspondence assertion
style, as follows “when an authenticating principal finishes its part of the protocol, the
authenticated principal must have been present and participated in its part of the protocol”.
This can be formulated as invariant constraint over start and finish functions, such as in
NSPK protocol we have:
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invariant inv authAB over start, finish: implies( finish(NS, 2, 1), start(NS, 2, 1))
It informally means that if a participant successfully finishes receiving the first mes-
sage in the second session, then this implies that sending this message has been started
previously in this session. This constraint helps to prove the authentication of AA to BB
regarding this message, as the first message is sent to BB from AA. For the reason that AA
also sends the third message in the NSPK protocol, we have to assert the authentication
of AA to BB regarding this message as well by changing the message number in the above
constraint.
Recall that the NSPK protocol is intended to achieve mutual authentication, we also
have to check the authentication of BB to AA, by replacing the position of the start and
finish functions. More precisely, authenticating BB to AA can be checked through the
following:
invariant inv authBA over start, finish: implies( start(NS, 1, 1), finish(NS, 1, 1))
Informally this constraint asserts that when a participant has been started sending the
first message in the first session, then this message will be received successfully in this
session. Remember that the start and finish functions are updated only by the honest
participants, not by the intruder.
6.4 Results and Discussion
In our experiments, we are firstly focused on applying the FATI method to the protocol
under analysis in order to produce the possible attack types upon it, following that we
are concerned with simulating the protocol runs, which are specified by the scenario of the
expected attack type while observing the invariant properties. If there is no violation of any
stated invariant property, there will be no successful attack related to these properties and
the style of modelled attacks when its related scenario is simulated. We have analysed five
protocols, including NSPK, TP, DS, AS RPC, and KSL protocols, as they well-known case
studies, and they exhibit different patterns of attack scenarios related to the considered
attack types; in particular, MITM, REFL, DoS REPL, Simple REPL, and INTRL attacks,
respectively1.
As our methodology consists of two distinct phases, we will discuss each phase sepa-
rately in the following subsections.
1The specification for the five protocols with their related attack scenarios are available in [22]
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6.4.1 Manual Analysis Phase
The main idea of the manual analysis phase is to apply the FATI method to security
protocols using queries and guidelines, in order to identify the potential flaws and their
possible associated attack types. These queries and guidelines are useful for a concise and
instructive analysis of protocol’s flaws and attack types, as illustrated in its application
to security protocol examples in Sections 6.2.1-6.2.2, and they are also useful for saving
efforts needed in the next phase.
To evaluate the FATI method, we compare it to VIA and REA methods illustrated
in Chapter 3. Both of these methods were invented to identify vulnerabilities in security
protocols and to elicit requirements that counteract these vulnerabilities. The VIA method
uses guide words to identify the potential vulnerabilities, e.g., the omission guide word is
used to identify the vulnerability of no message sent, though, such guide words will only
identify vulnerabilities at an abstract level without precise recognition of the vulnerability
nature. Furthermore, the VIA method suffers from repetition in addressed vulnerabilities.
The REA method decomposes only the negated protocol’s goal (undesirable event)
into its possible sub-events that contribute to creating vulnerabilities. The decomposition
is performed by asking a query ”what do we mean by [the event under consideration]?”,
which is answered with respect to satisfying the security properties, such as availability,
secrecy, etc. Since this query is asked several times until a vulnerability is reached, REA
method consumes time and efforts. On top of that, the results of this method are not
complete, due to considering only the negated goal. Furthermore, both of these methods
do not identify possible attack types against security protocols.
Our method, on the other hand, is more determinant and precise at recognizing the
vulnerabilities (or flaws) by showing their nature (freshness or liveness) and their positions
(at which protocol action they occurs). In addition, it gives an insight into the possible
attack types that could compromise the security of a protocol. In spite of that, our method
is not suitable for analysing protocols that have not been designed yet, while the other two
methods are more convenient for that.
6.4.2 Automatic Analysis Phase
This phase uses simulation as a process of validation for security protocols. Through the
simulation process, two checks are performed in every simulated scenario: the violation
of invariant constraints and the acceptance of messages sent by the intruder. Typically, a
176 Farah Al-Shareefi
produced scenario from the simulation is equivalent to an attack, when the invariant con-
straints are violated, and all messages sent by an intruder are accepted by their intended
receivers. For example, by simulating the NSPK protocol using the MITM scenario with
two sessions, we obtained four scenarios. Only one of them has messages that conform
to the attack shown in Figure 4.2b and its invariant properties presented in Section 6.3.4
are violated. During this simulation, the intruder sends messages to honest participants
three times. By the addition of the expected content check, the number of the generated
messages each time is less than that obtained with the type matching method [129] . For
example, in our method, the intruder generates 6 messages at the first step of second ses-
sion: {A,NA}pk(B), {B,NA}pk(B), {I,NA}pk(B), {A,NI}pk(B), {B,NI}pk(B), {I,NI}pk(B).
While 24 messages are generated based on the type matching method. Fewer messages are
generated since the intruder is restricted with the expected responder public key, instead
of all the known keys, including pk(A), pk(B), pk(I), prk(I).
Note that, the attack scenarios give guidance exploring all runs with correct message
formats and types while looking for attacks, and this can reduce the number of checked
runs. As the number of protocol runs is positively impacted by the number of executed
sessions and the number of steps in each session, reducing the generated messages by the
intruder will eventually minimize the protocol runs. Combining the attack scenarios with
the idea of reducing the intruder’s messages can dramatically decrease the protocol runs.
Concerning the TP protocol, we obtain the attack in Figure 4.5b by executing the
REFL scenario with two sessions. In fact, our method is flexible in a way that it allows
adding more checking abilities to the participants for easy detection of the attack in Figure
4.5b by themselves, i.e., checking that the received message is not equal to the one sent in
a session before. The TP protocol is a challenging case study as it’s specification depends
on the commutative encryption property. Commonly, this property is modelled as an
equation directed from left to right (where the right-hand side is either a constant or a
rigid subterm of the left-hand side) by tools like Proverif and Tamarin, in which case it can
cause non-terminated analysis. We avoid this by modelling this property in a procedural
way that captures the commutative equivalence condition.
Although understandably we cannot claim any form of completeness for our method,
we can say that it detects attacks with given specified scenarios, including MITM, REFL,
DoS REPL, Simple REPL, and INTRL, on protocols vulnerable to these attacks, though
it cannot detect other attacks with undefined scenarios, such as type flaw and collaborative
attacks.
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In this methodology, we have modeled any protocol using the basic ASM instead of the
distributed ASM in order to check the simulation outputs (update sets) for every protocol
participant which has a rule equivalent to its behavior. Note that, to encode an AametaL
model of a distributed system or multi-agents system, we have to specify the main rule for
the main ASM which imports all the ASM modules that correspond to each agent of the
system, and the AsmetaS separately shows the outputs for each specified module.
6.5 Related Work
Different formal methods have been used for analysing security protocols. Model checking
tools, such as Spin and NuSMV tools, have been applied to the automatic verification of
security protocols, such as [47, 155]. These tools successfully prove that insecure states are
unreachable but with a bounding assumption for generated fresh components or protocol
sessions.
With respect to the unbounded analysis issue, ProVerif [51], is a well-known tool that
has emerged to address this. ProVerif employs Prolog style rules and executes an abstract
representation technique to analyse an unbounded sessions. Its specification language is
applied pi calculus. ProVerif reasonably proves secrecy and correspondence properties.
However, for some protocols, e.g. TP protocol, and algebraic properties, ProVerif may go
into an infinite loop which leads to a stack overflow. Recent work related to unbounded
analysis [168], presents the Tamarin tool as a protocol verification tool in a symbolic model
checking style. The specification language for Tamarin is based on multiset rewriting
rules. Tamarin’s language is more expressive than that of ProVerif in specifying security
properties, as it supports direct modelling for temporal properties. It nevertheless shares
with ProVerif the same non termination limitation.
The ASM method has been theoretically used for specifying and analysing security
protocols, taking into account modelling intruder capabilities [45, 46]. However, this work
does not deal with expected content during generating messages.
The papers [130], and [129] are closest to our work. The first paper restricts the in-
truder’s ability to generate only the messages of a particular type, which can be accepted
by some agents. Depending only on type matching still may produce unacceptable mes-
sages. In [129] a methodology of simulating security protocols using scenarios designed for
different attack schemes is presented. This is implemented in the Estelle language. The
results showed it is an effective approach to reduce the number of protocol runs. However,
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in this work, the intruder generates messages based on method of [130]. In addition, this
work does consider the algebraic properties of the encryption mechanism.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents a methodology for analysing security protocols and developing secure
designs for them. This is achieved by extending the simulation based attack scenarios
method in [129] via 1) avoiding to waste unnecessary efforts in simulating all the specified
attack scenarios by prior identification of the expected attack types; 2) specifying the
scenarios in AsmetaL and simulaing them using AsmetaS tool 3) modelling a “clever”
intruder that will generate acceptable messages only by use two conditions: the expected
message content and type matching, to limit the intruder’s generated messages only to those
that meet these conditions; and 4) considering the commutative property of encryption
mechanism during protocol analysis.
Chapter 7
Clarifying Ambiguous
Requirements: SASL Case Study
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 6, we presented a methodology to analyse security protocols in order to identify
the main design flaws in these protocols and how the intruder can exploit these flaws to
lunch attacks. Chapter 6 also highlights the fact that flaws do not necessarily emerge
from mistakes in the design itself, rather they might come from silent assumptions or
from missing or non clarified details in the protocol requirements. To overcome that, the
requirements must be clarified precisely before performing the analysis process. As a result,
this chapter shows how to clarify informal requirements for the Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) case study using Abstract State Machines.
SASL is a framework that can be used by application protocols to perform authentica-
tion, and to optionally supplement it with what is called security layer services, including
integrity and confidentiality. SASL was firstly described in Requests for Comments (RFC)
2222 [173], and then in RFC 4422 update [169], using technical natural language. Un-
fortunately, the RFCs, being stated in natural language that intrinsically has associated
informality and imprecision, are sometimes ambiguous. There is an Oracle implementation
of SASL [177], its documentation also includes textual explanations and some underspec-
ified aspects of the RFCs. In addition, as the source code of this implementation is not
publicly available, their details are unknown.
To overcome the imprecision and ambiguity problems, formal methods can be used
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as they are based on mathematical foundations [109]. Among these methods, we choose
the Abstract State Machine (ASM) method, since it can be used to specify systems in a
rigorous mathematical, understandable, and scalable way.
Consequently, we formally analyse the ambiguities of the SASL textual explanations in
the RFCs and Oracle implementation documents using the ASM method. This is achieved
by implementing two strategies of the ASM method. First, the ground model directly
captures the informal SASL behavior in an understandable and concise but precise enough
manner. Second, the refinement strategy allows us to precisely explicate and re-elaborate
the under-defined notions in the ground model. The refined specification is written in
the executable ASMETA Language (AsmetaL), since it is close to the ASM mathematical
concepts, and it directly permits us to test specification errors.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
• clarifying the ambiguities of the SASL informal descriptions in RFCs and Oracle
implementation documents clearly in terms of ASMs;
• presenting a methodology for clarifying ambiguity that starts with the RFC document
to capture its informal description, via the ASM ground model, then it explicates
the potential description ambiguities depending on other document sources by using
ASM refinement;
• highlighting the main differences between RFCs and the Oracle documents.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the SASL
framework. Section 7.3 describes the ASM formal specification, and highlights how this
specification elucidates the main ambiguities of SASL. Section 7.4 discusses our results.
Section 7.5 presents some related work. Finally, Section 7.6 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Simple Authentication and Security Layer
In this section, we describe the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) example.
SASL was initially introduced in RFC 2222 [173], and later updated in RFC 4422 [169],
as a framework for providing authentication support with an optional security layer ser-
vice, such as integrity or confidentiality, to connection-oriented protocols, via substitutable
mechanisms. Providing these services is achieved through using a shared abstraction layer
which has a structured interface between intended protocols and mechanisms. With this
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layer, any SASL supported protocol, such as IMAP [215], SMTP [216], etc., can exploit
any SASL supported mechanism, such as PLAIN [243], DIGEST-MD5 [144], etc.
Based on RFC 2222/4422 [173, 169], the client and server of the SASL protocol applica-
tion launch a negotiation about the selection of a suitable mechanism, then they negotiate
the authentication. Essentially, the client requests to connect with the server using SASL.
Then, the server replies with a list of supported authentication mechanisms. Next, the
client selects the best mechanism. After that, the authentication is started by the client
via sending an authentication command, which involves the selected mechanism and op-
tionally authentication data, to the server. The authentication exchange continues until
the authentication succeeds, fails, or is aborted by the client or the server. During the
authentication exchange, when the selected mechanism supports the security layer, the
client and server negotiate the use of a security layer. If they both agree about using it,
then both sides must negotiate the maximum size for the cipher text buffer, that each side
is able to receive. The RFCs specification, however, leaves open a number of questions, in
particular:
• how the server advertises its mechanisms’ list;
• how the client selects best mechanism, when the client and server agree about using
the security layer and how it can be used; and
• how they negotiate the maximum cipher text buffer size.
Some of these questions also relate to the ambiguity and missing details of the informal
description for the API routines in the Oracle implementation documentation [177].
According to the Oracle implementation [177], the application communicates with the
structured interface by calling a suitable API routine, which in turn calls a mechanism
plug-in interface. One of these routines is: the sasl client start() which is called
by the client to select the best mechanism depending on the security properties. The
main properties that restrict mechanism selection are: the security policies, such as
noplaintext, noactive, noanonymous, etc., and the maximum Security Strength
Factor (SSF) [177] for the client, server, and mechanism. The SSF is an integer that
denotes the security layer strength, as follows:
• When it is zero, it indicates only authentication.
• If it is one, it means both authentication and integrity.
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• If it is greater than one, it denotes authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and at
the same time the key length for encryption.
In addition, the server calls the sasl listmech() routine to obtain the mechanisms’ list
that satisfies the security policies.
7.3 The Formal SASL Specification
In this section, we show how the ASM method has been used to provide formal specifica-
tions for SASL. The main aim is to clarify precisely: how the server advertises the available
mechanisms, how the client selects the best mechanism, how the client determines the max-
imum size for the cipher buffer, and how and when the security layer is negotiated. As
the SASL framework has detailed and complex behavior, we separate the SASL into three
phases: the mechanism negotiation phase, the authentication negotiation phase, and the
security layer negotiation phase. In each phase, we will present (if necessary) the ground
model for both client and server sides, that is depicted via the control state ASM, then we
will focus only on refining the rules to clarify ambiguities in the RFCs and Oracle imple-
mentation documentation1. Each refined rule is expressed in AsmetaL. The mapping from
the graphical notation of the control state ASM to the AsmetaL notation is done according
to the mapping shown in Figure 2.5 that is presented in Chapter 2.
7.3.1 The Mechanism Negotiation Phase
Figure 7.1 shows the ground model at the client side for this phase.
Figure 7.1: Client side for mechanism selection phase - ground model
1All the rules for the refined model that is based on RFC 2222/4422 are available in [24], while those for
the refined model which is based on the description of Oracle implementation documentation are available
in [23]
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This figure is a direct interpretation of RFC 2222/4422. The client starts this phase
by sending a request in order to ask the server to send its mechanisms’ list. Whenever
this list is received, the guard ‘At least one mechanism in the list is supported’ checks if
the client can use one or more mechanisms in the received list. If so, the client selects
an acceptable mechanism from the server list and reaches the final state for this phase
‘Sending authentication request’. Otherwise, the client will send an abort response to the
server, and waits for an abort reply from it. When the abort reply is received, the client
aborts this exchange, by entering the Abort state.
The server side for this phase is also based on RFC 2222/4422, see Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Server side for mechanism selection phase - ground model
The ground model depicted in Figure 7.2, schedules the main steps taken by the server
for this phase. Initially, the server keeps waiting at the ‘Waiting for mechanisms list
request’ state until it receives a mechanism list request from the client. When this request
arrives, the server obtains the available mechanisms’ list in order to send it to the client.
After sending this list, the server goes to the final state for this phase, which is Waiting
for authentication request.
It is not clear from Figure 7.1, how the client chooses the desired mechanism. As stated
by RFC 4422 [169], determining the best mechanism is the client’s choice. This is specified
in the r selectmech rule shown in Code 7.1a. In this Code, the mechanism selection is
performed in an interactive manner with the client via the monitored function insertMech-
anism (the monitored function is a function whose value written by the environment of the
machine). The selected mechanism should be any mechanism in the arrived mechanisms’
set, which is represented by the arrivedMechList. An arbitrarily chosen mechanism is stored
in selMech.
On the other hand, the explanation of the Oracle implementation documentation [177]
states that the client selects the best mechanism, depending on the maximum mechanism
SSF and client’s security policy. This can be re-elaborated by refining the rule in Code
184 Farah Al-Shareefi
7.1a into the one shown in Code 7.1b. In the refined rule, we added further modelling
vocabulary. Precisely, let the ssf($m) function be the SSF value for each mechanism $m
in the domain Mechanisms={plain, digestmd, anonymous, external}, and poli-
cies($m) be the security policies set for each mechanism $m, while policies(self) is the secu-
rity policies’ set for client. The 0-ary function self is interpreted by the client agent as itself.
Each policies set can be one or more elements from the domain Policies={noplaintext,
noanonymous, noactive, mutualauth, nodictionary}. The mHasGreatestSSF
function returns true if the selected mechanism has the greatest SSF value. The refined
rule picks the best mechanism from the arrivedMechList, such that the security policies set
of the selected mechanism includes all the elements in the client’s set, and this mechanism
hasan SSF value, which is equal or greater than all the SSF values of the mechanisms that
their sets include the client’s policies set.
rule r s e l e c tmech=
i f conta in s ( arr ivedMechList , insertMechanism ) then
selMech := insertMechanism
endif
Code 13: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
function mHasGreatestSSF ($m in Mechanisms , $c in Cl i en t )=
f o ra l l $x in arr ivedMechList with
( ( $x!=$m) and a l l i n ( p o l i c i e s ( $x ) , p o l i c i e s ( $c ) ) implies s s f ($m)>=s s f ( $x ) )
rule r s e l e c tmech=
choose $m in arr ivedMechList with mHasGreatestSSF ($m, s e l f )=true and
a l l i n ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) ) do
selMech :=$m
Code 14: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
enum domain Mechsasl= {PLAIN | DIGESTMD | ANONYMOUS | EXTERNAL}
stat ic sas lmechs : Cl ient > Powerset ( Mechsasl )
function sas lmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )={PLAIN, EXTERNAL , DIGESTMD}
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := sas lmechs ( s e l f )
(a) The r getmechs rule according to RFC 4422
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
l et ( $ i =0) in
while $i<s i z e ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) do
seq
let ($m=at ( asSequence ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) , i t on ( $ i ) ) ) in
i f ( exist $p in p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) with
conta in s ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , $p )=true ) then
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := in c l ud ing (mList ( $c , s e l f ) ,$m)
endif
endlet
$ i := $ i+1
endseq
endlet
(b) The refined r getmechs rule according to Oracle implementation document
Code 15: The r getmechs rule
(a) The r selectmech rule according to RFC 4422
rule r s e l e c tmech=
i f conta in s ( arr ivedMechList , insertMechanism ) then
selMech := insertMechanism
endif
Code 13: The r Init r of the NS prot col
function mHasGr a estSSF ($m in Mecha i s , $c in Cl i en t )=
f o ra l l $x in arr ivedMechList with
( ( $x!=$m) and a l l i n ( p o l i c i e s ( $x ) , p o l i c i e s ( $c ) ) implies s s f ($m)>=s s f ( $x ) )
rule r s e l e c tmech=
choose $m in arr ivedMechList with mHasGreatestSSF ($m, s e l f )=true and
a l l i n ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) ) do
selMech :=$m
Code 14: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
enum domain Mechsasl= {PLAIN | DIGESTMD | ANONYMOUS | EXTERNAL}
stat ic as lmechs : Cl ient > Powerset ( Mechsasl )
func ion sas lmechs ( $c n Cl i en t )={PLAIN, EXTERNAL , DIGESTMD}
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := sas lmechs ( s e l f )
(a) The r getmechs rule according to RFC 4422
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
l et ( $ i =0) in
while $i<s i z e ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) do
seq
let ($m=at ( asSequence ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) , i t on ( $ i ) ) ) in
i f ( exist $p in p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) with
conta in s ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , $p )=true ) then
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := in c l ud ing (mList ( $c , s e l f ) ,$m)
endif
endlet
$ i := $ i+1
endseq
endlet
(b) The refined r getmechs rule according to Oracle implementation document
Code 15: The r getmechs rule
(b) The refined r selectmech rule according to Oracle implementation document
Code 7.1: The r selectmech rule
On the server side in Figure 7.2, getting the available mechanisms’ list needs elucidation.
As indicated by RFC 4422 [169], the server just advertises the available mechanisms’ list.
This is specified in the r getmechs rule shown in Code 7.2a. In this code, let the mList($c,
self) be a set of t e advertis d mechanisms which will be sent to the $c client. The
saslmechs(self) set contains one or more SASL mechanisms for server use. The server, in
the r getmechs rule, will simply make a copy of all the elements in the saslmechs(self) set
and pass it to the mList($c, self), which is initially empty set, to represent the advertised
mechanisms’ list.
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rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := sas lmechs ( s e l f )
Code 5: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
l et ( $ i =0) in
while $i<s i z e ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) do
seq
let ($m=at ( asSequence ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) ) , i t on ( $ i ) ) ) in
i f ( exist $p in p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) with
conta in s ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , $p )=true ) then
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := in c l ud ing (mList ( $c , s e l f ) ,$m)
endif
endlet
$ i := $ i+1
endseq
endlet
Code 6: The r Initiator of the NS protocol
(a) The r getmechs rule according to RFC 4422
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := sas l echs ( s e l f )
Code 5: The r Initi f t e NS protocol
rule r getmechs ( $c in Cl i en t )=
l et ( $ i =0) in
while $i<s i z e ( sas lmechs ( s e l f ) )
seq
let ($m=at ( asSequence ( sas lmec l f ) ) , i t on ( $ i ) in
i f ( exist $p in p o l i c i e s ( s e l f ) it
conta in s ( p o l i c i e s ($m) , $p ) tr e ) then
mList ( $c , s e l f ) := in c l ud ing ( List ( $c , s e l f ) ,$m)
endif
endlet
$ i := $ i+1
endseq
endlet
Code 6: The r Initiator of the NS protocol(b) The refined r getmechs rule according to Oracle implementation document
Code 7.2: The r getmechs rule
Obtaining the available mechanisms’ list is described in the Oracle implementation
documentation [177], as “The server can call sasl listmech() to get a list of the available
SASL mechanisms that satisfy the security policy”. In this quoted statement, it is not
obvious whether there is a specific policy for the SASL mechanisms and what is meant to
satisfy this policy. In the Java security guide provided by Oracle [178], it says that there is
a particular policy set for each SASL mechanism, such as the PLAIN, EXTERNAL, and
DIGEST-MD5 mechanisms have certain policy sets illustrated in Table 7.1.
Mechanism Policy Set
plain noanonymous
external noplaintext. noactive, nodictionary
digest-md5 noplaintext, noanonymous
Table 7.1: The security policies for authentication mechanisms
As an attempt to understand the exact meaning of ‘satisfy the security policy’, we
analyse the server’s reply (sending the available mechanisms’ list to the client) in some
SASL mechanism examples. For instance, in the DIGEST-MD5 mechanism example [144],
the server sends the {PLAIN, DIGEST-MD5} list. We can see that these two mechanisms
share the nonanonymous policy. This means that the server adopts the nonanonymous
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policy and it sends the mechanisms which satisfy this policy. Similarly, in the EXTERNAL
mechanism example [169], the server sends the {DIGEST-MD5, EXTERNAL}. Again,
these mechanisms in the list share the noplaintext policy, which is supported by the
server. Accordingly, the r getmechs rule in Code 7.2a can be refined into the rule in Code
7.2b.
In the refined r getmechs rule, the server gets a mechanism from the saslmechs for
the server use, which satisfies the following condition: the policy set for this mechanism
contains a policy of the server’s policies set. In other words, the policy set for every
mechanism in the advertised mechanisms’ list supports at least one server’s policy.
7.3.2 The Authentication Negotiation Phase
This phase is the longest phase in SASL. As a result, we divide the ground model for both
client and server into two parts: one for achieving an initial step in this phase, and one for
performing the later step(s). The number of the later steps is determined by the selected
mechanism. In this section, we provide the ground model for achieving only the initial
step by the client and server as this step is not clear, though the ground models of the rest
steps are presented in Appendix C.
Figure 7.3: Client side for performing an initial step in the authentication negotiation
phase - ground model
Figure 7.3 shows the ground model for performing an initial step in this phase by the client.
The client starts this phase checking by the guard ‘Client first and protocol permits’, to
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inspect whether the selected mechanism determines that the client must send the first
response and the protocol allows the client to do that. If so, the client will ‘Get response’
to send it together with authentication command and the chosen mechanism to the server.
Then, the flow goes further to the ‘Mechanism needs send another response’ guard. If this
guard is satisfied, the client will keep waiting for the server authentication data. Otherwise,
the client will wait for an authentication outcome. However, if the guard ‘Client first and
protocol permits’ is not satisfied, the client will send only the authentication command
with the chosen mechanism. Then, the client goes to the ‘Wait challenge’ state, and keeps
waiting for an empty challenge.
On the server side, Figure 7.4 displays the ground model for achieving an initial step
in this phase by the server.
Figure 7.4: Server side for performing an initial step in the authentication negotiation
phase - ground model
In Figure 7.4, the server initiates this phase, when it receives a message from the client.
At the receiving time, the server checks three guards: the message is not an ‘Abort authen-
tication’ response, it ‘Contains authentication command’, and the ‘Selected mechanism is
supported’. When these guards are satisfied, the server checks if the message ‘Carries an
initial response’. If so, the server checks if the mechanism specifies that the server is the
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first, or it specifies that the client is the first but the protocol does not allow for it to be
the first. In case that the mechanism specifies that the server must send the first message,
but the client does, or the protocol does not allow the client to send the message, then
the server sends the server must be the first and enters the ‘Failure’ state, otherwise, it
will process the response by verifying it and determining the next step. When the message
does not have an initial response, the server checks if the ‘server is the first’, to ‘get its
initial challenge’ and sends it to the client. Otherwise, the server just sends an empty
challenge. In both cases, the server goes to the ‘Wait response’ state.
One underspecified aspect of this phase, is the negotiation about using the security
layer and the maximum cipher buffer size, which are involved in the Get response and Get
challenge rules on the client and server sides, respectively. In RFC 4422 [169], it was stated
that when the selected mechanism supports a security layer, then a negotiation about
using this layer must be carried out, but how this negotiation takes place is not defined.
However, RFC 2222 [173] defines this by stating that the negotiation includes exchanging
a bit-mask (1: no security layer, 2: integrity, and 4: privacy), which corresponds to a
security layer level. This bit-mask ignores the confidentiality service.
On the other hand, in the explanation of the Oracle implementation documenta-
tion [177], the SSF value (0: authentication, 1: authentication and integrity, and > 1:
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and the key length), is used instead of a bit-mask.
However, it is not clear how the client and server agree about using a security layer.
The Java security guide provided by Oracle [178] states that the selected mechanism,
when its SSF value is greater than or equal to 1, tells the server to send its supported
Quality of Protection (QOP) list, which includes one or more items from the following:
auth (authentication), auth-int (authentication and integrity), and auth-conf (authen-
tication, integrity, and confidentiality). Later, the client selects a protection value from
this list according to its SSF value, and sends it to the server. The server verifies that the
client’s protection value is within its list, to save the session SSF value which is equivalent
to the client’s protection value. The saved SSF value represents the agreed security layer
service. However, in this guide, there is insufficient detail about how the client and server
determine the maximum buffer size when they agree about using the confidentiality service.
In the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism example [144], it was stated that when the
server sends its supported maximum buffer size (if desired), the client will check the avail-
ability of buffer size value in the received challenge. If it exists, the client will calculate
the size of the buffer for this session, by firstly determining the minimum value of the
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received buffer size and its supported size, then from the determined value, the 16 bytes
are subtracted to produce the buffer size for the current session. If it is not available, the
client will determine that the buffer size is equal to the default value 65536. Following
this description, we present in Code 7.3 the specification of how the client determines the
maximum buffer size.

































































i f conta in s ( rece ivCh ( s e l f ) , ”maxbuf ”)=true then
choose $max in Maxbuf with
eq ( at ( rece ivCh ( s e l f ) , i t on ( indexOf ( rece ivCh ( s e l f ) , ”maxbuf ”)+1) ) , t oS t r i ng ($max) ) do
i f $max<maxBuf ( s e l f ) then
maxBufDetermined:=$max 16
else





Code 7: Specifying the maximum bu↵er size in the client sideCode 7.3: Specifying the maximum buffer size in the client side
In Code 7.3, the receivCh(self) is a sequence of String that represents the received
challenge from the server, the integer domain Maxbuf contains the following possible values
for the buffer’s size {65535, 131071, 262143, 16777215}, and the maxBuf(self) is the client’s
maximum buffer size. First of all, the client checks if the receivCh(self) contains the server’s
maximum buffer size, to calculate the buffer size, or to set it to the default value. Setting
to a default value which is 65535, will be when the server does not send its supported buffer
size, i.e., the receivCh(self) contains the server’s maximum buffer size. Otherwise, the client
chooses an integer value from the Maxbuf domain, since the receivCh(self) is a sequence of
String, which is equal to the string value contained in the receivCh(self). Then the chosen
value is compared with the client’s buffer size to determine the buffer size, which is stored
in maxBufDetermined.
7.3.3 The Security Layer Negotiation Phase
This phase is an optional phase. Performing this phase depends on the negotiation in the
previous phase. Based on RFC 2222 [173], this negotiation includes exchanging a bit-mask
in order to decide on the use of this layer. In case that this layer is agreed upon, then the
messages related to this layer are exchanged between the client and server. Figure 7.5 the
ASM ground model for negotiating the security layer service on the client side.
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Figure 7.5: Client side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on RFC
2222
In Figure 7.5, it is not clear what are the messages that should be exchanged between
the agents to achieve the service of this layer, and how to finish this phase. Furthermore,
the bit-mask does not define the confidentiality service. The server side shares the same
ambiguities for the client side. RFC 2831 for the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism [144]
clearly shows the specification of messages related to achieve integrity and confidentiality
protection. In addition, instead of the bit-mask, the Oracle documentation [177] uses
SSF value to distinctly indicate which layer is negotiated. Furthermore, RFC 4422 [169]
illustrates how to finish this phase. As a result, we specify this phase relying on three
references: the Oracle implementation documentation [177], the RFC 4422 [169], and the
RFC 2831 for the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism [144].
Starting from the client side to clarify this phase, Figure 7.6 illustrates the clarified
ASM ground model for negotiating the security layer service on this side. In this figure,
the client starts this phase by checking the SSF value, that was agreed by both client and
server in the authentication phase. If this value is zero, then the client will reach the final
state Successful. This state indicates that the client has been authenticated successfully,
and there is no security layer. If the SSF value is one, this means that the subsequent
protocol messages must be integrity protected. Therefore, the flow goes to execute the
Get client integrity protected message, to obtain a test message that appends with the
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computed Message Authentication Code (MAC) for the message sequence number and the
message itself [144]. While if the SSF value is greater than one, then the following protocol
messages must be confidentiality protected (encrypted). As a result, the client executes
the Get client confidentiality protected message, to encrypt a test message together with
its computed MAC [144].
Figure 7.6: Client side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on three
references
The encryption is done according to the selected cipher, which is one of the following: rc4-
40 (40 bit key), rc4-56 (56 bit key), rc4 (128 bit key), and aes-ctr (128 bit key). Later, the
client sends the protected message to the server, and changes its state to Waiting for server
test message. Note that, the two consecutive rectangles in this figure, i.e, the Get client
confidentiality protected message and send encoded message are executed sequentially using
seq end seq construct. Whenever the client receives a protected message from the server,
it will check the agreed SSF value. When this value is greater than one, the client will
perform confidentiality verification (decrypt the message, compute the MAC and compare
it with the received one). While, if the SSF value is one, the client will perform integrity
verification (compute the MAC and compare it with the received one). In case that the
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verification succeeds, the client reaches the final state Continue, which means the client can
continue the interactions after SASL. Whereas, the client terminates the connection with
the server and changes its state to Close, when the verification fails. As the ground model
in Figure 7.6, clearly shows how the client uses a security layer service, and how the SSF
value guides the client to determine whether a security layer has been negotiated, we do
not show the refinement for this model. We annotate the main information for specifying
this phase in Figure 7.6.
On the server side, the security layer negotiation, which is shown in Figure 7.7, is similar
to that on the client side. However, the server here keeps waiting for a protected message
from the client before sending its message. Note that, the two consecutive rectangles in
Figure 7.7, i.e, the Get server confidentiality protected message and send protected message
are executed sequentially using seq end seq construct.
Figure 7.7: Server side for security layer negotiation phase - ground model based on three
references
As in this phase we need to encrypt and decrypt the message with regards to a suitable
cryptographic method, we modify our encryption and decryption specification, which is
presented in Chapter 6, such that it takes into account the encryption and decryption key,
and the named of the method for performing the encryption and decryption besides, see
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Code 7.4. In Code 7.4, the method is a cipher method that has been used to encrypt
the plain message. The r Encrypt rule for converting the presented plain message into
an encrypted one using the determined key and method, and the r Decrypt rule which
transforms the encrypted message into a plain text one using a specific key and method.
In other word, the r Encrypt rule generates a new ciphertext, given its plain text, key, and
method, by extending the Cipher domain. While r Decrypt rule choose a ciphertext item
from the Cipher domain, in such a way that this item equals to the given ciphertext, and
the key and the method for this item are equal to the given ones, in order to return the
plain text of this item. If there is no such item, this rule will return undefined output.
dynamic abstract domain Cipher
dynamic abstract domain Key
controlled pla inText : Seq ( S t r ing )
controlled c iphe r : Cipher
controlled key : Cipher > Key
controlled p l a i n : Cipher > Seq ( St r ing )
controlled method : Cipher > St r ing
rule r Encrypt ($m in Seq ( St r ing ) , $k in Key , $method in St r ing )=
choose $c1 in Cipher with ( p l a i n ( $c1 )=$m and key ( $c1 )=$k and method ( $c1 )=$method ) do
c iphe r :=$c1
ifnone
extend Cipher with $c2 do
par
c iphe r :=$c2
p l a i n ( $c2 ) :=$m
method ( $c2 ) :=$method
key ( $c2 ) :=$k
endpar
rule r Decrypt ( $c in Str ing , $k in Key , $method in St r ing )=
choose $c1 in Cipher with ( t oS t r i ng ( $c1 )=$c and $k=key ( $c1 ) and method ( $c1 )=$method ) do
pla inText := p l a i n ( $c1 )
ifnone
pla inText :=undef
Code 8: The r GenerateNc Rule
Code 7.4: Abstract specification for encryption and decryption with respect to the em-
ployed encryption method
7.4 Results and Discussion
The main aim of this chapter is to provide clarification of ambiguities in SASL using
ASMs. Our methodology starts with reflecting the textual description in RFCs, using
ground model notion, then it re-elaborates this description using other document sources
by exploiting the refinement notion. Table 7.2 outlines the main ambiguities that have
been investigated, and the source documents for both the ambiguity itself and its formal
clarified specification.














































SASL mechanism [144], and
RFC 4422 [169]
Table 7.2: The source document for each ambiguity and its formal clarified specification
(1) selection of the best mechanism is ambiguous in RFC 4422 [169], as it just states that
the client selects the best one. We try to elucidate this using the description of the
Oracle implementation [177], which states that the client selects the best mechanism
with the maximum SSF, and according to its security policy;
(2) advertising the available mechanisms’ list is not clear in both RFC 4422, which
only states that the server advertises the list, and the Oracle implementation, which
states that the server advertises the mechanisms that satisfy the security policy. We
convert the informal description of Oracle into a formal one, based on analysing the
server reply in the document sources shown in Table 1. We conclude that satisfying
the security policy means at least one server’s policy must be supported by every
mechanism in the advertised list;
(3) determining the maximum buffer size is under-defined in RFC 4422 [169] and the
Oracle implementation. For explicating that, we use the explanation that is provided
by the DIGEST-MD5 SASL mechanism [144];
(4) using the security layer in RFC 2222 needs more explication, as it states that using
this layer relates to the agreed bit-mask, which does not consider the confidentiality
service. Therefore, we rely on the Oracle implementation, that uses the SSF instead
of a bit-mask, to show when this layer is used. Also, we rely on the DIGEST-MD5
SASL mechanism [144], to show how the client and server negotiate this layer.
This paper shows how the ASM formalism is valuable in clarifying the ambiguity, es-
pecially with its ground model and the refinement notions. The ground model can first
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capture the informal specification in understandable way and at the desired level of details.
Then, it can be evolved via stepwise refinement into a precise and enhanced mathematical
specification. For the reason that we focus on employing the stepwise refinement for ex-
plicating the ambiguous behavioral aspects in the ground model, we have not proven the
model refinement correctness. However, proving the relationship between the ground and
the refined models can be addressed in the future by using the AsmetaRef tool [34], within
ASMETA framework, which automatically facilitates proving the refinement correctness.
As we construct a formal specification and provide links between it and informal or
under-defined resources, we could prove properties of the development specification using
a suitable tool in the ASMETA framework.
In our ASM specification, the timing aspects for SASL are not considered, since neither
of RFC 2222/4422 and Oracle implementation documents give specification for that.
7.5 Related Work
Our work elucidates ambiguities in the informal description for SASL, based on the ASM
method. Therefore, in this section we discuss other work related to either elucidating am-
biguity or to the ASM method. In [45], the ASM formalism is used to get a formal model of
the Kerberos Authentication System which is based on the Needham and Schroeder authen-
tication protocol. The formal model is used as a basis to locate the minimum assumptions
to guarantee the correctness of the system and to analyse its security weaknesses.
In [72], the ASM ground models of a content adaptation system employed for the
interactions between different client devices and the Cloud, is presented. This work is
extended in [37], by refining the initial model into a more detailed one, through focusing
on the interactions between the client and the middleware server to retrieve information
relating to the client’s device. Furthermore, the modelling process has been supported by
validation and verification activities which are integrated within the ASMETA framework.
In [202], abstract encryption and decryption is specified using the language AsmL. This
specification is based on the object-oriented features and constructs, and thus it diverts
from the theoretical model of ASMs.
The researchers in [49] use Higher-order logic (HOL4) to develop a rigorous post-hoc
specification for TCP, UDP, and the Sockets API, that reflects the behavior of different im-
plementations, include: FreeBSD 4.6, Linux 2.4.20-8, and Windows XP SP1. They validate
their specification against several thousand traces captured from these implementations,
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to test whether they meet this specification. This paper is notable in the context of our
work as its authors are motivated by increasing clarity and precision over ambiguous in-
formal specifications of the RFC, that may result in inconsistent implementations. In this
paper, we do not consider validating that the implementation meets the specification. We
focus on clarifying ambiguities in the RFC description, and on elucidating uncertainty in
the textual explanation of the implementation. Furthermore, our specification is expressed
using the ASM method, because it is accessible, as it requires a minimum of notational
coding, unlike HOL4, which requires extensively annotating the mathematical definitions
side-by-side with informal specification [49].
7.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have provided the ASM specifications that elucidate ambiguities in the SASL frame-
work. We have focused on the ambiguous parts in RFC 2222/4422 and Oracle implementa-
tion documents, including mechanism selection, providing mechanisms’ list, defining when
and how the security layer can be used, and determining the maximum cipher buffer size.
We have showed how the comprehensible specification has been achieved based on two
ASM notions: a ground model and stepwise refinement. The ground model enabled us to
reflect the desired behavior, which is explained in RFCs, in an understandable way. While
the stepwise refinement helped us to explicate the ambiguous part of the desired behavior
in an accurate way, using other document sources to inform us.
We convert the informal specification into formal one by expressing it in the ASM
formalism, which is mathematically well-defined, precise, and easily understood.
To further our research we are planning to consider the security of the SASL, to show
whether the SASL specification is secure by using a suitable verification technique.
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Research
Works
This chapter presents an overall summary of the work described in this thesis, a review of
the main ndings in terms of the research question and associated research issues identied
in Chapter 1, and some potentially fruitful directions for future research.
8.1 Summary
In this thesis, we have proposed two systematic methodologies to analyse safety-critical
systems and security protocols based on combining a formal method with an informal safety
analysis technique. In particular, during analysing safety aspects of critical systems, we
combined the ASM supported model-checking method with the safety requirements yield-
ing from applying the STPA technique to the system under analysis. While when analysing
security aspects of protocols, we combined the ASM supported simulation method with
the attack types obtained from a developed STPA technique, called FATI. Also, when
using the SASL example for protocols whose informal requirements contain ambiguities
and hidden details, we showed how we could obtain precise specifications that clarify these
ambiguities and hidden details based on employing two ASM notions: ground model and
stepwise refinement.
After the introductory chapter, the next three chapters overviewed the necessary back-
ground and the related work to the areas of our contributions, namely, the Abstract State
Machines, the safety and security analysis techniques, and security protocols. Our contri-
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butions were covered in chapters 5, 6, and 7 detailing the proposed analysis methodologies
and clarifying the requirements for SASL.
In more detail, Chapter 5 presented the methodology that combines the ASM method
with the STPA technique to analyse critical systems and develop safe designs for them.
The fundamental idea was to link the model-checking based verification verification based
supported by the ASM method with the STPA requirements which need to be formalized.
The STPA requirements were formalized using the if and only if, and disjunction operators.
In comparison to related work [17, 19] our formalization process captured the temporal
aspects of the STPA requirements adequately and reduced the number of requirements to
be verified. Our analysis methodology also conducted the simulation and validation activ-
ities before moving into the more expensive activity, which is verification, to gain enough
confidence in the specified model. The effectiveness of this methodology was demonstrated
by indicating the main unsafe aspects and conditions in the insulin pump control and train
door controller systems. This motivated the development of another methodology that
adopts a similar combination idea but in a way benefiting the security protocols.
Chapter 6 considered the proposed methodology for analysing security protocols. It
imitated the previous methodology for critical systems but it replaced the STPA safety
requirements with possible attack types and the model-checking with simulation in the
verification process. The possible attack types relied on a proposed method called Flaws
and Attack Types Identification (FATI). The FATI method is STPA-like as it is based on
a set of queries to identify the possible protocol security flaws and their related attack
types, in particular, liveness and freshness flaws that can be exploited by MITM, REFL,
Simple REPL, DoS REPL, and INTRL attacks. Compared with the related work in [108],
FATI is more specific and accurate at identifying flaws by showing their nature (freshness
or liveness) and their positions (at which protocol action they occurs). The identified
attack types were employed to guide the simulation-based attack scenarios process to look
only for these attack types upon protocol under analysis. We cannot claim any form
of completeness for our methodology, though, we can say that it does not miss attacks
against the protocol examples we had analysed by simulating the specified scenarios for
the external attacks, including MITM, REFL, DoS REPL, Simple REPL, and INTRL.
The main limitation with critical systems and security protocols analysis methodologies
is the lack of automation for eliciting safety requirements and for identifying the flaws and
attack types, and this can be considered as future work.
Finally, chapter 7 covered the ASM specifications that elucidate the main ambiguities in
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the informal requirements for SASL case study. However, these specifications need further
future work in concern with verifying whether they meet some properties that SASL should
guarantee.
8.2 Main Findings and Contributions
This section outlines the main findings and contributions from the work presented in this
thesis. The principal motivation for the work was represented in a single research question
as follows: Can ASM be combined with STPA to analyse safety aspects of critical systems
and security aspects of protocols?. The answer to this question required providing answers
to a number of supplementary questions. Thus, this section is arranged by presenting the
main findings in view of each supplementary questions, and then in terms of the main
research question as follows:
(1) Can the STPA technique help to improve the ASM specifications concerning safety
issues? How can we formulate the STPA safety requirements to be used in further
verification?. The STPA technique can help to improve the ASM specification by
feeding the STPA safety requirements to the model-checker which produces guided
counter-example in case of violation. The four STPA requirements which are or-
dinarily represented by using ‘provided’, ‘not provided’, ‘provided too early’, and
‘provided too late’ phrases, were formulated into one formula using the ↔, and the
∨ operators. By the ↔ operator, we put a strong condition on providing the action,
i.e., the action will not be provided with other combinations or with the later/earlier
satisfying determined combinations. Furthermore, the ∨ together with ↔ help to
reduce the number of properties to be verified. The STPA requirements aided at
improving the ASM model for train door controller example by highlighting the con-
dition in which the model does not consider cancelling the open action after the door
is fully opened, and for insulin pump control system, by highlighting the conditions
wherein the model delivers a manual dose even if it exceeds the available insulin, and
the model does not give an alarm if the available insulin in the reservoir is less than
the sum of 4 maximum single doses.
(2) Can the STPA technique be developed to analyse security protocols?. To answer this
question and based on the attacks reviewed in Chapter 4 together with the main flaws
they had exploited, we developed FATI method which is an inspired form of STPA
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that asks queries on each protocol action to determine the possible protocol flaws
and attack types. We found that direct flaws identification can be realized by asking
queries about participants’ liveness and messages’ freshness. The reason for choosing
these two queries is the fact that attacks against security protocols essentially aim
to compromise the authentication and/or secrets distribution goals. We developed
guidelines to answer these questions based on the presence of an encrypted sent
message containing a freshness component which is generated by the receiver and
whose association is clearly stated. We have shown how the FATI method helps to
determine the possible flaws and attack types for AS RPC and NSPK protocols.
(3) Given the answer to the above, in which analysis activity (simulation, verification),
should the outcomes of the developed STPA technique be considered to serve the anal-
ysis of security protocols?. The answer is simulation because the efficacy of its use
to analyse security protocols has been proven in [129] with respect to the designed
attack scenarios. However, it needs a guidance in deciding to simulate which attack
scenario instead of simulating all the scenarios even those not definitely compromis-
ing the protocol under analysis. Therefore, we developed security protocols analysis
methodology that applies the FATI method first to produce the expected attack
types, then it performs simulation using scenarios specified for these types. Our
methodology extended the simulation based method in [129] by reducing the number
of explored runs more through decreasing the number of intruders generated messages
via considering: the expected message content and type matching. Furthermore, the
algebraic property for commutative encryption has been dealt with during analysing
a protocol that depends on that property. Our methodology has been successfully
detected known attacks against five protocols including NSPK, TP, AS RPC, DS,
and KSL protocols.
(4) How to clarify ambiguous requirements for security protocols using the ASM method?.
The issue of imprecision and ambiguities in textual requirements of security protocols
was shown with respect to the Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) case
study which is stated in RFCs documentations. Addressing that issue was through
the implementation of two ASM essential notions: ground model and stepwise re-
finement. The ground model notion reflects the textual description in a concise but
precisely enough manner, while the stepwise refinement notion allows us to accu-
rately explicate and re-elaborate under-defined aspects in the ground model. The
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uncertainty of textual explanation for SASL was elucidated starting with capturing
the informal description of the RFC document via the ASM ground model, then
the potential ambiguous description was explicated depending on other document
sources by using ASM refinement. The ASM notions helped to achieve compressible
specifications for the following ambiguous behavioural parts for SASL: mechanism
selection, providing mechanisms list, defining when and how the security layer can
be used, and determining the maximum cypher buffer size. In addition, the main
differences between RFCs and the Oracle documents were highlighted.
Returning to the main research question of this thesis, Can ASM be combined with
STPA to analyse safety aspects of critical systems and security aspects of protocols?,
it can be concluded that the combination of the ASM method and the STPA tech-
nique is possible straightaway in the safety-critical system, while this combination is
possible in security protocols only after modifying the STPA technique in a way that
helps to identify the possible flaws and the expected attack types against protocols.
As STPA technique was designed for safety, so no surprise that it directly works for
safety-critical systems. Furthermore, the STPA charming feature of inspecting how
each action affects the whole system function can be utilized for security protocols,
though, its focus mainly on timing conditions affects its applicability to protocols.
The ASM method was a good choice for this combination due to its generality feature
which is associated with simple syntax and accurate semantics to specify any system.
Also, it is equipped with automatic analysis tools that facilitate our analysis goal for
both critical systems and security protocols.
The main contributions for the work presented in this thesis are restated from Chap-
ter 1 as follows:
1) A systematic methodology that combines the ASM method and the STPA tech-
nique for analysing and developing safety-critical systems.
2) The FATI method for identifying the possible protocol flaws and attack types.
3) The analysis methodology for security protocols that guides the simulation based
attack scenarios with the identified attack types.
4) The precise specifications for SASL.
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8.3 Future Work
During the research work of this thesis, a number of possible directions for future work have
been identified. Below is a list for some of these directions concerning both safety-critical
systems and security protocols.
• Precise formal semantics for STPA requirements elicitation process which can be
used to build an automatic tool to support this process.
• Extending and formalizing the STPA requirements in terms of Allens interval algebra
[27] which is a set of thirteen binary relationships between pairs of intervals, including
proceed, meet, overlap, during, begin, end, and equal. These relationships can be used
instead of ‘too early’ and ‘too late’ to elicit requirements about interval actions.
• An automatic tool for producing the ASM specification of the protocol under analysis
directly from its abstract specification which is written in Common Syntax. This will
greatly contribute to simplify the modelling and analysis processes.
• Considering the specifications of other scenarios for unaddressed attacks, such as a
type-flaw attack in which honest participants misinterpret the message types, and a
collaborative attack where multiple intruders can launch an attack together.
• Verifing the SASL specifications against the RFC requirements and validate these
specifications against the traces produced from the Oracle implementation, using a




The Application of Safety and
Security Techniques
This appendix explains the principle work of safety and security analysis techniques by
applying the safety techniques to the Train Door Controller (TDC) example [227], while
the security analysis techniques have been applied to our given example. This example
is an authentication protocol for two participants: initiator and responder. The protocol
aims to authenticate the responder to the initiator through exchanging two messages. In
the first message, the initiator sends its identity together with a randomly chosen nonce
to the responder, i.e., the initiator tells the responder, This is my identity and I want to
communicate with you. The nonce is my challenge. Upon receipt, the responder encrypts
the nonce with a secret key shared between it and the initiator. Once the second message
is decrypted and the nonce checked by the initiator, this will confirm that the responder
is an authenticated participant. We call this protocol is a Single Authentication Protocol
(SAP).
Safety Analysis Techniques Below are the safety analysis techniques that have been
described in Chapter 3.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Figure A.1 shows an example of FTA for Train Door Con-
troller system from Chapter 2, which has a door that may accidentally crush a person.
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Figure A.1: Example FTA diagram
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA). Table A.1 presents an example FMECA















The system must be
provided with more













must be warned at
this situation
Table A.1: Example FMECA worksheet
HAZards and OPerability Analysis (HAZOP). The HAZOP analysis worksheet for
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Table A.2: Example HAZOP worksheet
Security Analysis Techniques Below are the security analysis techniques that have
been described in Chapter 3.
Attack Tree (AT). The attack tree for the single authentication protocol is constructed
with a goal of breaching the authentication, see Figure A.2.
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Figure A.2: An AT example
Vulnerability Identification and Analysis (VIA). The VIA process is applied to the
single authentication protocol. The first step of this process is identifying the high
level functional requirements. These requirements for the single authentication pro-
tocol are:
• The none and the initiator’s identity must be sent to the responder.
• The responder should securely send back an encrypted nonce to the initiator.
• The initiator approves that the responder is an authenticated participant.
The next setp is analysing each requirement separately. The analysis for the first
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Requirements Analysis and Elicitation (REA). We apply the REA tree process to
the single authentication protocol, see Figure A.3. The root for the tree in Figure
A.3 tree is: The authentication is not guaranteed, which is obtained by negating the
main protocol goal. The oval shape in this tree represents the assumption which is
used for the analysis.
(D) The responder should 
send a hash of its message to 
the initiator to detect 
corruption
The participants are not 




The freshness of 
the message is 
not ensured
(P): A better origin check 
should be performed by the 
initiator
Or 
gate The authentication 
does not succeed
The initiator received 
fake message
The liveness of the 
responder cannot be 








There is no control on the 
network
There is no restriction on 
the attacker’s actions
A breach of authentication 
is not detectable
(D) The responder should 
send a hash of its message to 
the initiator to detect 
corruption
The responder sent its 
message to another participant 
The attacker intercepts 





(D) The identities of the 
initiator and the responder 
should be explicitly stated 
in the responder’s message
Figure A.3: REA tree analysis for the requirement: The authentication is not guaranteed
Appendix B
The Corresponding Requirements
for the IPCS Scenarios
This appendix details, in Tables B.1 and B.2, the informal requirements which correspond
to the scenarios that have been used to validate the model for the IPCS, and the main
values that have been checked through these scenarios besides.
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Scenario
no.
Corresponding Requirements Checked Values
s0
No insulin dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value is
less than the minimum safe limit
The dose=0 when the
current glucose
value is 4, i.e,
cR=4 ((cR=4)<(sMin=6))
s1
The minimum dose must be
delivered when the current
glucose value is greater than the
maximum safe limit, the glucose
level is stable, and the cumulative
dose is less than the maximum
daily dose
The dose=1 when the
current glucose
value is 16, i.e, cR=16
((cR=16)>(sMax=14))
and sugar level is stable
cR=pR=16, where pR
is a reading 10 minutes
before
s2
If the current glucose value is
greater than the maximum safe
limit, the glucose level is
increasing, the rounded division
of the glucose level by the
maximum single dose is greater
than zero, and the cumulative
dose is less than the maximum
daily dose then the delivered dose
must be equal to the rounded
division result
The dose=round((cR-pR)/4)





If the current glucose value is
greater than the maximum safe
limit, and the glucose level is
increasing, the rounded division
of the glucose level on the
maximum single dose is equal to
zero, and the cumulative dose is
less than the maximum daily dose
then the delivered dose must be
equal to the minimum dose






No insulin dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value
is greater than the maximum safe
limit, the glucose level is
declining, and the decrease rate
is rising




the decrease rate is rising
((cR=17)-(pR=18))<=
((pR=18)-(oR=19)),
where oR is the reading
20 minutes before
s5
Minimum dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value
is greater than the maximum
safe limit, the glucose level is
declining, the decrease rate is
declining, and the cumulative
dose is less than the maximum
daily dose









No insulin dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value
is within the safe limits, and the
glucose level is steady or declining
The dose=0 when the
(cR=13)>=(sMin=6), and
(cR=13)<=(sMax=14),
and glucose level is satble
(cR=13)<=(pR=13)





Corresponding Requirements Checked Values
s7
No insulin dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value
is within the safe limits, the
glucose level is rising, but the
increase rate is declining
The dose=0 when the
(cR=13)>=(sMin=6), and
(cR=13)<=(sMax=14),
and glucose level is
increasing
(cR=13)>=(pR=12), and




Minimum dose must be delivered
when the current glucose value is
within the safe limits, the glucose
level is rising, the increase rate is
rising, the rounded division of the
glucose level on the maximum
single dose is equal to zero, and
the cumulative dose is less than
the maximum daily dose
The dose=1 when the
(cR=12)>=(sMin=6), and
(cR=12)<=(sMax=14),
and glucose level is
increasing
(cR=12)>=(pR=10), and





If the current glucose value is
within the safe limits, the
glucose level is rising, the
increase rate is rising, the
rounded division of the glucose
level on the maximum single
dose is greater than zero, and the
cumulative dose is less than the
maximum daily dose then the
delivered dose must be equal





and glucose level is
increasing
(cR=14)>=(pR=9), and





If the summation of the
computed dose plus the
current cumulative
dose is greater than the
maximum dose per day,
then the delivered dose
must be equal to subtraction
the cumulative dose from the








mDD is the maximum





The delivered dose must
be equal to the computed
dose, if delivering it will
not exceed the maximum
daily dose, and the
computed dose itself is less








where mSD is the
maximum single dose
s12
If the summation of the
computed dose plus the
current cumulative is
less than the maximum
dose per day, and the
computed dose itself is
greater than the maximum
dose per delivering then
the delivered dose must be
equal to the maximum dose
per day






Table B.2: Corresponding requirements of the successful scenarios for the IPCS case study-
Part 2
Appendix C
The Ground model for the Rest
Steps of the Second Phase for
SASL
This appendix presents the ground models for the rest steps performed by both client and
server for SASL example in the authentication negotiation phase.
Client-Side. Figure C.1 shows the ground model for performing the rest steps in the
authentication negotiation phase. The client starts that when it receives a challenge from
the server. If so, the client will check if it is waiting for one of the following: outcome,
AuthData, abortReply, or addAuthData. When it is waiting for outcome, i.e., the outcome
of sending the authentication command together with the selected mechanism and the
initial response, the client will check whether it received a successful outcome or not. If
not, the client goes to the ‘Failure’ state. While if it is successful, the client inspects
that the selected mechanism supports the security layer and the quality of the protection
field in the challenge contains auth-int or auth-conf, to goes to the security layer phase;
otherwise, the client goes to the ‘Successful’ state to indicate that the authentication
phase is finished successfully.
When the client is waiting for authentication data (AuthData), then the client will
implement the ‘Challenge processing’ rule to process the received data, which we will
detail it down. While in case that it is waiting for an abort reply ‘abortReply’, as it
sent in the mechanism negotiation phase an abort response when there is no supported
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mechanism by it in the received list, the client will check if it is received an abort reply
challenge. If so, then the client goes to the ‘Abort’ state; otherwise, it will return back
to the ‘Wait challenge’ state.
In case that the client is waiting for additional authentication data (addAuthData), the
client will inspect whether the received challenge contains additional data. if so, the
client will verify them, when the verification output is successful, the client checks that
the additional authentication data is attached with successful authentication outcome.
If true, the client goes to the security layer phase, but if it is not attached, the client
sends an empty response to the server and waits for an authentication outcome from the
server. When the received challenge does not contain additional authentication data or
it contains that but the verification of data failed, the client sends an abort reply to the
server.
The Challenge processing rule is shown in Figure C.2. The client processes the receiver
challenge by firstly checking that this challenge is an Abort reply, Server first, or Failure
decoding, in order to release the connection and go to the ‘Abort’ state. When the
challenge is not of any the previous types, the client makes sure that it must process
the first challenge. If so, the client checks if it receives a challenge indicating that the
server does not support the mechanism that has been selected by the client. When
this indication is received, the client will select another mechanism and send another
authentication command by repeating the initial step in the authentication negotiation
phase. When the received challenge does not contain unsupported mechanism, the client
checks if it is an empty challenge, then it sends its initial response and it waits for the
authentication outcome when the mechanism does not need more authentication data;
otherwise, it waits for an authentication challenge. In case that the client is not waiting
for an empty or the first challenge, then the mechanism must be checked whether it needs
to very the receiver challenge. If true, then the client verifies the received challenge. If
the challenge is not authenticated, then the client sends an abort reply. While, when it is
authenticated or the mechanism does not require to perform the verification process, the
client sends a response to the server and waits for an authentication challenge when there
are more challenges to exchange. However, when the client must wait for a last challenge
from the server, then this challenge must be either an additional authentication data or
authentication outcome depending on whether the mechanism supports the additional
authentication data or not, respectively.
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Figure C.1: Client side for performing rest steps in the authentication negotiation phase -
ground model
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Figure C.2: The Challenge processing rule - ground model
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Server-Side . Figure C.3 shows the ground model for performing the rest steps in
the authentication negotiation phase. The server starts these steps when it receives a
response from the client. At receiving the time, the server checks if the response is an
‘Abort authentication’, then the server in parallel sends an abort reply and releases the
connection to enter the ‘Abort’ state. However, when the received response is empty
and the mechanism specifies that the server must wait for an empty response, the server
will send a successful outcome and go to the security layer negotiation phase. In case
that the mechanism does not specify that the server must wait for an empty challenge,
the server will send a failure outcome and go to the Failure’ state. when the reserver
does not receive an empty or abort authentication response, it will call the ‘Response
processing’ rule to handle the received response.
Figure C.3: Server side for performing rest steps in the authentication negotiation phase -
ground model
The Response processing rule is shown in Figure C.4. The server processes the received
response by firstly decoding this response. When the server fails to decode the receiver
response, it will in parallel send failure decoding challenge to the client and release the
connection to enter the ‘Abort’ state. In case that the server succeeds at decoding the
response, it will verify the response. When the verification failed, the server sends failure
outcome to the client, releases the connection, and enter the Failure’ state. However,
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when the verification succeeded, the server checks if the mechanism determines to send
a challenge. If so, the server sends the challenge and enters the ‘Wait response’ state.
When the mechanism does not determine to send a challenge, the server checks that
the mechanism does not require to send addition authentication data, or it requires
that but the protocol does not permit, then it sends successful outcome and goes to the
security layer negotiation phase. While when the mechanism requires to send addition
authentication data and the protocol permits to perform that, then the server sends
additional authentication data to the client and goes to the ‘Wait response’ state.
Figure C.4: The Response processing rule - ground model
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